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Bonum est homini ut eum veritas vincat volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vancat
invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantum sive confitentum.

S. AUG. EPIST. CCXXXVIII. AD. PASCENT.

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THE CHURCH AND THE PRINCES OF EUROPE.

A RETROSPECT.

Aurelii Augustini De Civitate Dei. Libri xxii. Parisiis, 1841.
Histoire de la Papauté, par Francis Lacombe. Paris: Adrien Le Clere
et Cie, 1867.

WHAT causes have chiefly contributed to bring about the visible decline of the Church's influence in this age? How is it that the rulers of Europe in our day have come to look on her with indifference, if not distrust? These are important questions, and in thoroughly studying them, we may detect the fallacy of the supposition, too often indulged in at this time, that it has been the fault of the chief pastors of the Church, in past ages and in our own. The beauty of the Bride of Christ is so dazzling, that, unable to bear its splendor, the eyes of her adversaries often drop down from her face to her feet; and their hearts rejoice if they can succeed in detecting on the hem of her garment any dust or stain, which, expanded by the power of a wicked imagination, seems to them to cover her whole person, and change the Heavenly Queen into a frail and faithless daughter of Eve.

This fallacy must be done away with. Consequently, this paper will offer a retrospect embracing a considerable part of the Church's history. A general outline of it, however, will be sufficient; and if it be accurately drawn the picture will be correct, though devoid of details and of color.

Two preliminary remarks will render the task easy, and avoid

the necessity of lengthy discussions. The first may be stated thus: The decline of the influence of the Church, and the unmistakable opposition of Christian princes, so called, had been foreseen long before, and predicted, independently of prophecy, by the anticipation of logical sequence from well-ascertained premises; all to the Church's honor, and constituting a complete justification before the fact. Yes, several great and holy men, ages ago, announced it; but particularly St. Augustine, whose most striking words will be quoted as much *in extenso* as a brief discussion permits. In the second place, the Catholic Church having been constituted by her Divine Founder so as to depend altogether on a visible and all-powerful centre—the Papacy—the only question to be examined reduces itself to an inquiry into the causes of the constant opposition between Rome and the secular rulers of Europe. This inquiry can be made within the limits assigned to a Review article.

I. St. Augustine, in his great work, *De Civitate Dei* (lib. xviii., c. 52), examines, first, the truth of the assertion of many Christian writers in his time, that there had been only ten persecutions of the Church from Nero to Diocletian; which had been typified, as they thought, by the ten plagues of Egypt; and that henceforth there would not be any other until the last persecution by Antichrist. The holy Doctor proves that this historic generalization, although plausible, and to many Catholics of that epoch satisfactory, is nevertheless untrue. No analogy, he says, can be drawn between the persecutions of the Christian Church by infidel princes and the plagues of Egypt, which were in fact directed, not against the people of God, but against its enemies. Later on in the volume, reasoning from the past and from what was taking place in his day, with regard to the propagation of the faith in infidel countries, he concludes that persecutions will continue until the end of time, at least in places not brought under the yoke of Christ; that at the end of the world only will all countries be evangelized. This, he thinks, is foreshadowed by the Gospel parable of the tares and the wheat growing together in the same field until the day of judgment.

This first remark, however, of the Bishop of Hippo, though it has some reference to our present question, is not altogether pertinent to it. We must examine the causes of the opposition to the Church, on the part not of infidels and idolaters, but of so-called Christian princes and believers. This St. Augustine attempts to do, after discussing for a moment the general question of good and evil in this world (lib. xx., c. 2). He there briefly observes, that "good men are sometimes miserable and bad men happy." Often, however, "*et malis mala eveniunt et bonis bona proveniunt.*" "From which it seems as if there were no uniform rule followed

in this world by Providence. Yet God is supreme virtue, wisdom, and justice, in whom there can be no weakness, no thoughtlessness, no iniquity. A wise man, consequently, will learn from it not to attach too much importance to the good and evil things which are common to good and bad men. But when the day of the final judgment shall come, not only the last decision will appear perfectly just, but whatever has been permitted to take place in this world, shall also be judged to have happened justly." This may not please modern atheists, and Mr. John S. Mill, were he living, would not, probably, be satisfied with this general answer. But the opinions of atheists are not worthy of much consideration. Those who are not atheists will undoubtedly find weighty matter for reflection in this doctrine of St. Augustine.

In the seventh chapter of the same book, however, a great step in advance is taken by the learned African Doctor. He begins by discussing a well-known passage of the Apocalypse (ch. 20), where it is said that an angel was sent to bind Satan, and cast him into the abyss, and leave him there a thousand years, during which the saints were to reign with Christ. At the end of this period of time the great Tempter was to be unbound, and left free during three years and a half. In this St. Augustine saw the future history of the Church, and conceived therefrom the great ideas which he afterwards developed.

It is known that several Fathers of the Church and ecclesiastical writers have attempted, many of them with small success, to interpret this sublime but very obscure book of St. John. It is useless to refer to the numberless essays of the kind, written within the last half century or previously. But whoever reads the explanation of this chapter by St. Augustine, will admire the simplicity, naturalness, and admirable adaptation of it to our age in particular. The object here, however, is not to examine how far his exegesis can be adopted. We merely look at the ideas of the author with regard to the future history of the Church; and no one will refuse to admit that he has admirably foretold what our ancestors have seen, and what we ourselves witness every day.

He thinks that, in speaking of a thousand years, during which "Satan was to be bound, and the saints were to reign on earth with Christ," St. John meant simply an indefinite period of time, extending from the first propagation of Christianity, when holiness began at last to dwell on earth—*regnum sanctorum cum Christo*—to the epoch of the unbinding of Satan previous to the coming of Antichrist. It is in fact the whole history of the Church except the last catastrophe. This present age is comprised in it. It is evident that St. Augustine entirely discards not only the harsh millenarianism condemned by the Church at its first appearance in the second

and third centuries, but also the milder opinion of a great number of good Christians whom the Church has not forbidden to expect that Christ will actually come and reign visibly on earth during a thousand years, previous to the last resurrection and judgment.

In the impossibility of giving the whole explanation of St. Augustine, we are obliged to confine ourselves to a mere sketch of his ideas. The simplest way of doing this is to develop briefly with him the short passage of St. John on which he comments, following strictly the order of the Scripture text.

First, therefore, what is the binding of Satan during those thousand years, if the time extends from the preaching of the Apostles to the last persecution of Antichrist? Is he bound now? Was he bound in the sixteenth century when Protestantism broke loose? Yes; because, says St. Augustine, when he is unbound at the end, he is let free to seduce all nations, *ut seduceret omnes gentes*; therefore, the great thing which really binds him is the impossibility of his accomplishing this universal seduction. He is thus bound, only because he is less powerful than he was before Christ came, and much less powerful than he will be at the end. But that in this state of bondage he seduces many, and thus he makes them partakers of his own eternal damnation, is known to all. And "those," declares St. Augustine, "who thus openly embrace his cause, though they appeared to belong to us at first, had, however, no real claim to that privilege." For as St. John says (1 Ep. ii. 19): *Ex nobis exierunt, sed non erant ex nobis; nam si fuissent ex nobis, mansissent utique nobiscum.*

The second thing to be considered is the meaning of the reign of Christ with His Saints during this indefinite millennium. It is in considering this in the light under which St. Augustine views it, that the reader will understand the right St. Augustine has to be considered as a revealer of futurity. He, certainly, is not an inspired prophet like David and Isaias; but he is a profound thinker, and, by the strength of his reason, supported by the text of Holy Scripture, can foresee future events. The reign of Christ, he says, is the strict keeping by many of the commandments of God, by which holiness comes to prevail in the hearts of a great number of people. Has not God chosen to Himself a peculiar people over whom He rules and who accept cheerfully His government? Do not we who live so long after St. Augustine, know that it has been so in all ages, even the most corrupt and degraded?

The *Saints*, as he explains in a remarkable passage, are those who succeed each other on earth; new ones being successively and constantly born, baptized, and moulded by the Church according to the great pattern of all virtues, Christ Himself. At every epoch there is a new generation of them to replace those who die and go

to their reward in heaven. The nature of this reign of Christ is more particularly explained in the ninth chapter of the twentieth book of *De Civitate Dei*. It consists in the observance of the commandments of God, the smallest as well as the greatest, so that "the justice of the Christian is above that of the Scribe and the Pharisee;" so that the Christian, according to St. Paul, "looks to the things on high where Christ sits at the right hand of His Father."

Whilst Christ reigns thus in all those who follow Him, that is, in the true members of the Church, the Church herself reigns with Christ; because, even on earth, according to Scripture *judicium datum est sibi*. The Saviour besides said to His Apostles, *quæ ligaveritis in terra ligata erunt in cælo*, etc. (Matt. xviii. 18). The Saints in heaven, also, form but one body with the Church on earth, who makes mention of them at the altar of God.

Seated, therefore, as a Queen, the Bride of Christ endeavors to establish in all men the reign of her Spouse. She does it in two ways, and, consequently, meets with two kinds of opposition, and these are to continue until the end of time. She has, first, the exterior mission of converting the world. This was begun originally by the Apostles; it has been going on from their time to ours, and is to continue until the end of time, when the Gospel shall have been preached *per totam terram*. This stupendous work of evangelization must constantly meet with fierce opposition from without, that is, from pagan and infidel princes and peoples. This kind of persecution is always open, above board, and employs the usual means of tyranny, namely, the sword, the rack, and other most cruel tortures ending always in death. The reader need not be reminded that this part of the prediction of St. Augustine has been fulfilled in all ages, and continues to be fulfilled to the letter in our day. It is now at the eastern edge of Asia that the process is going on under our eyes, and we have only to read the letters written by Catholic missionaries from China, Japan, Corea, Tongkin, Cochin China, and other places, to see that the work of evangelization is accompanied with open persecution by infidel rulers, as it was in the times of Decius, Severus, and Diocletian. But this is not exactly included in the present investigation, the object of which is to see how within the material kingdom of Christ, that is, the visible Church, persecution must always go on, stirred up by some of her own children. This is the main point we propose to consider.

How is it that the Church, all intent on establishing the reign of Christ in the hearts of her spiritual offspring, meets with opposition from them, finds enemies among them, so that her influence is curtailed by them, her power sought to be taken from her, and she is reduced at last to the condition of a captive in the hands of pretended friends, as is happening in our own day? Yes, the same

men who thus persecute her belong to her by baptism, even by belief to some extent, by exterior connection at least, though they can scarcely be said to belong to her by their works. St. Augustine tells us that they are represented in the Gospel by the tares, *zizania*, which Satan, *homo inimicus*, has sowed in the midst of the wheat, and which will continue to grow along with it until the time of the harvest, when God shall command his angels to winnow the wheat and cast the chaff into the fire.

This phenomenon—which existed already in the time of St. Augustine, as he often comments upon it, was to continue during the thousand years or indefinite millennium, and almost to the end of the world—is easily explained by the open refusal of a number of the children of the Church to have the reign of Christ established in their hearts. Consequently, they turn against their mother as against an enemy, and openly exclaim: “We do not want her to rule over us,” *nolumus hanc regnare super nos*. And to show that St. Augustine regarded this rebellion of unworthy Catholics as a perpetual feature of the Church in all ages to come, and considered the continual vexations of bad Christians as deadly an opposition as the open persecutions of infidels, we have only to quote a few words of his comment on this short passage of the Apocalypse: *Si qui non adoraverunt bestiam, nec imaginem ejus, nec acceperunt inscriptionem in fronte aut in manu sua*. “This,” he says, “must be understood *de vivis ac mortuis*, of men actually living in our time, and of those who have died before us.” . . . But what is this *bestia*? Although this is a question of importance and requires deep investigation, it can be said, without fear of going in the least against faith, that it is the city of the impious, the mass of unbelievers, always opposed to the faithful people, to “the City of God.” They are those who have never belonged to the Church by baptism. “Its *image*,” however, seems to me to be its *personation* on the part of those men who profess to believe, and yet live as if they did not. They pretend to be what they are not, and they are called Christians although they do not bear the true stamp of Christianity, but only a false image of it. For to the same *bestia* belong not only the open enemies of the name of Christ and of His most glorious city, but also the tares, *zizania*, which are to be gathered up at the end of time, and only then separated from the kingdom of Christ, which is the Church. Thus bad Christians often *personate* open infidels by persecuting the Church of Christ, and enlisting themselves in the ranks of her enemies, although by baptism they ought to be her friends.

Nothing can be clearer than these ideas of the holy Bishop of Hippo; and it is wonderful how in a few pages he has given to posterity a substantial abstract of a history which now has lasted nearly

nineteen hundred years. It is only because the Church is divine, and the general features of her future annals were pencilled by Christ himself and His Apostles, that any man, even with the deep mind of an Augustine, could tell us how it would be in a thousand years or more. It is in fact nearly fourteen centuries since he wrote, and a thoughtful man cannot but wonder when he reads those entrancing pages, replete with the thoughts of previous prophecy analyzed and elucidated by human genius.

These remarkable speculations are the best answer to the questions propounded at the very beginning of this paper; and, at the same time, they also contain a clear justification of the Church in regard to the matter under consideration. How can it be said that it is her fault that she has lost in our day some of her previous influence or power? Was there any accusation brought or intended to be brought against her in the predictions of St. Augustine? If he now lived among us, or could come back from heaven to hold converse with us, and supposing that God had not made him acquainted through the Beatific Vision with the successive vicissitudes of the Church, he would not feel any surprise at anything we know, and see, and daily grieve to experience from false brethren and pretended Christian rulers, lawgivers, and men of influence of every kind, but would, probably, only repeat a few sentences of what he has penned in another part of his *City of God*. "*In hoc ergo maligno sæculo*," etc. We give the translation by Rev. M. Dods, in the Edinburgh edition 1871:

"In this wicked world, in these evil days, when the Church measures her future loftiness by her present humility, and is exercised by goading fears, tormenting sorrows, disquieting labors, and dangerous temptations, when she soberly rejoices, rejoicing only in hope, there are many reprobates mingled with the good; and both are gathered together by the Gospel, as in a drag-net. In this world, as in a sea, both swim inclosed without distinction in the net until it is brought ashore, where the wicked must be separated from the good, that in the good, as in His temple, God may be all in all."

II. The great Doctor of Hippo in various passages speaks constantly of the Church, but scarcely mentions her pastors. He likewise descants on the virtues or vices of nations and peoples, yet very seldom names their princes and kings. But for us it is evident that the expression now must be different, the sense remaining the same. In his time the nations appeared on the convulsed stage of the world simply as peoples, and the Church was uppermost in the mind of all, instead of the Papacy. Why so? St. Augustine lived and wrote in the precise epoch of the confused mingling of all tribes and races in an almost inextricable disorder. The barbarian invasions, it is true, had begun their ravages much earlier, and already at the time of Gallienus the Goths had invaded Western Asia, and Europe was at the mercy of numerous German tribes.

But these were then mostly in the service of Roman generals who disputed the empire against Valerian's son. There was still an empire, and there were only too many emperors. It was from 375 to 568 of our era that almost the whole population of the North and East swept like the waves of the sea over the West and South. It is now ascertained that all the northern tribes then living, from the frontiers of China to the Atlantic Ocean, were in constant motion, warring perpetually with each other and, one and all, were making incursions into the rich domain of Rome. During those two centuries the barbarian peoples did not move fitfully as they did before, returning after awhile to their former haunts. They meant to settle permanently on the plains of Europe, or wherever else fortune might offer them the opportunity of securing more desirable abodes. The whole life of St. Augustine was passed in the midst of those violent convulsions; and the Vandals were besieging Hippo, his Episcopal city, when he closed forever his eyes on a world apparently in ruins. Persons must then have been accustomed to speak oftener of peoples than of their rulers, who were mostly unknown. The destiny of the world was in fact trembling in the rough hands of numerous tribes rushing impetuously forward in their career, without an intelligent directing head. St. Augustine was thus naturally brought to look at the future fate of the Church as dependent more upon peoples than on their rulers.

He, also, could not but look on the Church as on a body already everywhere established, having received from Christ the mission of converting those infuriated savages, and keeping in the observance of the law of God her defenceless children, then in the throes of agony. The Popes had enough to do in Rome and the surrounding country. They could not exercise a universal power in the prevailing confusion, and it was designed, in the providence of God, to be at a much later period that peoples should look on them as the fathers of regenerated mankind and the arbiters of the whole world. This explains why St. Augustine speaks thus in general terms, and uses phraseology differing greatly from ours, yet carrying with it, after all, a like meaning.

As soon as peace and order succeeded to war and confusion; as soon as Europe became mapped, nearly as it has been ever since, and the various kingdoms and empires which we know, began to develop, each its own individual life; as soon as, at the same time, the Church could set in working order the divine constitution which Christ had given her, and the Papacy visibly arose to take the lead of Christendom; then the moral power of the Christian Church, whilst it continued to fulfil the predictions of St. Augustine, did so under vastly different circumstances, and presented to a thoughtless looker-on a very dissimilar scene, though it was in fact the same.

The nations came to be represented by their individual princes, chiefly after feudalism arose; and the Church also became, as was proper, identified with the Pope. Thus it came to pass that the words of St. Augustine had to be slightly altered, though their meaning remained the same. The wicked of whom he spoke as inclosed in the "net of the fisherman" were, most of the time, the emperors, or kings, or powerful barons, who, by persecuting the Church, caused her to lead a life of sorrow, and fear, and labor, and temptation, just as described in the last passage we have quoted from the work, *De Civitate Dei*.

It is proper, consequently, to review briefly the secular contests between the Papacy and the empire, in order to come to a more exact understanding of the situation of the Church at the present day. From the very exposition of the subject just laid down, it is evident that whatever happened between the former Roman empire and the Christian Church previous to the final success of the barbarian invasions, is excluded from this present inquiry. The former Roman civilization was entirely destroyed by the barbarian invaders. Whatever came into existence afterwards was entirely independent of the anterior period; and the complexion of things at the present time will be sufficiently explained, when the principal facts which were evolved in the contest between the crosier and the sceptre, say from the time of Charlemagne down, will have been properly understood and stated. In this review even the Greek or Byzantine world scarcely enters; because the modern civilization of Europe, and the relations between the Popes and the kings have derived very few elements from the effete organization known as the Byzantine Empire. The fact is that the problem is reduced to the examination of its proper conditions as involved in Germany, England, France, and Spain. Italy forms a subject of itself, apart from the others, very important certainly, but which it will be more profitable and convenient to consider at the last.

It is impossible to enter into this discussion without indulging first in a general remark on the most important element of the problem, namely, the Papacy. But the Papacy placed here under our eyes is not that of the catacombs, however great, sublime, superhuman it may have been. It is neither the heavenly but hidden power wrestling in the dark with a corrupt and tyrannical paganism, nor the already manifest City of God confronting, in and around the Roman capitol, the undisguised city of Satan. This first struggle had long previously passed away. The victory had been won and paganism had ceased to exist. The Pontiffs had planted the cross on the summit of the Capitol. Rome and the world had become Christian. But the Papacy which at this moment stands before our gaze, is the majestic, and at the same time sweet and mild figure of

a high priest placed in antagonism to his own wayward spiritual children. It is the hand which has poured by proxy the regenerating waters of baptism on the heads of all those emperors and kings, constrained to ward off, nay, anathematize those whom it desires only to bless; it is the tongue proclaiming the saving precepts of true morality, which, strange to say, is not listened to with reverence, but is mocked by the open and unreasonable disobedience of those who have freely sworn to obey; it is the heart of a father, deeply wounded by those very sons whom he had engendered in Christ. For it ought never to be forgotten that from Rome had been sent the Apostles who converted originally the Germans, the Anglo-Saxons, the Franks, the Visigoths of Spain, the Ostrogoths of Italy, all those nations which afterwards formed Christendom. In their first enthusiasm they had gratefully acknowledged their allegiance to the Papal power. They had called the Supreme Pontiff their spiritual ruler; they had blessed his hand full of holy ministrations; they had recognized it as an instrument of untold blessings; they had heard his voice and called it the voice of Christ explaining to every Christian the same clear, strict, absolute duties; they had, finally, been folded to his heart, which they knew was that of a father prompted only by a true heavenly charity. This was, in fact, the Papacy which has been so often misrepresented and accused. Yet any impartial reader of the annals of those times is compelled to acknowledge that in all its contests with the powers of this world, the Papacy bore in fact either all the characters just described, or at least some of them unmistakably. We shall see this more satisfactorily in the details of these contests, in the various changes which resulted from them, and in the final consequences which we now explore and study.

Germany.—The natural and chronological order would seemingly require that the Italian politicians and princes should be considered first. For, during a part of the ninth century and the whole of the tenth, the margraves of Tuscany and the counts of Tusculum often intrigued at the Papal elections, with a view to introducing their detestable feudalism into the very organization of the Church, and perpetuating the abuses of simony and incontinency among the clergy of the whole peninsula. But Italy, for various reasons, ought to be studied apart, and will be deferred to the last.

The strongest proof that the subsequent deplorable antagonism between the German Empire and the Papacy did not result necessarily from the assumptions and pretensions of Rome, as the enemies of the Papacy allege, consists in the fact that with the restoration of imperial power in Germany, after the disappearance of the Carlovingian dynasty, the greatest harmony prevailed for a long time between the temporal and the spiritual powers. The Carlovini-

gian era itself might be adduced in corroboration of this proof; but as the present discussion must date from the origin of the difficulty between the empire and the Papacy, there is no need of going farther back than to the Saxon line of emperors. When they first took up the sceptre which the progeny of Charlemagne were unable any longer to wield, they adopted the large views and Christian policy of the first Charles; and continued up to the end of their dynasty in perfect accord with the Popes. The single exception which will be mentioned does not affect the general result. When Otho I. went to Rome for the purpose of putting an end to the dissensions of contending factions, he recognized John XII. as Pope in spite of what he had heard against him from his German courtiers, and he took an oath as explicit as that of Charlemagne's could possibly have been, "to always exalt the Church of Rome and her Pastor." If later on he appeared to swerve from his purpose, if he went so far as to depose the Pope and have another elected, he was urged to it by unworthy bishops and cardinals, and thus an excuse, though an insufficient one, could be found for his conduct. But it must be said that this deplorable excess is the only one which can be alleged against the Saxon line. Otho II., surnamed the Great, was a still greater benefactor to the Roman Church than his father had been. Almost the same might be said of Otho III. But all other Saxon emperors were surpassed in this regard by Henry II., the last of them. This pious prince, the holy husband of the still holier Cunegunda, has been considered in all ages a pattern of all Christian virtues on the throne.

Had this policy been followed by all the German imperial dynasties, there would have been no conflict between the Tiara and the Sceptre. It is impossible to find room for such a conflict when we consider that those first emperors never took upon themselves to mix in the affairs of the Church or take part in the clerical elections, or grant the investiture of spiritual offices without the full consent of the Popes, which consent they knew, and acknowledged they knew, was necessary. Thus all the subsequent troubles with the Franconian line would have been avoided, had the emperors of that line adhered to the same principles. As to the unheard-of pretensions of the Hohenstaufen, it is not possible to imagine that the Saxon emperors would ever have originated them. What would have been, in consequence, the happiness of Europe and the world, had all the emperors of Germany followed the example of the Saxon emperors? When the two powers, the spiritual and the temporal, are in perfect accord, nations can advance in civilization without any inward hinderance. All the powers of the State are set forth either for the submission of exterior enemies or for the normal development of interior activity. In the case of Germany, at the

time we are speaking of, the exterior enemies were all pagan tribes which were successively to be subjected to the sweet yoke of Christianity, and consequently to be highly benefited by the process; the development of interior activity consisted in doing away with the last remnants of barbarism which had not yet disappeared, and in elevating the nations, in as short time as possible, to the highest pitch of true civilization, which all Christian peoples reach under the powerful sway of the sublime doctrine of the Saviour.

Many in our day will say, perhaps, that submission to Rome would have brought about an entirely different result; would have established servility, gradually leading on to degradation, etc., etc. We all have heard of these modern axioms of so-called philosophical historians, but have no room for discussing them at length. A general observation must suffice. Does history prove that such deleterious effect resulted when the temporal power submitted cheerfully to the Papacy? This was the case under Charlemagne and most of his dynasty; this was emphatically the case under the Saxon line of emperors which replaced the Carolingians; this was the case in Germany whenever a truly Christian prince ruled. Was not the country then more prosperous and powerful than under the majority of the Franconian, Hohenstaufen, and Hapsburg emperors? On this subject we must content ourselves with the remarks of Höfler in his admirable paper on the German Empire, in the *Dictionnaire de Theol. Cath.* (vol. vii.). He says:

“In spite of the insistence of many writers to regard as the most flourishing period of Germany that in which the two heads of Christendom were at war, when the energetic efforts of the two parties produced, no doubt, an extraordinary development of talent and institutions, history will always prove that the grandest period, and the one most productive of a natural and solid development was that during which a common principle animated the empire and the Papacy; when, as a consequence of this union, the Christian world—*orbis christianus*—going on from victory to victory, crushed the powers both of paganism and Islamism. It is dating from those memorable days that the country began to *Germanize* the surrounding regions, a remarkable operation, to which historians do not give the attention it deserves, and which was certainly the immediate result of the union of the temporal and the spiritual powers. North Germany became thenceforth Christian and German. The countries devastated by the Huns were soon teeming again with men and cities. Toward the East the Alemanni arrived,” etc.

The writer speaks here of the precise time when the Othos and the first two Henrys of the Saxon line carried the empire over which they ruled to such a pitch of glory. Did their constant union with the Popes bring on “servility and degradation” for their persons and those of their subjects? The same reflections might be indulged in with reference to France, and also to England in regard to its Anglo-Saxon kings. But this must suffice.

Germany had become so prosperous and great by the adoption of the policy of union with Rome under the Saxon princes, that the two first emperors of the subsequent, Franconian, line naturally followed the same course. They appeared only intent on leaving Rome free, and protecting the Pontiffs against the plots of Italian politicians and intermeddlers, of whom there will soon be occasion to speak. They allowed, in fact, Hildebrand who was not yet Pope, but had already acquired immense influence in Rome, to energetically oppose simony and incontinency among the clergy. Henry III., however, the second Franconian emperor, gave the first hint of a change of principle, when he publicly withdrew his friendship from Wasson, Bishop of Liege, who had declared that "he owed fealty to the emperor, but obedience only to the Pope." The germ of the contest on Investitures was contained in this declaration. It is known that open war on this subject broke out only under Henry IV., to continue with fury during almost the whole reign of Henry V. What was the real meaning of this war of Investitures? It was, in fact, at the beginning, when controversy and argument had not yet made clear the various points of the question, nothing else than the bold assumption on the part of the emperors of the spiritual power itself, through their claim of *investing* the chosen bishops and abbots, before their consecration, with the crosier and the ring. *Consecration* was supposed, by the lawyers of the crown, to add almost nothing to the ceremony of *investing*. The emperors pretended also to have thus the right of *electing* the future prelates, and becoming the real source of their authority by merely conferring upon them its emblems. There was, of course, on their part, the obligation to notify the Pope afterwards, and the Pope was expected to approve everything they did with cheerful assent. This was indeed to repress "the assumptions" of the court of Rome with a vengeance.

In our age this must be acknowledged, even by Liberalists, to have been an outrageous pretension, since they seem at least to respect the spiritual initiative of the visible Head of the Church, and acknowledge that in spiritual matters he must be independent and perfectly free. Yet Gregory VII. has been for a long time abused, even by pretended Catholics, for having opposed the Franconian pretensions. If he had not, he would have openly prevaricated and been unfaithful to his most sacred duty. But the reader may wonder how such an abuse as this could possibly have crept unperceived into the Church, and then at once burst out openly so soon after the Christian Saxon line. This happened very simply through the development of feudalism, which was then beginning its career all over Europe, but particularly in Germany. Bishops, abbots, ecclesiastical officers of all degrees (for the ceremony of investiture ex-

tended to all) began, before the Franconian dynasty, to receive from the emperors, kings, and other sovereign princes, fiefs by which they were made dukes, counts, barons, etc. In this capacity they depended on the emperor or king, owed him feudal fealty, a well-known expression in those times, and became great dignitaries of the empire. Under the Saxon line the princes, all of them, had been so great benefactors to the Papacy, that extensive privileges were granted them by the Pontiffs with regard to the nomination and election of Church dignitaries. This was enough to lay the foundation for strange and pernicious abuses.

Imagine the position in which Gregory VII. was placed, when determining immediately after he had been elected and crowned Pope to eradicate incontinency and concubinage from among the clergy, and wipe away at once this foul blot from the garments of the Bride of Christ, he found the youthful Henry IV, just come of age after the regency of his mother Agnes, already a profligate, given over to all vices, chiefly to unbridled lust, established in state at Goslar in Germany, and acting in the following shameful and wicked manner:

At Goslar there was a collegiate church with Canons in it. These Canons were notoriously among the most immoral men in Germany. But His Majesty, the Emperor, who treated them as his boon companions, would not look beyond them, when a bishopric, a rich abbey, or a fat ecclesiastical benefice became vacant, for a person to fill it. Instantly the golden prize fell to the lot of one of those infamous men. They were not long in receiving the investiture of their new office by the crosier and the ring. The Pope, of course, would then be notified of the appointment by Henry IV., but could not prevent the unworthy candidate from receiving consecration at the hands of some worldly bishop. Was the reformation of the Church possible under such circumstances as these? Neander himself, though a Protestant writer of Church history, cannot refuse to acknowledge that the Pope was right in his conflict with Henry IV.

Other Protestant writers besides Neander have justified Gregory with respect to his claim of universal dominion in spiritual matters. There is no need, however, of discussing this point at present, since no one in the time of Hildebrand objected to it, and the Hohenstaufen were the first, subsequently, to controvert it. The claim being then admitted by all, it could not give rise to any contest. But is it not most painful to see such a man as Gregory spending all his Pontifical life in these arduous conflicts, dying at last in exile, to be subsequently abused by scribblers of every description? Is it not a disgraceful sight on the part of Germany to witness in such a plain, nay, self-evident question, all the strength of a large

empire arrayed against an unarmed Pontiff, after having deprived him of his natural allies by gaining over, through open corruption, the bishops themselves to the cause of Henry, so that there was a time when only six of them sided with the Pope? Worse yet! Henry having been able through his creatures, the corrupt bishops of his court, to have an antipope elected, there soon were in many dioceses two rival bishops, in order, we suppose, to compass the more quickly the total destruction of Christianity. Had St. Augustine come back to visit the earth at that epoch he could have said of Gregory what he had prophesied of the Church in general:

“In this wicked world, in these evil days, the Church is exercised by goading fears, tormenting sorrows, disquieting labors, and dangerous temptations!”

The quarrel of Investitures appeared at last to have reached a settlement at Worms under Henry V. in 1122, and this settlement by a *concordat*, then made, was undoubtedly a rightful victory on the side of the Church, since the emperors of Germany gave up the privilege of election and investiture, by crosier and ring, of the ecclesiastical prelates, who were thereby declared to owe to the prince feudal fealty only for their temporal possessions. But at the extinction of the Franconian line in 1137, when the Hohenstaufen came into power, a new pretension set up by this dynasty soon began to disclose itself. It was nothing else than the principle of universal dominion in all matters, in the strictest sense of the term. This could not be said to have been suggested by the anterior claim of Gregory VII. to spiritual rule all over the earth as Vicar of Christ, since the two claims had absolutely nothing in common. This new and most startling doctrine was first proclaimed on a most solemn occasion by Frederick I., or Barbarossa, the second Hohenstaufen emperor. After having humbled Milan, the head of the republican confederation of the Lombard cities, which was openly fostered later on by Innocent III. and other Popes, and from which originated the celebrated Italian republics, Barbarossa called a general assembly of German and Italian noblemen in the plain of Roncaglia in 1158. He there introduced four legists from Bologna, who were to open the legal era of Imperial Germany, and whose names ought to be preserved and remembered forever. These were Bulgarus, Martinus Gossia, Jacobus da Porta, and Hugo de Alberico. Hegel, in his *History of Municipal Corporations*, has, fortunately for us, extracted their names from some old and authentic MSS. The decision of these four men, learned in the law, was simple enough, but was also more than sufficiently comprehensive. The pith of the matter consisted merely in declaring,

“That the German Empire being the continuation of the Roman, the former Roman

code must be that of Germany. Consequently, all the despotic powers of the renowned Roman Cæsars must essentially belong to the Cæsars of Germany."

This was solemnly proclaimed in the plain of Roncaglia, at the command of Frederick I. This is a fact which cannot be contested, and we find reason here to wonder that lawyers in general, at least in Germany and France, after this, have generally been so loud in their denunciations of "papal pretensions," yet have scarcely ever uttered a word against those of temporal rulers. This most extraordinary declaration was directly opposed to all German traditions which recognized in the sovereign, only the elected head of the nation, *primus inter pares* (Cantù, tom. 10, p. 404); and at the moment of its utterance it was emphatically denied by the then quite recent establishment of the Lombard municipal cities, founded on popular rights, or rather on strongly republican principles. The Hohenstaufen wished, on the contrary, to establish an absolute monarchy with all the forms of despotism, nay, with all the detestable features of former Roman Cæsarism, over the whole extent of Germany and Italy. It was in fact the resuscitation of paganism, at least as regards political doctrine and rule. For, in all pagan countries the harshest despotism of the State, or of the head of the State, has always been maintained in vigor, even in the case of pretended republics. The citizen was invariably regarded as having no conscience of his own, and was obliged to submit to the authority of the State, or of its ruler, in all things whatever.

The Popes had to firmly oppose this outrageous pretension, because they were the natural defenders of the people's rights, and their own temporal possessions would have been absorbed into the scheme of the new legists. Moreover, the principle set forth with such solemnity, involved the spiritual as well as the temporal supremacy; for who does not know that every Cæsar of Rome was *Pontifex Maximus* as well as *Imperator*? The great contest carried on between the emperors Frederick Barbarossa, Henry VI., and Frederick II., on the one side, and the Popes, from Alexander III. to Clement IV., including the great Innocent III., on the other, was waged chiefly on the principles involved in this great question. Had the Hohenstaufen succeeded, the people would have been crushed under the heel of these despots, religion would have been enslaved, and the Popes, deprived of their temporal States, would have become the mere tools of politicians. But, thank God, the victory again remained with the Papacy; and at the end of the contest the municipal republics of Italy were consolidated, chiefly by Innocent III., and immediately began that brilliant career which brought European civilization at once to the highest pitch of glory. This may be counted as one of the chief results of the Pontificate of

Innocent in particular. (Lacombe, *Histoire de la Papauté*, tom. 2, p. 298, § 9.) Thus disappeared in a short time the vaunted power of the new Cæsars, to the first of whom the Archbishop of Milan, a great supporter of the Roman code, did not scruple to say: "*Scias omne jus populi in condendis legibus tibi concessum. Tua voluntas jus est, sicuti dicitur. Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem, cum populus ei et in eo omne suum imperium et potestatem concesserit.*" (Cantù, *Hist. Univ.*, tom. 10, p. 405, note.)

But although the Papacy triumphed gloriously over the Hohenstaufen, who could never carry a single one of their points, neither in Germany nor in Italy, the long-protracted contest between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines had commenced in earnest, and was to bear its baneful fruits during centuries. For the Hohenstaufen, who belonged to the Ghibelline family, continued as a party long after their dynasty had ceased to disgrace the throne, and the Saxon princes who remained constantly faithful to the Popes, were Guelphs. To whom, then, ought to be attributed the wars, devastations, and often the desolation of fair Italy, if not to the Hohenstaufen? Were not the Popes constrained by the strictest duty to oppose a policy which would have trampled on the rights of the Church and of humanity itself? Were they not appointed by Christ to fight for justice against might? Could they stand mute when the old pagan principles, which Christianity in fact had buried long before, were again asserted as living and true, and attempted to be re-established in full vigor? What the first Popes had obtained by their austere life in the catacombs and by the shedding of their blood, namely, the downfall of paganism and of the most outrageous despotism on earth—was it to be lost by yielding to the pretensions of princes who by baptism were the spiritual children of the successors of Peter? For it was nothing else but the re-establishment of pure paganism in politics and law, that the Hohenstaufen attempted to achieve by the help of their lawyers and the power of their armies. And the state of open war declared by the clear enunciation of these principles was to continue for a long time under the banner of the Ghibellines, against which was justly raised that of the Guelphs. Meanwhile the Popes had "to be exercised by goading fears, tormenting sorrows, and disquieting labors, inflicted upon them by their own wayward spiritual children." So Augustine had foretold it, and so it must continue to the end. And, instead of wondering that the Church in our age has seen her influence decline, and of searching around for the causes of it, as though they were obscure, we might rather ask ourselves how it is that the Church still exists and was not destroyed ages ago.

Our want of space compels us to conclude this branch of the subject by merely remarking that the contests between the Papacy

and the empire in Germany, had the fatal tendency to establish a constant antagonism between both, and to increase, consequently, the animosity of the secular power against the Church. This continued, more or less, under the dynasties subsequent to that of the Hohenstaufen, until the time when the rebellion of Luther, enlisting on its side a great number of German princes, resulted in the division of Christendom. The actual situation of the Church in Germany is thus sufficiently well explained; and if any one has to blush on account of it, it is undoubtedly not to the Popes that the shame of it is due.

England.—The struggle which brought the Church in Great Britain to the state to which it has been reduced for the last three centuries, began directly after the conquest of England by the Normans. Our short sketch, which we must necessarily make brief, will prove this assertion, which many, owing to a want of serious reflection, may be inclined to doubt. The first kings of the Norman line introduced *customs* thoroughly opposed to the former relations between Church and State under the Anglo-Saxon dynasties; and it may be said, without fear of great error, that in these so-called customs lay the germ of future Protestantism. Mr. Freeman in his celebrated *History of the Norman Conquest of England*, pretends, it is true, and brings many facts to prove, that the policy pursued from the beginning by the Conqueror and followed out by his successors, consisted mainly in changing nothing in the customs of the nation. This general thesis cannot be examined here; but, supposing even that it is thoroughly proved, and must be henceforth admitted as historically demonstrated, the notorious *consuetudines regie* with respect to Church affairs, which soon began to be spoken of, must certainly be regarded as forming a remarkable exception to the general policy of the new princes. These *customs*, certainly, had no existence under the old Anglo-Saxon kings. They were so evidently new that at first nobody could say precisely in what they consisted. The people and the clergy were kept for some time in the dark as to the meaning of these ominous words. It must, certainly, have been with great surprise that their purport became finally somewhat better known. The fact is that their object was: 1st. To interfere on the part of the State in the ecclesiastical elections, by requiring the presence, on those occasions, of officers, from the king. 2d. To prevent free communication between English Church dignitaries and the Pope. 3d. To introduce gradually in many cases the civil jurisdiction, instead of the ecclesiastical which the people always preferred. 4th. To limit the right of excommunication, a right purely spiritual, by requiring the consent of the king for its exercise. How is it that these *customs*, openly declared at last in the pretended Council of Clarendon, came into force? No one in

England had ever heard of them before the invasion of William the Conqueror; and there was no positive mention of them, neither under his reign nor under those of his immediate successors, until Henry II. If any fact known to history during that first period of Norman rule could have any reference to such customs as these, it ought to be looked for during the reigns of these first Norman kings, and a short discussion of the subject is required.

William the Conqueror, William Rufus, and Henry I., the only Norman kings, predecessors of Henry II., who can deserve attention, Stephen's reign being short and unimportant, tried, undoubtedly, to establish in England *royal customs* in cases between Church and State. But they did not succeed, owing chiefly to the noble opposition of Lanfranc and Anselm. Moreover, those attempts at introducing ecclesiastical customs were very different from that of Henry II., whose programme at Clarendon may be called altogether new, and was stamped with a character *sui generis*. The efforts of the three first Norman kings were bold, but, at least, honest in their violence. Had they succeeded, Christianity would soon have been altogether subverted in Great Britain, and a savage supremacy in spiritual things and temporal on the part of the kings, worse yet than the long subsequent one of Henry VIII., would have been established as early as the twelfth century. The attempt of Henry II. had, on the contrary, all the characteristics of the cunning attributed by French Bretons to his race. It was a dishonest attempt. But it did not deceive Thomas a'Becket who knew his master well, and could immediately perceive *in cauda venenum*. Let us look at this a little more in detail.

William the Conqueror was a bold soldier, as is well known, and by no means gentle in his manners or moderate in his aims. But, at least, he spoke out and expressed himself with a kind of blunt frankness. It seems that his first wish after the conquest was to reform the clergy, and for this he prevailed on Lanfranc that he should accept the archiepiscopal dignity in Canterbury. In this he undoubtedly rendered a great service to religion; but it was strangely qualified by the care he took to appoint only Normans to the sees, abbeys, and other important benefices; and the Norman clergy of that epoch had scarcely had time to imbibe all the mildness and virtue prescribed in the Gospel to the ministers of God. But what was still worse was the stubbornness of the king, who could scarcely imagine that any one could be above him in any capacity whatever, and consequently he refused to yield, even to the Pope, the proper tokens of filial submission. This amounted, in fact, to the declaration that he was supreme in all things. Lanfranc, who knew how easily an open schism, with all its deplorable consequences, could be brought about, did not dare to use in this case the

severe measures of ecclesiastical censures, and for this he was reprimanded by Gregory VII., who then was Pope. This is the first attempt tending to the establishment of "royal" ecclesiastical "customs" we can find in the history of Norman England.

With William Rufus the state of affairs became much worse, and the position of the king was unambiguously announced. He boldly announced from the first that he alone was master of State and Church; that no *foreign* influence in his dominions could be tolerated. What could he possibly have to do with a Pope to whom he had not given the proper investiture, etc.? Henry VIII. never went further in his assumptions, and there is, consequently, nothing rash in the assertion already made, that the struggle which ended in securing the ascendancy of Protestantism in England began with the Norman conquest. What amount of prudence, forbearance, mildness, joined to a firmness which never surrendered the essential rights of Christian truth, did not Anselm, the successor of Lanfranc, give constant proof of during a long life of anxiety and trouble? His biography should be read by all those who wish to know what is the true spirit of the Catholic Church in her conflict with the wicked powers of this world. Any one who comes to this knowledge will be able to form a correct judgment on the important question, whether false pretensions, inordinate ambition, and glaring encroachments are chargeable against the Church, or the State?

In the impossibility of going more into detail, we can only state, as an incontrovertible conclusion, that a bold attempt had been made by Rufus to establish in England customs which could not prevail, owing to the sublime virtues of the greatest Archbishop of Canterbury that ever lived, Anselm of Piedmont. The same conclusion will be reached on investigation with regard to Henry I., who, like his predecessor, fostered simony among the clergy, and wished to assume to himself the right of investiture. These few words must suffice on the subject. If the question is studied thoroughly the odious violence of all those Norman kings will come out in such bold relief, that the reader, however prejudiced against the Popes he may at first have been, will be compelled to confess that the resistance of the secular powers by such Pontiffs as Gregory VII. and Alexander III., and by such prelates as Lanfranc and Anselm, was inspired by a profound sense of right, and saved, in fact, Christianity from destruction.

It is now in place to examine the celebrated *consuetudines regie* of Clarendon, and see how far they differed from the pretensions of the first three Norman kings. The reader is referred back to the statement of their object as given above. It is taken from Lingard's *History of England*, and is unquestionably a correct state-

ment. It is important here, for many reasons, to keep in mind the date of the pretended Council of Clarendon. It was held in 1161. This was just two years after the proclamation of pure Cæsarism at Roncaglia by Frederick I. of Germany. The long quarrel of the Popes with the Franconian emperors terminated in a victory for the Church. The pretended right of investiture had been given up very reluctantly by the secular power in Germany, though it was afterwards claimed on several occasions. The question raised now by Barbarossa was of a very different character, and had it been decided in his favor it would have resuscitated the long-dead despotism of the ancient Cæsars. It may be presumed that Henry II. knew this. He was far better educated than the rude conqueror, William I., and the still ruder William Rufus. His predecessor, Henry I., with all his natural violence, cultivated the fine arts and received the surname of *Beauclerc*. Henry II. did not live constantly in the retired island of Great Britain; he resided often in Normandy and other parts of France, where the great questions, agitated between the empire and the Papacy, were daily discussed, at least by the cultivated part of mankind. He knew, therefore, that the pretensions of kings in regard to investitures had passed away; still he hankered after them and would certainly have greatly rejoiced could he have revived them under another name. The articles of Clarendon, therefore, never mention this name; but the first and the second, evidently, aim at a return to the substance of these pretensions by requiring the presence of some officers of the king at the election of prelates, and by preventing the free communication of English ecclesiastics with the Pope. These first two articles once secured, it would not have been difficult to usurp again into the hand of the king the bestowing of spiritual offices. The last two articles of this fine schedule, by substituting civil jurisdiction for ecclesiastical, and placing the king, in fact, above the reach of ecclesiastical censures and excommunication, might have gradually paved the way to a future assumption by his majesty of all power, civil and religious. Does it not look as if this really was the intention of Henry II. in claiming so loudly his precious *consuetudines regie*? To aspire directly and simply, as in Germany, to supremacy in spirituals and temporals, that is, to an undisguised Cæsarism, would have been too bold a thing for a simple king of England. Moreover, he was not supported by the arguments brought out by the four celebrated lawyers of Bologna, whose system required a certain line of descent, moral or otherwise, from the Roman Cæsars. Again, the French bishops he had to deal with—a great part of his possessions were then in France—could not be as easily managed at that time, as those of Germany or England. Motives of prudence, therefore, led him to the course he adopted. He was, indeed, a

cunning Norman, with the savage, crafty, and cruel character of his wild Scandinavian ancestors.

But he had to meet Thomas a'Becket; and he did not fare as well with him as he at first expected. The reader knows the rest. By the murder of the Archbishop of Canterbury at the foot of the altar, which Henry II. had certainly provoked, if not positively directed, he raised against himself the indignation of Christendom. How he had to atone for it is well known. Not drawing back even from the public penance imposed upon him by an assembly of bishops, he could not claim either the right of investitures or of unlimited authority; and the *consuetudines regie* were, for the time being, hidden out of sight.

They were not, however, altogether dead, though apparently buried. They manifested occasionally strong signs of life; and one or another of the four articles of the Clarendon creed appear but too often in the annals of ecclesiastical England, besides several other heavy grievances against the Holy See, such as the refusal to pay Peter-pence and the denial of the obligation to receive from time to time the visit of Papal legates. The consideration of these in detail would greatly exceed the limits assigned to this paper. There is, however, a compendious way of reaching a proper conclusion. It is known that the real encroachments of the civil power over the prerogatives of the Holy See went on, gradually increasing, with or without the help of parliaments and courtly prelates, until the *Reformation* capped the climax, by placing in the hands of the king all spiritual as well as temporal authority. On the restoration of Catholicity in England, under Mary Tudor, the Papal jurisdiction was, of course, re-established; and it is known how poets and historians have represented the heaviness of the yoke placed by this act on the neck of the English people. Now Lingard, a moderate Roman Catholic writer, to say the least, thus expresses himself in the first chapter of Queen Mary's reign, in a remarkable note which must strike every thoughtful reader. The occasion for publishing this note is the act of Parliament by which Catholicity was restored, and which Lingard states "deserves the attention of the reader, from the accuracy with which it distinguishes between the civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and the care with which it guards against any encroachment on the part of the latter."

"Most readers," says Lingard in his note, "have very confused and incorrect notions of the jurisdiction which the Pontiff, in virtue of his supremacy, claimed to exercise within the realm. From this act of Parliament and the statutes which it repeals, it follows that that jurisdiction was comprised under the following heads: 1st. He was acknowledged as Chief Bishop of the Christian Church, with authority to reform and redress heresies, errors, and abuses within the same. 2d. To him belonged the institution or confirmation of Bishops elect. 3d. He could grant to clergymen licenses of

non-residence, and permission to hold more than one benefice, with care of souls. 4th. He dispensed in the canonical impediments of matrimony. 5th. He received appeals from the Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Courts."

All persons acquainted with Church history and Catholic theology will readily acknowledge that it was not only on this occasion, of framing a bill in the English Parliament, that the Pontiff "claimed to exercise only this jurisdiction within the realm." These are the only necessary conditions required at all times by the Popes. If any other prerogatives were granted them by some Catholic States, the Pontiffs did not refuse to surrender them when the circumstances of the times required it. It is very doubtful if at any time the Popes ever claimed anything more from England, except once owing to the extraordinary act of John, who, in order to save himself, felt compelled to place his kingdom at the feet of the Pontiff. Let the history of England be read carefully, and it will be found that in all the difficulties raised between Rome and the English kings, some one or other of these five specifications was the subject-matter of dispute. The first article especially was the one which had created most trouble during previous conflicts. Yet every candid man, having a just notion of the Christian Church and of its Chief Pastor, must admit that it is absolutely necessary for the spiritual welfare of Christians. A like remark may be made respecting the others, except perhaps the third. It is not to be doubted, however, that nearly all the controversies which had previously convulsed England with respect to *Papal pretensions*, were carried on, on the part of the Church, only to obtain these necessary liberties; and that, consequently, she had never done anything more than oppose the encroachments of the State in matters which were absolutely necessary to the welfare of her spiritual children. And the men guilty of those encroachments, though the highest and most influential in England, were not less her spiritual children than the poorest and lowliest of the English people. There is no need of again repeating here the text of St. Augustine, which the reader by this time ought to know by heart. And this must suffice for Great Britain.

France.—Of all the countries on the continent of Europe, France undoubtedly is the one which imbibed more thoroughly from the very start the true Catholic spirit. This commences with Clovis, her first king. All the other new nationalities on the Continent, at that time, Vandals, Goths, Ostrogoths in Italy, Visigoths in Spain, were Arians. But the strict union of France with Rome dates from her cradle. As the Bishop of Poitiers eloquently said in the Cathedral of Rheims, the 1st of October, 1876:

"Dating from this day," the baptism of Clovis, "a great nation, another tribe of Judah under the New Dispensation, was just starting on its career in the world. The

Roman Pontiffs recognized this fact as well as the bishops of Gaul. . . . From that moment faithfulness to orthodoxy, the indissoluble alliance of the priesthood with the civil power, the Apostleship and Catholic protectorate all over the world, became the three distinguishing marks of the religious vocation of the French."

But to Charlemagne principally was France indebted for her deep spirit of faith. She, however, followed his lead most cheerfully, and in a better and more constant disposition of mind than the other Germanic nations subject to the sceptre of the great Charles. For France remained, more than any of them, faithful to the policy of the head of the Carolingians. Should any one feel disposed to controvert these assertions, he needs only to throw a glance on the Capitularies of French kings of this dynasty to be convinced that our position is unassailable. These Capitularies are, at this day, accessible to all in Migne's edition (vols. 97, 98, of *Lat. Fath.*). No one, even if he merely looks over them, will deny that the whole essence of the Ages of Faith is contained in those strange but singularly beautiful enactments; and it is in them that France found the food which nourished her infancy and her youth up to manhood.

The Carolingian race, without a single exception, were faithful to what may be called the traditions of the greatest exponent of their line. The Capetians even, who followed, entered largely into the same religious path. This may be said to have continued until the time of Philip the Fair at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries. For the troubles which arose between the Popes and both the first and the second Philips, regarded merely the personal affairs of those kings, and had no reference to any of the great principles of Church and State. Both successively tried to divorce their legitimate queens and to contract new alliances contrary to divine and human law. In these contests no question arose regarding the temporal and the spiritual powers. It was only after Germany had been fiercely agitated for a long time by the pretensions of her emperors that the first storm of a like nature arose in France. And in extenuation of the crime of Philip the Fair, it may be said that although he was inexcusable in his assumptions, carried on the contest in bad faith and with duplicity, placed himself unreservedly in the hands of legists more unprincipled still than those of Henry IV. and Frederick II. in Germany, yet Boniface VIII., unfortunately, had not the equable temper of Gregory VII. and Innocent III., and on some occasions may have been rather harsh during the long series of events which ended in open and revolting outrages against his sacred person. Yet justice was, certainly on the side of the Pope, and the cause of Philip was as wrong, as it was disgracefully carried on.

And what, after all, was the first cause of this long quarrel?

Simply the obstinacy of the French king in refusing to submit to the decision of the Pope, after having requested his arbitration between himself and the king of England. All Europe was then a bloody field of battle. It was the duty of the Pontiff, as the recognized arbitrator between rival princes, to restore peace by his kind offices. He succeeded in bringing to an end the interminable dispute of the kings of Aragon against the dukes of Anjou, for the possession of Sicily. He likewise settled, for a time at least, the differences between Adolph of Nassau and Albert of Austria for the Imperial crown. He was most anxious to re-establish peace between Philip of France and Edward of England; and, had his endeavors not failed on this occasion, the fierce war of a hundred years which soon after broke out between the two nations might have been averted. Philip had recognized the Pope as arbitrator; but the decision, which he wanted to be all in his favor, did not please him, as it involved a compromise. It was simply that "things should remain as they were at the breaking out of the dispute." This disappointed and enraged the king of France, who henceforth considered the Pope as his enemy.

Boniface thought it was his duty to complain shortly after, in the Bull, *Clericis laicos*, of the universal abuse then prevalent, by which ecclesiastical property, bestowed originally for merely pious or charitable objects, was unjustly and heavily taxed for mere secular purposes. Philip looked upon the Bull as though it were addressed to himself alone, although there was no intimation of the kind in the document. It was an encyclical and a universal circular; and it applied more to the king of England than to that of France, because the abuse was greater in the former country than in the latter. But Philip alone appeared to resent it; and he retaliated on the Pope by issuing a decree against the exportation of coin from France to any foreign country, not excluding the Papal States, thus aiming a blow at the Papal exchequer, which relied upon its dues from France as well as from other Catholic countries. The Bull *Clericis laicos* was explained unreservedly in three other documents, but the king would not hear of explanation.

The details of the whole affair cannot be given in these pages; but a general statement of what immediately followed is important. The king of France saw that the strength of his antagonist lay in the principles of the canon law, which then was the law of all Europe. He was acquainted with the details of the previous contests of the Franconian and Hohenstaufen Emperors of Germany against the Papacy. He had, no doubt, remarked that in these conflicts the Emperors had derived great advantages from the employment of legists skilled in canon law. The fact has already been mentioned that Barbarossa brought out on one occasion four able Doc-

tors *utriusque juris* from Bologna, to sustain his cause. Later on, but before Philip's time, Frederick II. used very successfully his "dear Doctor," Petrus de Vineis, whom he rewarded afterwards with perpetual imprisonment. The poor Doctor, it is known, broke his skull in a fit of madness against the walls of his prison, to put an end to his misery. Enlightened by these very remarkable precedents, Philip called to his aid two learned men of this kind, Peter Flotte and William Nogaret; Nogaret in particular, "whom the king," says Alzog with great justice, "called to Court in order to avail himself of his knowledge and ability in cloaking royal usurpations under the legal forms and appearances of justice." This is admirably said, and explains the success which later on crowned the efforts of numerous Doctors of Law in the councils of Constance and Basle, in the first outbreak of Protestantism—for instance in the case of the divorce of Henry VIII., and his assumption of spiritual supremacy,—in the whole history of Gallicanism in France, and in the antics of Jansenism afterwards, finally in our own days in the frantic efforts of the Anti-Vaticanists in England, and the "Old Catholics" in Germany. On all those occasions, law, and particularly canon law, has been the constant outcry of the enemies of the Church. The reader, however, will understand that this outcry has always aimed at setting up a pretended canon law advocated by these men, not the noble creation of the Church herself, bearing the same name, but having a very different object.

The use the first asserters of the so-called canon law in France made of it, was simply to falsify abominably the Bulls of the Pope. Boniface, obliged at last to assert the rights of the spiritual authority, had issued his celebrated Bull, *Ausculda fili*. Peter Flotte got a copy of it, and by erasing a few lines, and writing others in their place, he made the Pope say that "there was no civil or temporal power in existence, and everything was absorbed in the spiritual authority." Boniface, however, had merely reasserted the principles previously declared by Gregory VII. and Innocent III. He recognized everywhere in his Bull the *two swords*, namely, the two distinct powers, temporal and spiritual. If he placed the papal over the kingly power, it was only in the sense that the king was a Christian, and as such subject to his pastor in spiritual matters.

"If Philip," says Alzog, "was subject to the Pope, it was not as a temporal prince, *ratione dominii*, but in a spiritual sense and as a Christian. In temporal matters he was subject to him only when and in so far as there was question of sin and injustice, *ratione peccati*. The Holy See, far from denying, recognized the fact that there was a difference between the two powers established by God." (Alzog, vol. ii., p. 623, and note, p. 624.)

The simple meaning of this is, that according to Boniface VIII.

every king or civil sovereign has full power to rule his dominion, and exercise his office ; but if he openly violates the rules of justice, and becomes a tyrant, he is subject to the authority of the Pope as his spiritual superior, who can call him to order, or depose him in the end, leaving to the people the election of his successor. This was the public law of Europe at the time.

The reader knows what followed. Two successive States-General were convened by the king in France. The three orders, persuaded of the genuineness of the copy of the Bull produced by Peter Flotte, took the side of Philip against Boniface. The Pope was declared deposed as a heretic. Nogaret was sent to Anagni with a troop of soldiers. There is no need of narrating the atrocious proceedings of Nogaret and his satellites, which a few years later on brought from the heart of Ghibelline Dante the well-known agonizing cry, *Veggio in Alagna entrar lo fiordaliso*, etc.

Thus from her French children, as early as the fourteenth century, the Church experienced all the terrors, sorrows, etc., predicted to her by St. Augustine. And more strange than all is the fact that the prevailing public opinion during succeeding ages, from the time of Philip the Fair to our own, has been that Boniface VIII. was a most ambitious and overbearing Pontiff, justly punished for his pretensions, though, in fact, he merely demanded the acknowledgment by Christian princes of the most elementary Christian truths, namely, that every member of the flock ought to obey his spiritual superior, listen to his advice, and reform his conduct. Thus has public opinion continued for ages to mislead people, and has gradually prepared what we witness in our day, a widespread hostility to the Church of God, and an eager emulation on the part of secular rulers of nations to spurn her, neglect her, if not to conspire for her utter destruction.

Spain.—There is nothing to say of Spain on this subject, thanks be to God ! During all the time we have been speaking of, she was fighting nobly for Christianity against Islam ; and it was not from her that the Popes could expect any persecution. If in our age a different spirit has infected many of the rulers of that noble country, it was not so during the times we have been considering. Spain has not contributed, in any great measure at least, to prepare the way for the decline of the influence of the Church in Europe.

Italy.—If an exception could be supposed to have been intended in the predictions of St. Augustine, it surely, one might suppose, would have been Italy. The seat of the Papacy brought to that favored country advantages which no other enjoyed, and the Italians ought to have been the most submissive children of the Popes. Yet the very reverse is the fact, and the Church, in the persons of the

Supreme Pontiffs, has suffered more from her Italian subjects than from any others.

Look at the whole series of Popes from Peter down to his successors at the beginning of the tenth century—this is about the epoch from which our investigations began—and say if Italy ought not to have been proud of such an array of illustrious men. In the first three ages who can withhold admiration for the heroism displayed by the founders of Christianity in Rome? In their arduous and obscure labors, so fruitful, however, since they finally conquered paganism in its stronghold; in the extraordinary purity of their lives shining steadily as a bright luminary in the midst of unprecedented corruption; in the prudence and wisdom of their administration as they laid the foundation of a spiritual empire which was never to disappear; finally, in their fortitude and unfaltering constancy when led before the pagan judges who condemned nearly all of them to cruel deaths, they showed themselves true heroes, so that even the enemies of the Catholic Church are either compelled openly to admire them, or endeavor to escape from expressing their admiration under the pretext that their biographies are only legends, and that their lives cannot be truly said to be known.

When the storm of persecution finally abated, we see a second line of Supreme Pastors, worthy of the first, in the great men placed at the head of the Church, who fought so bravely against Arianism and its kindred heresies. The names of Sylvester, Julius, Liberius, Damasus, Siricius, and Anastasius must forever be illustrious in the annals of mankind. Directly after, the barbarian invasions began, and the Papacy was often the only bulwark able to stand against the violence of the shock. During this period the Popes had to contend against both the rudeness and barbarism of foreign invaders, and the intrigues and violence which attended the attempted intrusion into Christianity of Nestorianism and Monophysism. Can anything grander at that epoch be presented to the admiration of the world than the lives of such men as Innocent I., Bonifacius, Celestinus, Sixtus III., and Leo I.? The conversion of the barbarians, which began from the very first day of their irruptions, and the settlement of many questions between Italy and Greece, that is, between Rome and Constantinople, present afterwards to our gaze the noble figures of Felix II., Gelasius, Symmachus, John I., Agapetus, Sylverius, Vigilius, Pelagius, and at last Gregory the Great! Finally, the continuation of the struggle between the Pontiffs on the one side, and the Eastern Emperors and the Patriarchs of Constantinople on the other; the new relations, also, just beginning to exist between the Papacy and the Frankish kings, both of the Merovingian and Carlovingian lines, continue to add to the list of Popes names of which Italy ought to have been forever proud.

For, the successors of Peter were evidently laboring not alone for the Church of God, but for the general good of mankind, particularly of Italy. And here it is needless to recall to the memory of the reader the long list of distinguished Popes, since it would be an insult to suppose him altogether ignorant of the lives of Zacharias, Stephen III., Hadrian I., Leo III., and the Pontiffs who immediately followed them. Who among men of culture has not read of the epoch of Charles Martel, Pepin, and Charlemagne?

But here begins, precisely, the period which is to be examined more closely. It has been already anteriorly remarked that the vexations the Church experienced from the old Roman empire, and consequently from the Byzantine also (which was only a continuation of the first), do not enter into our subject, because they did not influence, except very slightly, subsequent European history. On this account the ancient Europe which prepared the way for and produced the modern Europe of our day, dates only from what is called the beginning of the middle ages. In Italy it immediately followed the Carlovingian epoch, and grew out of the troubled state of affairs consequent on the establishment of feudalism.

But it is proper to insist briefly on the fact that during more than nine hundred years after St. Peter's time, nearly all the Pontiffs who ruled over the Church at Rome were conspicuous for their noble deeds, and that all of them, without a single exception, were distinguished for the purity of their lives. They were elected by the Clergy and the people; and although the elective system has invariably proved, in all large countries where such a means of choosing civil rulers obtained, a source of confusion ending often in anarchy, it worked well for nearly a thousand years in the Church; so as to present the historic spectacle of more than one hundred successive spiritual rulers worthy of the respect of all mankind. The reader will soon perceive why the system of election by the people had to be discontinued, without any probability of its being ever revived. But compare this array of Pontiffs with any series of kings who ruled over nations of whatever race you select, and say if anything of the kind has ever been reproduced in the annals of mankind. Yet Italian rulers who had witnessed it, or who lived at least at the close of this grand period, were among the first opponents of it, and vied with Germany in the contest, or rather gave the first hint to future adversaries. The Church in the persons of the Popes was to find henceforth arrayed against her not pagan emperors of the cast of Decius or Diocletian, not fosterers of heresies like the immediate successors of Constantine, not barbarous half-Christian kings like the Lombard dynasty, but full-fledged Catholics, recognizing the Popes professedly as the Vicars of Christ, but bent on making them their tools, and introducing, as early as the

tenth century, all the deadly resources of hypocrisy, violence, hatred, which good men of our time are too apt to record as the exclusive character of this nineteenth century.

Feudalism, introduced chiefly by the Northmen, in spite of what many writers assert of its Roman or purely German origin, never had so firm a foothold in Italy as in the other European States. It flourished, however, during a few hundred years in the north of the peninsula, brought down thither probably by the Scandinavian Lombards, and in the southern half of it in the wake of the Normans. Tuscany was soon invaded by it, and from this beautiful country it naturally passed to the "Patrimony of St. Peter." It is proved beyond all cavil that Charles Martel, Pepin, and Charlemagne had successively granted this territory to the Popes as a means of supporting their dignity and preserving their independence of all civil rulers. Louis the Pious confirmed these grants and added to them.¹ The Popes of that age did not think that armies were required to guard their temporal authority. They relied on the Carolingian emperors to protect and preserve it as defenders of the Holy See. But at the breaking down of the Carolingian dynasty, the Pontiffs found themselves at the mercy of the feudal chieftains of Tuscany and of their own States. This is the simple truth, and it fully explains what followed.

The new state of things naturally brought disturbances into the Papal elections. At the death of every Pope factions arose. It is impossible to give in detail an account of these events. The only reasonable way of treating them, is to consider the chief causes of the popular commotions which constantly existed in the Papal States. The German emperors, degenerate successors of Charlemagne, always had a party in Rome. The Margraves of Tuscany were at the head of an opposite party. This last faction represented feudalism, pure and simple; and, unfortunately, the chiefs of it resided mainly in Rome. Adalbert was the first of those Margraves who openly proposed to himself to make the Papacy a kind of heirloom in his family, and the Popes themselves the vassals and tools of the secular ruler for the time being. He did it easily by controlling the Pontifical elections. One of his female relatives, Theodora, a known courtesan, but a brilliant one, obtained through Adalbert the chief power in the city; and her two daughters, worse than herself, Marozia and Theodora the younger, successively replaced her, and continued, like a dynasty of three Furies, a long reign of scandalous horrors and revolting crimes. On this subject, Cardinal Mathieu, in his *Pouvoir Temporel des Papes*, justly remarks:

¹ See F. Lacombe's *Histoire de la Papauté*, t. 1, p. 472.

"No one ought to be surprised that in such circumstances as these, there have been bad Popes, but that there have been so few of them. God's providence thought proper to try his Church by scandals, but scandals have always been a rare exception in the Chair of St. Peter, and virtue has constantly been the rule."

The fact is, that in the numerous list of Pontiffs who are acknowledged to have been real Popes during the greater part of the tenth century—when their reigns were so short under the sway of Theodora and her daughters—only two or three have been really bad men. Some of those who, until lately, have been considered as among the worst, are now believed to have been calumniated by Luitprand, the sycophant of the German Emperors. John X. is undoubtedly one of them. Octavian even, the son of Alberic, known under the name of John XII., and regarded for a long time as the most profligate, appears almost like a great ruler when the slanders of Luitprand are set aside. Mr. F. Lacombe, in his *Histoire de la Papauté*, ought to be consulted on the subject. He speaks more plainly and consistently than Alzog.

But whatever view of the subject is taken, it is evident that the Church cannot be held responsible for these scandals. She was merely the victim of infamous princes who bore the name of Catholic, but were, in fact, worse foes to her than the most undisguised persecutors; and thus again we have in Italy the realization of the prediction of St. Augustine.

When the Margraves of Tuscany disappeared, after more than fifty years of abominable domination, the counts of Tusculum replaced them as disturbers of the peace. But, adopting a line of policy just the reverse of that of the former Margraves, they advocated the interests of the German Emperors. In order, however, that there should be two parties in the field, with a view, we suppose, to a continuation of the strife, Crescentius, Count of Sabina, the pretended first advocate of Italian nationality, rose in opposition to the Tusculan chieftains. The Papacy continued, therefore, a prey to faction and anarchy. The temporal power of the Popes, in fact, was lost, although they alone, among the contending factions, had on their side the real power, *de jure*. But it must be again insisted upon, that no reproach whatever can be cast upon the Church in all these disorganizing broils. It all came from the fact that in receiving their temporal authority from the Carolingians, the Popes gratefully accepted civil authority in Rome and the Papal States, but refused even to touch the sword, and take rank among the military powers of Europe. Who can blame them for it? Did they not act prudently in leaving the sword in the hand of Charlemagne and his successors? In the end they appeared to have leaned upon a reed which broke and pierced their hand. Whose fault was it?

Nevertheless God—as it was meet—took pity on his defenceless Church. As the first ray of the sun shining at last through the drifting clouds, seems speedily to allay the fury of the storm, so only at the appearance of a man of genius and piety, Sylvester II., the factions were lulled to rest, and the holy Emperor of Germany, Henry II., coming soon after, the great era of Gregory VII. was prepared to heal the bleeding wounds of the prostrate Church.

Strange to say, however, in that glorious epoch of Hildebrand, Alexander III., Innocent III., when the Papacy was acknowledged in Europe as the leading power, when Christendom appeared as a unit under the guiding hand of the Pontiffs, the petty factions of feudal chieftains still existed in Rome. The quarrels of the Guelphs and the Ghibellines continued to disturb the peace, and often obliged the Popes to leave the city. The opposite parties of the Emperors of Germany, of the kings of France, of various other rulers, went on, making of Rome occasionally a bloody battle-field; keeping the Popes often in prison, either in the Vatican, or in the Castle St. Angelo, or in some other fortress; giving, in fine, to the world the wonderful spectacle of the most powerful sovereign of Europe scarcely able to enjoy or command the peaceful submission of his immediate subjects.

This state of things became at last intolerable, especially during the violent resistance of Philip the Fair to the authority of the Church, so that the successor of Boniface VIII., Benedict XI., had to retire with his court to Perugia, where he could at least find rest. Rome was thus left at the mercy of two Roman families, the Orsini and the Colonna, who, not satisfied with ruling alternately by main force in the city of the Pontiffs, wished, by intriguing in the Pontifical elections, to become the real owners of the Popedom. It is said that Benedict XI. was poisoned to secure the success of some scheme or other. It is certain that when he died at Perugia, the Roman factions were directly transferred to that town of Umbria, in order to influence the election of his successor. Intrigues of every kind became so unscrupulous and violent that the Perugian people rose at last in opposition to the outrageous partisanship which threatened to render an election impossible. A French prelate was at last chosen, De Got, Archbishop of Bordeaux, principally to please Philip the Fair; and Clement V.—that was the name he took after being crowned Pope in Lyons—on being urged by the Cardinals to go to Rome, could easily convince them that it was impossible under the then present circumstances. The Papacy was then transferred to Avignon, and thus was produced the chief cause of the deplorable schism which followed.

From a study of this lamentable period of Church history, the causes which led to the so-called Reformation are clearly evident

to the reader of its annals. There is no doubt that among the bishops, the cardinals, the Popes even, of that epoch, there were unworthy dignitaries and rulers. But can their guilty conduct be attributed to the principles of the religion they professed to believe, and of which they ought to have been the guides by their virtues, as well as the teachers by their doctrine? Who can say that the Church was responsible for them? They were, in fact, her greatest enemies, worse than former persecutors; and St. Augustine, had he known them, would have placed them at the head of the City of Satan. But no sensible man can imagine that there were not at the same time in the Church virtuous and holy men, powerful preachers of the word of God, leading after them the multitude of the people for the reformation of their morals and the practice of the highest virtues. Any one who does not know this has only to read a detailed life of Vincent Ferrer, and from the powerful encouragement which he will perceive this holy man received from Popes, bishops, cardinals, princes, also dukes and kings, he will be led to the conclusion that the true Church of God possessed at that time a countless multitude of children worthy of her in all ranks of society, and that there was no need of such men as Luther, Calvin, Zwinglius, and their associates, to restore to the Bride of Christ her former beauty and loveliness.

They came, however, and by this time the most unintelligent reader of history must know what kind of faith and holiness the *Reformers* have introduced into Christianity. They have been the most powerful agents to give birth to the spirit of unbelief and lawlessness, so prevalent at this time, and which agrees so well with the position which secular rulers of nations have striven to give to the Church. Thus the object of this paper has been fully attained. The causes of the condition of things which we now witness are patent, and, instead of being attributable to Catholicity, they are for her a just subject of glory and honor. By her war of nineteen hundred years against the spirit of evil, she has saved the principles of the Gospel which would have perished ages ago if it had not been for the imperishable strength which God gave her, when he built her on the Rock against which the gates of hell cannot prevail.

WHAT THE UNITED STATES OWES TO JAMES II.

History of the State of New York. By John Romeyn Brodhead. First Period, 1609-1664. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1853. Second volume, 1664-1691. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1871.

THE title we have thought proper to give to some reflections suggested by Brodhead's *History of New York* will seem to many preposterous. The idea that our country can be indebted, in even the slightest degree, for any element of its present greatness to the unfortunate sovereign, who was the last male of the Stuart line to occupy the English throne, will doubtless appear too extravagant for sober consideration.

In England, history has been written to sustain and justify the Revolution of 1688, and the exaltation of the character of William III. entailed almost of necessity the darkest picturing of James. Hence the majority of writers and readers have adopted certain theories on the reign of James II. and the Revolution of 1688 as axioms not to be examined or disputed, and the career of James is judged by these hypothetical assumptions rather than by the sober facts of history.

In this country, public opinion on the subject has been but a reflex of that of England, and local causes aided to make the unfortunate James stand forth on the canvas painted in still darker colors. New England had to justify the course which she pursued in 1691, and could do so most easily by blackening the character of James; a task all the more easy as there was no one to gainsay the writers, or to defend a man who had no one to defend him, either from attachment to a lost cause or from pure love of historic truth.

This has caused so general and sweeping a condemnation of James, that the pet phrases of condemnation slip almost as naturally from Catholic as from Protestant lips, from American as from English.

Yet we think the time has come when examination into real facts may allow us to adopt opinions not based on the century's re-echo of party clamors, but on documentary and substantial evidence.

American history has dealt largely in fiction. Short as the period is that our annals embrace, a curious article might be written that would merely touch on the mooted or doubtful points. The history of our colonial period has been written almost exclusively by persons of New England origin, and from the New England standpoint. Other parts of the country may have amounted to a little,

may have weighed a grain in the balance; but all that was great, noble, pure and liberal originated in New England. This is in fact the theory underlying all our popular histories, and inculcated in most of our school-books.

The apathy of other parts of the country has been as great as the activity of New England, and the consequence is that there are few works in the hands of the people that give the early history of other sections anything like a fair treatment as showing their part in the general growth of the country from the early struggles of the first settlements.

Among the States thus indifferent or careless was New York. Till within a few years her colonial history was virtually unwritten. The State, however, has done much to collect material for her colonial history. Some years since, stimulated apparently by the publication of Dr. O'Callaghan's *New Netherlands*, she sent John R. Brodhead abroad as the State agent, and he collected from the archives of England, France, and Holland an immense mass of documents bearing directly or indirectly on the early history of the State.

Dr. E. B. O'Callaghan virtually laid the foundation of New York history by his patient researches into the printed and documentary material still extant, relating to the Dutch colony of New Netherlands; a mass of historical matter overlooked and ignored. His *History of New Netherlands* first gave an insight into the early beginnings of a mighty State, and the growth of her liberal institutions. This labor was followed up by the translating and editing of the vast mass of documents collected by Mr. Brodhead as agent for the State, in the archives of England, France, and Holland, and by the arrangement and publication of documents of that period in the State archives. Mr. Brodhead, familiar with the subject, then gave us his *History of the State of New York*, which he unfortunately never lived to complete, but which remains as one of the most important contributions to the history of the country. His first volume traverses the ground already covered so ably by Dr. O'Callaghan, giving on various points the benefit of different views by two competent students and writers. His second volume is devoted exclusively to the connection of James with American colonization, as Duke of York and King of England. Mr. Brodhead came to his task evidently with the usual strong prejudices against James, so that his judgments where favorable are wrung from him by the very power of the authorities before him. In this view it is perhaps not unfortunate that he, rather than the Catholic historian of *New Netherlands*, treats the period of James's influence.

The volume is full of interest as a picture of the growth of the colony, from the period when it passed into English hands down to the moment when William III. at last shook off his lethargy, and

took some steps to extricate the colony from the fearful evils into which his apathy had plunged it, and which continued for years to hang as a blight over New York.

To study the growth of the State as shown by Brodhead would be interesting, but in this paper we shall confine ourselves to a consideration of the character and acts of James II., as revealed in the cautious and accurate pages of the New York historian.

To most this history will come as a surprise, so different will be the estimate which the reader will form of the Stuart prince.

The life of James was an active and eventful one. He began a military experience as a boy of seven on the battle-field of Edgehill, and when finally captured by the Roundheads at Oxford the boy contrived to escape and reach Holland. In France he entered the army under Turenne, and in several campaigns displayed not only the intrepidity of a brave soldier but the military ability of a commander. Unlike his brother Charles, who lived only for pleasure, James was a serious man of work. "He loved the details of business," says Brodhead, "as much as Charles detested them; and with all the method of a conscientious clerk he seemed to work for work's sake." He is accused of being slow and obstinate, and harsh in his manner, having none of the winning power of Charles; but he was "upright and sincere, and his word was sacred," says the New York historian. At most periods of her history he would have made England an excellent ruler; he was thoroughly and characteristically English, slow perhaps, but brave, truthful, business-like, wise in council, and strongly conservative.

His brother's restoration to the throne gave James a new field of action. He was an active member of the Council for Foreign Plantations. He was also created Lord High Admiral of England, and his systematic mind introduced reforms, and established rules which were maintained when all else of the Stuarts had disappeared. But he was not content with a nominal command merely. In the wars with Holland we see James at the head of English fleets, and he showed an aptitude for command at sea as he had shown for generalship on land.

To this prince, who lacked only popularity, Charles made a grant which more than any other act shaped the future of America. James, in soliciting it, showed that he was in advance of the English statesmen of his time, for he recognized the coming greatness of the British empire growing up unheeded beyond the Atlantic. In soliciting the territory James was impressed with its vital importance to England.

France had planted her colonies on the banks of the St. Lawrence and the islands at its mouth; she held Nova Scotia and the coast-line westward towards the Kennebec. Below them, on the

coast, the English separatists and Puritans held New England for themselves, if not for the English crown; further south the ancient colony of Virginia with its Catholic neighbor, Maryland, were increasing in wealth and power. These two clusters of colonies were, however, kept asunder by the Dutch colony of New Netherlands, which, absorbing the petty Swedish province of Nye Sverige, controlled the Hudson, a great natural highway, navigable for large vessels and almost interlocking with Lake Champlain and its outlet into the St. Lawrence, while its mouth widened out into a bay unequalled on the coast as a harbor.

The indifference of English and French statesmen had allowed the Dutch to occupy and hold this key position, on which, in fact, their future power in America depended. A nun, the venerable Mary of the Incarnation, seems to have been the first to arouse attention to the importance of this position for the safety of Canada, but her advice to those who guided the destinies of France fell unheeded on ears of men who perhaps smiled at the idea of their following the advice of a cloistered nun on an affair of state. France neglected to acquire or reduce New Netherlands. On the other hand, though New England was an annoying neighbor to the Dutch, encroaching on them and molesting them, New England rulers and English statesmen were as indifferent as the French to the importance of possessing the Dutch colony.

James, Duke of York, saw that it would never do to allow France to secure for Canada that second pathway to the ocean, cutting off New England from Maryland and Virginia, and by her active energy hemming in the two isolated groups of English colonies to the seaboard. The Dutch, slow and quiet, were not dangerous, but they held their possession by a frail tenure; and France might, by a single stroke or by adroit negotiation, plant her fleur des lis at the mouth of the Hudson.

The sagacious and far-seeing mind of the Stuart prince perceived distinctly that England must in justice to her own future anticipate any such movement of the French. New Netherlands must become English, and English colonists must be induced to occupy the coast, so as to exclude all other nations from the St. Croix to the Chesapeake. Below that again the unoccupied coast-line trending towards Florida was to be possessed, and men of rank and means stimulated to settle it.

His position as Admiral, again, interested James in the colonies, and to him is undoubtedly due the first idea of the exclusive occupation of the Atlantic coast from Acadia to Florida.

The course to be pursued was soon decided in English councils. The rights of the Dutch were to be ignored, and they were to be considered as unauthorized intruders on soil which was English by

right of discovery. As the colony of New Netherlands was the domain of the Dutch West India Company, the affair did not seem to rise to the importance of an international question. The extension of British claim to lands originally theirs, but on which a trading company had inadvertently entered, need not, it was reasoned, disturb the harmony of the two countries.

Acting on this idea, the Duke secured the rights of Lord Stirling to Long Island under an old grant, and having thus color of title, he solicited from his royal brother a patent, which issued March 12th, 1664, and vested in him all the territory from the west side of Connecticut River to the east side of Delaware Bay. Audacious as this proceeding was the Duke followed it up promptly. Borrowing several vessels of the royal navy and a small force of veteran troops, he dispatched them under the command of Nicolls, an officer who had served under him in France.

The Dutch, deluded by diplomatic explanations, made no effort to reinforce the colony, though warned of its perilous condition. Nicolls appeared in the harbor of New Amsterdam in August, having by James's shrewd directions called upon Massachusetts and Connecticut to aid him in reducing the Dutch, as they did promptly. The Dutch governor, Stuyvesant, was utterly unprepared to meet the force thus swelled by contingents from the adjacent English colonies. He capitulated. The Dutch garrison marched out and embarked. The flag of Holland was hauled down, and the English colors, borrowed from one of the ships, were run up. New Netherlands ceased to be. New York suddenly appeared as a new English colony, binding those already on the coast indissolubly together.

So rapidly had all this project of the Duke's been carried out that a French expedition, sent from Canada to chastise the Mohawks for hostile depredations, were astonished by a summons from an English officer, demanding to know why they had invaded the territories of the King of England. They returned to Canada with the alarming intelligence that the greatest French colony in America had now to cope, not with the easy and friendly Dutch, but with the English under the guidance of the Duke of York. Governor Courcelles prophetically remarked, "that the King of England did grasp at all America."

If the Duke of York evinced the farsightedness of a great statesman in seeing the vital importance of this point, for the very life and existence of English power in America, a point to which all before him seemed blind, he showed the sound judgment of a ruler in his steps to transform into contented British subjects the alien elements thus suddenly torn from their own allegiance. His whole policy was shaped by sound and wise caution. Its fruit was seen

in the fact that the Dutch settlers, the governor and his council, ministers and people, all remained in the colony. To the mind of James, the surest way to make the colony strong and useful to England was to make the people contented and satisfied with the change; and, above all, to make them feel that their foreign language, habits, and religious practices should not be an obstacle to their free enjoyment of all rights possessed by English settlers.

To conceive how far James, Duke of York, was in this respect the superior even of English statesmen nearly a century later, we have but to compare his treatment of the conquered Dutch of New Amsterdam with the English treatment of the conquered French in Acadia. The statesmen of the last century, by their own orders and through the governors they sent over, harassed the neutral French in every possible point—in their religion, their customs, their trades, their intercourse with their neighbors. Instead of endeavoring to make them, as James made the conquered Dutch, contented English subjects, they kept them in a state of chronic uneasiness and doubt, deluded by unauthorized promises, misguided by false hopes, and finally seven thousand inhabitants were at once swept away on board a fleet, neither subjects nor prisoners of war, while their farms and villages were committed to the flames. How can we call men statesmen whose only plan of retaining a conquered colony was to depopulate it, and restore it to its pristine state of wilderness? Judged by the standard of the men of George II., James, Duke of York, in his treatment of the conquered Dutch, rises in moral grandeur like a giant among pigmies.

James was wise in the system of laws which he proposed for the government of the colony, till such time as, used to English forms of government and constitution, the newly acquired settlers might take part in the administration. The code known as the Duke's Laws was not a philosophical dream, a Utopia, like that which the learned Locke prepared for Carolina. The practical sense, the experience in actual life, the systematic mind of James, led him to far different results. He collected the laws actually in force in the various English colonies, laws originating in America, and therefore, as he wisely inferred, best adapted to meet the wants of an American community. From these he compiled the best enactments, avoiding all that savored of local harshness or bigotry, providing for religious services among the people, but establishing no church.

James was wise in his selection of governors. Brodhead, speaking of the first appointed, Colonel Richard Nicolls, says: "The Duke was singularly fortunate in the choice he made." Lovelace, the next, was, he tells us, "of a generous mind, and noble, upright, and good-natured, and, by the very moderation of his character,

unwilling to disturb the policy by which Nicolls had administered the government of New York with such success." "Andros was an English Episcopalian, but no bigot. Moreover, he was a good Dutch and French scholar, of unblemished private character, with talents, energy, and zeal." "Dongan was a Roman Catholic, enterprising, and active, coveting money, yet a man of integrity, moderation, and genteel manners."¹ Compared with subsequent governors of New York, those selected by James are remarkable. But it was not mere good fortune; he selected men whose ability he knew. His instructions to them were clear and detailed, and many of his letters to them, entirely in his own handwriting, show how zealously the Duke studied the well-being of the province.

To James is, therefore, not only due the idea of occupying the valley of the Hudson, but the merit of securing to England the possession of the province by wisely gaining the goodwill of the Dutch settlers through judicious laws, and governors beyond reproach.

Intimate with many of his assistants in the Naval Board, at which as Lord High Admiral he presided, he interested several in American colonization, and to two, Carteret and Berkeley, he granted New Jersey, to stimulate the colonization of that territory, into which the Dutch had not penetrated with their settlements to any great extent. And in the part which these and other associates took in the attempt to colonize Carolina we can easily trace the influence of James, as we see it undisputedly in Penn's settlement of his colony.

But as New York took form, we see the statesmanlike views of James unfold themselves more grandly. To this English prince it was not enough that his country should hold and control the vast seaboard line on the Atlantic. The Greater Britain was to extend without limit into the interior; as it was to have no rival where the waves of ocean broke upon their western shore, so it was to brook none in the great valley beyond the Apalachian range that stretched from north to south. To those who read the usual accounts of James, he was a feeble, incapable man, the pensioner and slave of France. In his American policy he showed himself as unlike this as possible. From the outset his policy was antagonistic to France; he obtained New Netherlands as a check on her power in America, and New York at once assumed an attitude that New Netherlands had never taken. To the Dutch the powerful Iroquois confederacy, the Five Nations, extending from the valley of the Mohawk to the Falls of Niagara, were allies and good customers. To James they became tribes within his territory and under his protection. The first English officers who replaced the Dutch com-

¹ Brodhead here certainly underrates the singular ability of Dongan.

mandants at Albany gave the French to understand that the territory of the Five Nations was British soil, not to be invaded by a foreign power.

As the Iroquois had kept up a war on the French and their allies from the very foundation of the colony, and had overthrown and exterminated tribe after tribe, besides carrying death and desolation through the French settlements, this new position of the occupants of New York was fraught with danger to Canada. The Five Nations were to be not merely a savage nation warring on Canada by the aid of purchases from a Dutch trading company, but a nation of savage warriors to be armed, controlled, and directed by the hereditary enemies of France.

The French had secured influence among the Iroquois by the generous, self-denying labors of the Jesuit missionaries, who, at the peril of their lives, had for more than twenty years been laboring to win the Five Nations to Christianity. In all the cantons, though the old heathen rites still prevailed, there were some believers in Christianity, and many who listened readily to the missionaries. James was a Catholic, and at once prepared to deprive France of any influence for her national interests that could result from the nativity of the missionaries. He obtained English Jesuits and sent them to New York, that they might continue the good work begun by the French priests, without alienating the cantons from English influence.

Through the able and energetic Colonel Thomas Dongan, governor of New York, James strove to neutralize the influence of the French and their commercial advantages with the western tribes. He first claimed the line of the great lakes as the English boundary, and sent English trading parties, guided by French and Indian pioneers, to offer the products of England to the tribes of the Northwest. The trading parties of James pushed further into the interior than any expeditions starting from the English colonies on the coast had ever done.

Under his impulse New York traders sought to open their goods to Indians at Detroit, and made their way along Lake Erie years before New Englanders had contrived to reach Lake Champlain, or Virginia grown ecstatic over the immense achievement of her governor in crossing the first range of the Alleghanies and riding down into the lovely valley of the Shenandoah.

James sought to plant an English trading post at Detroit; it was not his policy, but the indifference of his successors of the House of Brunswick, which allowed the French to plant their forts at Niagara, Le Bœuf, Venango, and Fort Duquesne, with another line at Mackinaw, Detroit, Vincennes, and Fort Chartres.

As early as 1666 he projected the conquest of Canada; but as

New England deemed it impossible at the time, to James's mind the lakes formed the great natural boundary, and his whole policy tended to hold the French to the northward of that line. The energetic missionaries and explorers of France had, however, gained one vast advantage. Pushing on through Wisconsin, Marquette and Joliet, representing well the two great bodies of pioneers, had reached the Mississippi and traced its course, which La Salle followed to its mouth, and finally attempted to hold that important point by a settlement. With the upper waters and the mouth of this great river in her hands, France seemed to hold the interior of the continent with a firm grasp. Nearly a hundred years after the occupation of New York by James, the English rulers woke to a sense of danger, and, appreciating at last the schemes of James, found France holding every strategic point, so that the united efforts of England and her colonies were required, and tested to their utmost, to break up the French lines of outposts, and restore the northern boundary as claimed by James. France met the struggle manfully, and preferred to lose all rather than yield the point.

"Bigot and tyrant," says Brodhead, using terms which have become stereotyped in connection with James; "bigot and tyrant, James had one characteristic which shone in vivid contrast. He was a more patriotic Englishman than his faithless brother. Anxious for the support of Louis, James scorned to betray England to France." Dongan, following out James's policy, so persistently thwarted the plans of the French governor of Canada, that De la Barré declared that affairs in Europe alone prevented him from marching against "Dongan, who fain would assume to be sovereign lord of the whole of North America, south of the river St. Lawrence." "The King," says Brodhead again, "directed Barillon, his ambassador at London, to ask the Duke of York to prohibit Dongan from aiding the Iroquois, and order him to act in concert with De la Barré to the common advantage of both nations." No such orders, however, were or could be given at Whitehall, where Dongan's policy was cautiously but fully sustained.

The evidence teems that James as duke and king was thoroughly alive to England's interests in America, and planned for British America a vast power. The seacoast and the northern line of the United States are his work, and remained at the close of the American Revolution as James had planned them a century before.

James's foresight and statesmanship appear all the more striking when we contrast his colonial policy with the utter want of policy, the fitful neglect and occasional ill-timed energy of William, Anne, and the Georges, and their wretched appointments of governors; and we see clearly that they never seemed to have appreciated the importance of the American colonies or really sought their well-being.

From Elizabeth to Charles II. the sovereigns of England had been lavish in granting charters and titles; from William III. to George III. there was neglect of American interests, colonies involved in European wars, and their final loss by misgovernment. In the whole series of British rulers James II. stands alone for his constant, active, and intelligent interest in America; and the United States is thus really indebted to that maligned prince for far more than many dream of.

"Of all the sovereigns of England," says Brodhead, "James II. knew most about her colonies. Soon after the restoration of his brother he was made the proprietor of a large royal English-American province. In the details of its administration he took a lively personal interest, because the revenue of that province affected his pocket. So, with his own hand the hard-working Stuart prince wrote many letters to his deputies in New York. Certainly his dispatches had the merit of directness and precision. Unconstrained by the conventional phrases, which often beguile mere secretaries, the terse holographs of the Duke of York uttered his own imperious will."

"With this long proprietary experience, James became the sovereign of England and her dependencies. Yet while as king he could no longer correspond directly with his colonial subordinates, he retained some tranquil pleasure in guiding the action of his plantation committee. The diligent business habits of the Duke of York infused order and economy into every department of the government of James II. As far as mere administration was concerned, his short reign seems to have been more effective than that of any other English sovereign."

His policy in regard to the Indians was sound. He wished them to be instructed and converted, as he did the negro slaves, whom he repeatedly directed to be instructed and baptized, dispelling the old idea entertained by many masters that baptism operated as a manumission of a slave.

But he determined to control the Five Nations, break up French influence, and use the confederacy as the great bulwark of New York, making it with English support a terror to Canada and the western tribes, and at the same time the means of drawing the trade of the Indians on the Mississippi and upper lakes to New York.

The Indians were loath to give up their independent action, and, in the apathy of later New York governors, they frequently caused serious embarrassment, but on the whole James's policy prevailed. The Five Nations became a powerful arm in the hands of England, baffling French efforts, exciting Indian tribes to oppose them, and luring others to join the English side.

Even when James was tottering on his throne in 1687, James in

reply to Louis XIV. maintained that it was "well known that the Five Nations of New York had been British subjects, as proved since the first settlement of their country by Europeans, and now lately by their voluntary submission, made and confirmed by them in writing, to the crown of England, on the 30th of July, 1684, before His Majesty's governors of Virginia and New York. The English king was, therefore, obliged to protect those Indians 'as others of his subjects.'"

James showed equal energy in his treatment of the Indians in Maine, where he was thwarted by the greed of Massachusetts.

We now pass to another point, the union of the colonies. Some of the New England colonies had indeed confederated, but all their operations were bound within the narrow circle of similar religious views. Nothing broad or general, or looking to the general good of all the British colonies, could originate with them.

A general union of the colonies under one government was a project long entertained by King James, a project carried out in full, only when the colonies repudiated the house of Hanover. This idea grew out of his plan for checking French power in America. "New France, with its undefined territory, was governed by a viceroy who executed the French king's orders. The neighboring British possessions had discordant local administrations of English authority. To the savages Louis seemed a greater monarch than James. As long as Canada had the energy of union, while New England, New, York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania were distinct and inharmonious, so long France would be stronger in America than England. Dongan's warnings now impressed Whitehall, James's recent arrangement with Louis about colonial hostilities offered British statesmanship a grand chance to establish the supremacy of England in the transatlantic world. And so the king did the best thing he could, which was to unite, as far as convenient, all the North American British possessions under one viceregal government."

The moment was favorable to his plan. When James came to the throne, Massachusetts had become a royal province. "The separate name of Massachusetts no longer existed legally; and that part of New England which had been governed under the patent of Charles I. was left to the discretion of Charles II." "Charles thought that those subjects who controlled his colony had abused their corporate privileges. If they had done so by excluding from the freedom of their corporation those who did not agree in the Congregational way or by other methods, it was his duty to resume the authority of the crown."

Proceedings similar to those taken against Massachusetts were instituted against other colonies, into which we need not enter.

The colonies were in his hands. "The King's attention had been drawn to the encroachments of the French upon the territory claimed by England in North America, and especially to their interference with the New England fisheries, of which Preston, his ambassador at Paris, had complained, but had gotten no satisfaction."

Another point which, to the mind of James, made a general union of the colonies necessary, was the great point of Indian relations. Trouble with the various savage tribes was scarcely to be avoided, as Andros well observed, "so long as each petty colony hath or assumes absolute power of peace and war, which cannot be managed by such popular governments, as was evident by the late Indian wars in New England." In fact, while each colony claimed and exercised the right of declaring peace and making war with its Indian neighbors, complications might easily ensue. New England would be negotiating with tribes in New York, while those tribes were attacking the settlers in the latter colony; or making war upon them at a moment when the very existence of New York depended on the friendly attitude of the Indians. The savages, too, finding the different English colonies pursuing different courses would be induced to throw themselves into the hands of the French.

The Duke of York showed from the outset a wise policy in regard to the Indian tribes, and began with a principle which this country has at last adopted after a century of blunders. By his directions Indians were to be treated as subjects, not as independent nations with whom treaties were to be made. From the commencement this attitude was assumed by his governors in New York; and Andros censuring the treaty plan pursued in New England, said: "Nor did I ever make treaty with, but dealt with them as being under or part of the government." Carrying out the Duke's wise policy, his governors never allowed the other colonies to hold intercourse with New York Indians, except in their presence. But the Duke on becoming King resolved, if possible, to remove the difficulties in the Indian and French relations by uniting them all as "one people and country."

The solidity of this motive was apparent only a few years later, when New England, refusing terms which New York accepted, was left to bear the whole brunt of hostilities from the French and their Indian allies, a state of things which would have been impossible under the Duke's plan.

As Massachusetts, at his accession, was a royal province without a charter, the first step was to unite as many of the New England colonies as possible under one rule. "The best English lawyers," says Brodhead, "concurred in the opinion that the only way in which English authority could be exercised in English unchartered

colonies was by their king's commission under the great seal. . . . If the King could delegate any of his prerogatives to any of his subjects so as to make them proprietors or corporations by charters under his great seal, he certainly could delegate similar authority to his governor by a commission under the same waxen symbol of his sovereignty. This logic seemed indisputable." So in 1686 Andros was made captain-general and governor-in-chief over his "territory and dominion of New England in America," which meant Massachusetts Bay, New Plymouth, New Hampshire, Maine, and the Narragansett country. As no provision was made for an assembly this act has been denounced; but Brodhead well observes: "James should not be charged with having removed that which never existed. 'The people' of Massachusetts, before the abrogation of the charter which a sectarian oligarchy misused, never had the share in local government which their fellow English subjects in Jamaica, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York actually enjoyed. Although arbitrary in form, the instructions of Andros were equitable in substance." In 1687 Connecticut was also included in New England, and in 1688 "James resolved to add New York and the Jerseys to his dominion of New England. Thus all the territory which his grandfather's patent of 1620 had named 'New England in America' would be brought, for the first time, under one royal English governor." "Protected by her astute owner's interest at court, Pennsylvania alone in her immunity escaped the forfeiture of her charter. But all the rest of British North America between Delaware Bay and the Passamaquoddy, and stretching across the continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific, was now to be made a political whole under one colonial governor chosen by the King to rule his dominion of New England." Thus the union of the colonies into one grand State, extending from ocean to ocean, under one system of laws, and one form of government as regarded the neighboring States, a union realized fully in our own time, was the conception and the thought of the maligned James.

It may be said that chief magistrates and legislative assemblies elected by the people are essential to good government, and that James's projected "New England in America" lacked this material element. This objection can now have no weight, for we have lived to see legislatures made and unmade, and even a President of the whole country made by returning boards, which had been proclaimed fraudulent in their constitution and in their action by State tribunals and the decision of Congress.

Thus James, in his grand policy two hundred years ago, looked forward to a "Greater Britain" in this continent, formed by a union of colonies under one head, extending from ocean to ocean

south of the St. Lawrence and the lakes, and with the whole Atlantic shore, greeting Europe beyond the sea.

One of our boasts is that in our land there reigns perfect liberty of conscience. No English king but James ever tried to establish liberty of conscience. It was the cause of his fall. The English people endured arbitrary acts, but when the King sought to force them to tolerate their fellow-Christians they rose against him. Liberty of conscience was inculcated in every state paper from the beginning of James's power in America, and if applied to it, the motto of his seal was not undeserved, "*Nunquam libertas gratior extat quam sub rege pio.*" By the capitulation of New Netherlands, the Dutch inhabitants were to enjoy the liberty of their consciences in divine worship and church discipline. The Duke's laws adopted many in force in New England, "with abatement of the severity against such as differ in matters of conscience and religion," and they provided explicitly: "Nor shall any person be molested, fined, or imprisoned for differing in judgment in matters of religion, who profess Christianity." In the "Conditions for New Planters," liberty of conscience was prominently allowed. In 1674, he said, in his orders to Andros: "You shall permit all persons, of what religion soever, quietly to inhabit within the precincts of your jurisdiction, without giving them any disturbance or disquiet whatsoever, for or by reason of their differing opinions in matters of religion; provided they give no disturbance to the public peace nor do molest or disquiet others in the free exercise of their religion." The Charter of Liberties, in 1683, guaranteed entire freedom of conscience to "all peaceable persons which profess faith in God by Jesus Christ." The New York Common Council wished under this to prevent the Jews from having a synagogue, but Brodhead remarks: "This severe construction, however, was contrary to the Duke's policy in regard to New York." When Andros was made governor of New England, King James added to his instructions, "And for the greater ease and satisfaction of our loving subjects in matters of religion, we do hereby will, require, and command that liberty of conscience be allowed to all persons, and that such especially as shall be conformable to the rites of the Church of England, be particularly countenanced and encouraged." Similar clauses run through all his instructions. In the last of all, that to Andros on his appointment to the vast province of "New England in America," James required liberty of conscience to be allowed "to all persons, so they be contented with a quiet and peaceable enjoyment of it."

We have thus drawn from Brodhead's thorough and well-considered work, often in his own words, the arguments to sustain the positions we claim as entitling James to the honor of having contributed by his policy and forecast to the actual establishment of

our republic, and the possession of its northern and eastern boundaries: "a union of States, and a land of religious liberty."

Mr. Brodhead never lived to complete his history. The part especially his is devoted entirely to the period of James's influence over the destinies of British America. He studied his subject profoundly and with leisurely examination. His array of authorities on every page show how completely he examined all that bears on the period. Different as many of his estimates are from those of writers of the New England school, it will not be easy to refute them. His work compels a rectification of American history, as popularly written, and nowhere is this rectification needed more absolutely than in the popular conception of James, Duke of York and King of England, and the part he took in the well-being of the American colonies.

The work is overlooked by many, as State and local histories are not widely read; and, except in New England, local history seems not to attract general attention, and the societies intended to collect and preserve the materials are but poorly sustained; but Brodhead's *New York*, as a study of the colonial policy of James, enters directly into the general history of the country, and must modify in no inconsiderable degree the estimates formed by English historians.

THE LIBERALISTIC VIEW OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL QUESTION.

SECOND ARTICLE.

HAVE CHRISTIANS NO RIGHTS IN REGARD TO PUBLIC EDUCATION?

Lecture on The Public School Question, as Understood by the Liberal American Citizen. By Francis E. Abbot. Boston, 1876.

PEOPLE are easily misled by fine phraseology. It is owing to this that the Liberals frequently succeed in bewildering the judgment and winning the applause of the simple. Their phrases are adroitly turned, and sound very well. They speak highly of justice and liberty, of enlightenment and progress, of morality and religion, as if they were the born champions, nay, the only champions, of all that is good. Their reasonings, too, are finely spun, and appear to be uniformly based on the most popular notions; but

the conclusions drawn from such reasonings, while seemingly favorable to the general interests of the people, tend in reality to further the interests of a party, and always turn against the Church. Mr. Abbot's lecture on the public school question is a very good sample of such a liberalistic style, as the readers of our previous article already know. But, as we have given in it only a portion of the lecture, we think that in justice to the lecturer, and to the cause of the public schools, we must continue our analysis of Mr. Abbot's production, even at the risk of being tedious, though we believe that the subject is one which cannot fail to prove interesting to most of our Catholic readers.

WHAT THE CATHOLIC CONSCIENCE CLAIMS.—After having mentioned the Catholic protest against the present school system, Mr. Abbot asks :

“What, then, is the essence and the rational ground of the claim that the Catholic conscience is wronged and trampled on by the maintenance of the public school system?”

To this question he replies by putting forward no less than seven distinct claims of the Catholic community, which he as distinctly rebuts.

“First. The Catholic conscience demands, in the apt phrase of Cardinal McCloskey, ‘Catholic education for Catholic children.’ But by whom is this demand refused? Surely not by the State, which imposes on no child any particular form of religious education. I admit, that the practice of Bible-reading in the public schools is a wrong and infringement upon the rights of Catholics, Jews, and all non-Protestant children; but that this practice prevents Catholics from giving Catholic education to their children, it would be preposterous to pretend. They are doing it at this very time. Certainly the demand of ‘Catholic education for Catholic children’ is granted in advance, unless it means that the State should *furnish* such education. That is a very different matter. Whoever wants sectarian education is perfectly free to get it; but it must be at his own cost. The State ought to furnish education, but not sectarianism; that is its own affair altogether. The right and wrong of this matter are evident: the State should not, and does not, prevent ‘Catholic education for Catholic children;’ but equally it should not and does not *furnish* it.”

Thus, according to this *liberal* luminary, everything is just as it ought to be. His liberality goes as far as to tell us: “Gentlemen, you are taxed to the amount of fifteen or twenty millions a year for the support of certain schools which your conscience condemns as totally unfit for your children; yet you must not complain of being plundered, for those schools are fit for our *liberal* children; and you are free, after all, to tax yourselves again to any amount, if you wish to educate your children according to your conscientious convictions.”

Exceedingly generous indeed! But we cannot expect more from men who hate religion. What do they care for us? They care for our money; and, if we complain, that, while we pay for education, no suitable education has been provided for us, they bluntly reply :

"The State cannot furnish the education you ask for." Thus we are first robbed, then snubbed.

We know that the State cannot adopt a system of Catholic, any more than of Presbyterian, Jewish, or Mormon, education. Religious education lies beyond the competency of the State. Nevertheless, the State needs, and must encourage, religious education ; and since it is incompetent to give it, as all agree, it follows that it should not assume the office of educator. This is an obvious conclusion ; any other course would be unjustifiable, as it is manifest that to tax the people for an object which you are confessedly incompetent to secure, or even to promise, is to extort money under a false pretext.

But here we are met by Mr. Abbot, who informs us that the State "ought to furnish education, but not sectarianism." We reply, that if the State cannot furnish religion, it cannot furnish education ; for education without religion is but a shell without a kernel, a body without a soul, a shadow without a reality. On the other hand, is it true, as Mr. Abbot pretends, that the State schools are free from sectarianism ? By no means. They are supremely sectarian ; they serve the exclusive interests of the worst of all sects—Freemasonry ; and they are conspicuous for their sectarian intolerance and hatred of every form of religious belief. Hence those of our citizens, whether Catholic or not, who wish to provide their children with real education, are constrained to turn away from the public schools, and overtax themselves for the maintenance of better, or less objectionable, institutions. This is the fact which Mr. Abbot points out with a proud satisfaction when he says : "Whoever wants sectarian education is perfectly free to get it ; but it must be at his own cost." Indeed, we thought that the public schools had been built and were managed "at our own cost ;" for we Christians of all denominations are the mass of the population from which the school tax is wrenched, whereas the professors of infidelity are a small part of the community, and contribute but little to the school fund, which they seek to manage for the exclusive interests of irreligion. We might, therefore, turn to the infidels, and say to them in their own words, and with much greater reason : "Whoever wants a godless education is perfectly free to get it ; but it must be at his own cost," for the American people believe in God, and cannot afford to have Him banished from public education.

Mr. Abbot continues :

"Secondly. The Catholic conscience demands freedom of exercise, says Bishop McQuaid, and he proceeds to declare : 'The majority of the people rule, by the power of numbers, that a large minority shall not be free to educate their children according to their conscience.' I can only pass over this assertion in mere astonishment. The simple fact is, that Catholics *are* educating their children according to their consciences, either at the public, or at the parochial schools, as they freely elect."

To this no new reply is needed on our part. What we have just said shows that Mr. Abbot does not speak to the point. If the majority of the people were to rule by the power of numbers, that the *small* minority of unbelievers shall not be free to educate their children in the public schools, unless they submit to Catholic teachers, use Catholic books, and imbibe a Catholic spirit, we fancy that Mr. Abbot & Co. would not feel quite satisfied with the arrangement, though they would still be "free to elect" another kind of education "at their own cost." But to proceed :

"Thirdly. The Catholic conscience demands equal rights. Very well: *that* it ought to have. The equal rights of the Catholics, like those of the Liberals, are infringed by Protestant worship in the public schools. Equal rights will be established when the Catholics have as much right to have their religion taught in the schools as the Protestants, Jews, or Radicals; that is, no right at all. The trouble with the Catholics is that this equality of rights does not satisfy them; they feel aggrieved unless their own religion is positively taught in the schools to which their children go. But so far as the public schools are concerned, this is to demand unequal rights; and this is to have a very unreasonable conscience."

Here our lecturer is evidently trifling. If the Protestant worship in the public schools is an infringement of equal rights, it is manifest that a systematic exclusion of all religion from the public schools must be accounted a much graver infringement of common rights. To assume, as Mr. Abbot does, that no denomination has any right at all to have its religion taught in the schools, is to beg the question. Of course, neither the Catholics can oblige the Protestants to frequent their schools, nor can the Protestants compel the Catholics, or the infidels, or the Jews, to frequent theirs. This, however, does not prove that these denominations have no right to demand that the public education be what all real education must be, that is, religious. But, as this cannot be done in the present system, they have the right, and if they unite, they will have the power to obtain a fair distribution among themselves of the school fund, which comes out of their pockets, and which is destined to promote, not the interests of free-thinkers, but those of all the denominations that are in the country, and constitute the State.

After having contended that religious denominations have "no right at all" to have their religion taught in the public schools, our lecturer remarks very truly, that Catholics are not satisfied with this "equality of rights." He might have added, that such is the case with others too, who are not Catholics. For this pretended "equality of rights," when the right of all denominations has been denied, is nothing but a general and equal disregard of those rights themselves, and it must cause general dissatisfaction. Mr. Abbot says also that Catholics "feel aggrieved unless their religion is positively taught in the schools to which their children go." This is true.

But how does it follow from this, that "so far as the public schools are concerned, this is to demand unequal rights," and therefore that we Catholics have "a very unreasonable conscience?" Mr. Abbot knows full well that we ask nothing for ourselves that we do not concede to others. Our conscience, therefore, is perfectly reasonable; and so is the conscience of other Christian denominations, too, when they claim the same right; though they claim it with less persistence than we do, for reasons which all know, and which it is not our present duty to examine.

After this misrepresentation, Mr. Abbot mentions our fourth claim as follows:

"Fourthly. The Catholic conscience demands, in Bishop McQuaid's words, 'the non-interference of the State in church or in school.' On the other hand, the secular conscience requires the non-interference of the Church in State or school. To which shall the school belong, to the Church or to the State? That is, indeed, the clean issue. But I do not see any way to reconcile here the two consciences. I suspect they are equally stubborn, equally unable to yield; but which is the more *reasonable* is a point which must prove in the end decisive."

From these words it would seem that there is something in the world which assumes the name of "secular conscience," and that this so-called "conscience" orders the non-interference of the Church in the education of her children. But let us say it plainly, the existence of such a conscience is a mere fiction, and an absurd one too. Guardians may feel obliged in conscience to oppose the notions of their wards, if they think them wrong; but secularists are not our guardians, nor are we their wards. How, then, can they feel obliged by their conscience to define what should be our conduct in relation to the system of public schools, and to decide that religion must be ignored in those very institutions in which it is most needed? A conscience of this kind cannot be found in human beings. If Mr. Abbot had said, that the secular conscience does not feel the duty of yielding to our just claims, we might easily believe him; for we know that free-religionists do not much mind their consciences. But to tell us that the secular conscience feels it a duty to ignore the rights of religion in our public schools, is to say what is false. No conscience can feel bound but by the moral necessity of obeying the moral law; and this law does certainly not order the maintenance, as it did not order the creation of schools in which God—the Author of the moral law—must be ignored; and, therefore, there can be no question of two opposite consciences "equally stubborn, equally unable to yield." Those who do not scruple to deny God's right in the public schools, cannot decently pretend that they do so for motives of conscience. Conscience without God and without religion is as impossible as a sphere without a centre. Accordingly what makes them "stub-

born" is not their conscience, but their antichristian spirit. If stubbornness were a test of reasonableness, as Mr. Abbot seems to hold, no creature would be more reasonable than the mule.

He continues :

"Fifthly. The Catholic conscience claims to be violated by a system which supports Protestant schools at the public expense ; and the justice of this claim must be allowed. To make the public schools Protestant by requiring or permitting Protestant worship in them is truly a violation of all but Protestant consciences. But it is easy to rectify this wrong, and to establish a perfect equality of rights in the case, by simply secularizing the schools altogether. If this would satisfy the Catholic conscience, a permanent settlement of the school question could be effected ; but the Catholic conscience is not satisfied with equality—it demands *privilege*, which is a very different matter."

This passage is a compound of cavil and calumny. The Catholic conscience claims to be violated by the school system, not because the system supports Protestant schools at the public expense, but because it does not equally support those of other religious denominations. Protestants, so long as they continue to pay their school tax, have a clear right to have Protestant schools supported at the public expense ; and, therefore, whatever Mr. Abbot may say to the contrary, no injustice is committed in thus supporting their schools. The injustice consists in not supporting the schools of other denominations, which have as much right as their Protestant neighbors to the benefits of religious education.

Mr. Abbot maintains that "a system which supports Protestant schools at the public expense" is unjust, because "it is truly a violation of all but Protestant consciences." This would be true, if Protestants alone were to be supported. But how did the lecturer fail to see that, for a similar reason, "a system which supports *godless* schools at the public expense" is even more glaringly unjust, as it truly violates all Christian consciences without exception? He says, that "it is easy to rectify the wrong" of which we complain, "by establishing a perfect equality of rights in the case," but he is shameless enough to tell us, that, to obtain this "perfect equality," the schools must be "secularized altogether," that is, our rights must be equally crushed, and *the secularists alone* must have the privilege of carrying on their hateful business at the expense of a protesting public. Mr. Abbot should be very careful indeed not to demand privileges for his party when he accuses others of not being satisfied with *equality*, and of demanding *privileges*. That we ask for privileges is a stupid and wicked invention of the lecturer, as we have shown ; but that the infidel party ask for privileges is a matter of fact, of which innocent Mr. Abbot himself furnishes us the most incontrovertible evidence.

Nor is this a matter of surprise. Freemasons in Europe have long been in the habit of charging the Catholic community with all

the evils which they themselves were actually maturing or perpetrating. When they were working out their plans for the enslavement of Italy, of which they are now the masters and the scourge, they pretended that Italy was being reduced by the priests to a deplorable state of slavery. When they determined to attack the Church in Germany, they contended, and Prince Bismarck was ready to swear in Parliament, that it was the Church that was preparing to attack Germany. When they were busily engaged in France and elsewhere in curtailing the ecclesiastical liberties, they furiously accused the bishops and the whole clergy of interfering with the liberty of the people. Their journals were always full of bitter denunciations. Church pretensions, ultramontane arrogance, Jesuitic conspiracies, usurpations of National or State rights, and other inventions of the same sort, formed the constant subject of violent articles and noisy declamations; and while the attention of a credulous public was adroitly drawn to these silly and imaginary charges, the Lodges were actually and effectually doing the very things of which they accused their neighbors. Such were, and are, their tactics in Europe. American Freemasons are said to be less treacherous; but it is remarkable, that they have never condemned the iniquities perpetrated by their European brethren. Nay, do they not rather show the same overbearing spirit, and resort to the same hypocritical means? Mr. Abbot, at any rate, strives to reach the perfection of the European craft, when he accuses the Church of demanding a privilege which none but his own party aspires to secure.

And now let us see how he treats our sixth claim.

"Sixthly. The Catholic conscience claims to be still more violated by a system which should support secular schools at the public expense. Now what is a secular school? A school in which the elementary branches of an English education—reading, writing, arithmetic, etc.—are taught, and in which religion is not taught; one which teaches nothing but what all children, whether of Catholic, Protestant, or Liberal parentage alike need to know, and which is scrupulously protected from all usurpation by any class of parents in matters of religion. To pretend that this careful exclusion of all religious worship and instruction is to teach irreligion, is an instance of unparalleled audacity. It is impossible to teach the alphabet or multiplication table and the Catholic Catechism at one and the same instant; and even in the Catholic schools a certain time is devoted to teaching the alphabet and the multiplication table exclusively. Is that to teach irreligion? I must press this question: is it teaching irreligion to devote a portion of time exclusively to teaching arithmetic or geography? If it is, then Catholic schools also teach irreligion just so long as they are teaching arithmetic or geography, and they should be denounced just as sweepingly as the public schools. But if not—if it is not teaching irreligion to devote in Catholic schools one or two hours exclusively to instruction in secular knowledge—then it is no more teaching irreligion to devote in the public schools three, or four, or five hours to the same instruction. The Catholics may choose which horn of the dilemma they please; either the Catholic schools teach irreligion part of the time, or else the public schools do not teach irreligion at all."

Well, we will tell Mr. Abbot, though he knows it perfectly, that his dilemma is a mere cobweb. We never said that to teach arithmetic or geography is to teach irreligion; but no one will deny that the atmosphere of the school, the personal bias of the teacher, and the manner of teaching whether arithmetic, geography, or any other branch of secular instruction, is calculated to instil religion or irreligion, according to the conditions of the case. An infidel may surely teach irreligion along with geography, and a Catholic may as surely teach religion along with arithmetic. This is a fact of common occurrence, and Mr. Abbot knows it as well as every one else. Hence it is really "an instance of unparalleled audacity" on his part to pretend that the Catholic schools, just like the infidel schools, when teaching the secular branches, are teaching irreligion. Again, to teach geography is not to teach irreligion, just as to furnish bread is not to forbid water. But a system which does not allow one to put any drink on the table, is a system which virtually forbids all drink, and violates the laws of health, and a system which does not allow religion to be learned and practiced in the schools, is a system which virtually condemns all religion, and violates the laws of conscience.

The lecturer proceeds as follows:

"The sole ground of complaint against secular schools is, that they omit to teach a positive Catholic doctrine; and the attempt to twist this omission to teach Catholicism into a direct teaching of the contrary is a very desperate shift."

Catholics do not complain that the omission in question is a *direct teaching* of infidelity. They only maintain that, owing to such an omission, the child is frustrated of religious education. The "very desperate shift" is, therefore, a product of mere sophistry.

"Let us illustrate. I go to a carriage warehouse where buggies are advertised for sale, and order a horse and buggy. 'But,' replies the proprietor, 'I do not sell horses; I sell only buggies.' 'That will do very well for those who want buggies only,' I answer; 'I don't believe in separating horses and buggies, and my conscience forbids me to purchase them separately.' 'I should be glad to accommodate you,' replies the puzzled proprietor, 'but really, my dear sir, I have only buggies for sale.' 'Then,' I exclaim, 'I denounce you for a violation of equal rights, and for a secret purpose to outrage the community by abolishing horses. You grant all they ask to those who conscientiously want buggies alone; but you refuse what I ask, when my conscience demands a horse and a buggy, one and inseparable. This is an invidious discrimination against my equal rights, a direct assault on the very existence of all horses; and now I propose to shut up your establishment altogether.' This is exactly what the Catholics are doing; they propose to shut up all State schools, if they can, because State schools can teach only secular knowledge, and not religion at the same time. They have profound scruples of conscience against buying buggies without horses."

This pretended illustration must have amused Mr. Abbot's audience, though every one might have easily discovered that it had really no bearing on the case. A buggy without a horse is still a

complete buggy, whilst education without religion is no education at all. Hence the illustration is not to the point. We might suggest to Mr. Abbot a better one. We might suppose that a company is formed, which obliges itself to furnish a city with buggies at the expense of the public, and we might suppose also that all the buggies provided by such a company are found to be without wheels. Would not this illustration harmonize much better with the point in question? But enough of such trifles. Let us see how our lecturer propounds and discusses what he considers our seventh claim.

"Seventhly. But the gist of the claims made by the Catholic conscience is, that Catholic parents ought not to be taxed for any but Catholic schools, since they cannot conscientiously send their children to any other; and since the State cannot support Catholic schools, Catholic parents ought to be relieved from school taxes altogether, or else to receive back their own taxes from the State to be expended under their own control for Catholic schools. This is the beginning, middle, and end of the Catholic claim; all other claims of the Catholic conscience grow out of this. Bishop McQuaid says distinctly: 'Catholics who are thus taxed are, to the extent of the taxes they pay, punished—persecuted for religion's sake.' And again, 'It must not be lost sight of in this argument, that our rights go where our money goes.'"

The case is fairly stated, though by no means completely. We do not believe in raising uniform State taxes even for Catholic schools. Taxes must be justified by necessity; and there is no necessity of educating at the public expense the many thousands who can educate themselves better by their own means. The only educational taxes which can be reasonably defended, are those which go to the support of orphans and helpless children; who, however, should be confided not to free-thinkers, but to educators of their own denomination. All other schools should be paid by those who frequent them. And as to the State (or rather to the few scores of politicians who are said to represent the State) we maintain that it has no right whatever to tax citizens for an object which it is wholly incompetent to secure. The objection, therefore, which we raise on this head, is not grounded exclusively on the Catholic conscience, and it may be as justly and reasonably urged by the Jew and the Protestant, as by the Catholic. After this remark, on which we will not now insist, but which is not without importance, let us hear what Mr. Abbot has to say in defence of his cause:

"It is in the name, therefore, of *Catholic parents*, who are taxed by the State for the support of the public schools, that the whole protest of the Catholic conscience is entered. But in truth the State deals exclusively with individuals in this matter of taxation; it deals with them neither as Catholics nor even as parents, but simply and solely as *citizens*. The State does not ask whether the taxpayer is a Catholic, or Protestant, or Jew, or Free-thinker; it does not ask whether he is married or unmarried, a parent or childless; it only asks him to pay his fair proportion of the school expenses as an *individual member of the civil community*."

In other words, the State *pleads guilty*. It knows the needs of the community; it knows that the Catholic wants Catholic education, the Protestant a distinctively Protestant teaching, and the Jew a Jewish instruction. It knows that these denominations constitute the great bulk of the people; it knows that the rights of these denominations are sacred; and yet it says: "I do not care whether the taxpayer is Catholic, Protestant, or Jew. I disregard alike all family rights, all duties of religion, all claims of conscience. Men, when not free-thinkers, have no rights; they are mere cattle. *I only ask them to pay!* It is money that I want; and this money, which I extort from them in the name of education, I will put in the hands of said free-thinkers, that they may multiply, fatten, promote all their interests, undermine all religious spirit, and form a generation which shall worship nothing but self." This, we conceive, is what Mr. Abbot's reply amounts to.

But he has more to say :

"Now the question whether the State, which wholly ignores the inquiry as to the taxpayer's religion or family relations, has a right to tax all citizens indiscriminately for the support of the public school system, will presently come up for independent discussion; but I wish to point out that this general question is not raised by the Catholic conscience, which claims exemption from the public school tax for *Catholic parents as such*. It is the duties imposed by Catholic parentage which constitute the ground of the demand of 'Catholic education for Catholic children;' and it is the rights inherent in the Catholic parentage which constitute at least the ostensible grounds of protest against taxation for public schools. The protest is essentially a denial of the general obligation of *citizenship* in the name of *Church membership and family ties*."

We deny this malicious conclusion, together with its premises. When we complain of the injustice done to us in particular, we simply mention the rights of *Catholic parents as such*; but Mr. Abbot should be able to understand, that while we do so, we by no means imply that we alone are dealt with unjustly. Protestants and Jews are just as badly treated as Catholics; and though we in pleading our cause, protest only against the school taxes which Catholics are forced to pay, yet we are fully convinced that all the other denominations have as much right to protest against the school taxes that weigh upon them. The State is quite incompetent to educate children and to form good citizens, for the very reason that it cannot teach religion. This is why Catholics and non-Catholics alike maintain that the State oversteps the boundaries of State rights in assuming the part of educator, and that it grossly violates justice in taxing the people for the godless system of public schools.

Mr. Abbot promises to show that the State "has a right to tax all citizens indiscriminately for the support of the public school system;" and he points out that this right is not objected to by the

Catholic conscience. We must inform him, however, that our Catholic conscience, while bidding us to pay our part of school taxes so long as they are enforced, does not cease to protest against the system for which such taxes are extorted. Whether the State has a right to levy taxes on all citizens indiscriminately for the support of public schools *adapted to the special needs of each religious denomination*, and to which children of each denomination respectively may be sent *without danger to their faith and morals*, we will not discuss; for we think that this question, apart from all reasons which may be alleged for either side of it, can be safely left to the decision of the citizens themselves, whose will, in this matter, makes law. But that the State can levy taxes on all citizens indiscriminately for supporting a public school system which disregards alike the religious needs of the pupils, and the religious rights of their parents, we most unhesitatingly and most deliberately deny; and every man of sense, whether he be a Catholic or not, will equally deny it. The State, in free America, is the servant, not the master of the people. The people may indeed be cheated, and has been cheated on this very subject of education by false promises; but now that the experiment has been tried long enough to test the demoralizing influence of the secular system, all intelligent men confess that the country has been the victim of a misplaced confidence. We will not denounce the State for betraying its duty towards a Christian people. This denunciation would be unfair; for the State could not do better. But it was for the people, before allowing the State to meddle with education, to reflect that the State has no power of modelling the consciences of children, no grace for controlling their passions, no means of instilling virtue, of educating the heart, or of doing anything else that reason and universal experience teach to be necessary for the formation of good and moral citizens.

The State, therefore, cannot be the educator of the children of the people; and this proves that the State has no right to be paid for what it is radically unable to perform. The State is for the people, not the people for the State. When all good Americans who grieve at the fearful spread of dishonesty and crime in the country will raise a loud unanimous cry against the State godless schools, it will be in their power to shake off the incubus, and to show to the secularists that not Catholics alone, but millions of all denominations agree in the great principle, that "where our money goes, there our rights go." Our protest, therefore, is not "essentially a denial of the general obligation of *citizenship* in the name of *church membership and family ties*," as Mr. Abbot vainly contends: it is a denial of any right in the State to be paid for a work which it is incompetent to do.

PARENTAL PREROGATIVES.—Our lecturer continues thus :

“ Before discussing the right of the State to tax all its citizens for public schools, I must first consider the astounding claim of Catholic parents to be treated as if they were no citizens at all, but to be excepted, set apart by themselves, and permitted to receive the benefits of the State without discharging the corresponding obligations. The Catholic claim is, not to be taxed for non-Catholic public schools; and it rests wholly on the alleged absolute rights of Catholic parents as such. These rights, it is evident, must be closely scrutinized and analyzed.”

We are quite willing that parental rights should be scrutinized ; but Mr. Abbot should state things as they are, not as they can be colored by malevolence. The “astounding” claim of parents “to be treated as if they were no citizens at all” is *not* a Catholic claim. Nor do we aspire “to receive the benefits of the State without discharging the corresponding obligations.” The calumny is even too silly to need a word of refutation. Rights and obligations are correlative, and Mr. Abbot, who is not ignorant of this truth, before speaking of our “obligation” to pay taxes for the *godless* schools inaugurated by the State, should have established the “right” of the State to tax all citizens for *godless* schools. But our lecturer lays down that obligation without having established this right; and although he promises his audience “a discussion” of such a right, he does nothing of the sort, but contents himself with a parade of gratuitous assumptions. Thus the right of the State to tax all its citizens for the support of *godless* schools is not established, and indeed it never will be, for it has no existence. Accordingly such a tax for such a *godless* object is an injustice, and, therefore, all citizens have a natural and a constitutional right to demand that either the public schools cease to be godless, or if this cannot be done, that the tax be repealed. Catholics, therefore, do not claim to be treated “as if they were no citizens at all;” they claim, on the contrary, to be treated as all citizens should be treated in a free country, that is, justly and with common decency. On the other hand, they are by no means anxious “to receive the benefits” of a godless State education; for they, and all Christian parents, may well afford to abandon such unwelcome benefits to the enemies of God and of his Christ.

But let us proceed :

“The protest of the Catholic conscience against taxation for a non-Catholic public school system grows out of what Bishop McQuaid has well described as ‘parental prerogative.’ But in this matter he speaks not for himself alone. Chief Justice Dunne, of Arizona, in a lecture delivered a year ago, laid down these two principles as the basis of the Catholic demand respecting the schools : ‘1. Religious instruction is of paramount importance. 2. Each parent has the right to say what religious instruction his child shall receive.’ And he says in another passage : ‘This claim to the absolute control of our domestic affairs is a sacred right which we cannot yield to the State.’”

Let us remark by the way, that our lecturer, while stating our

claims, carefully avoids all mention of similar claims advanced by other denominations, and by all mankind in general. His style of arguing compels him to ignore the well-known fact, that all religions and sects throughout the world admit the doctrine of parental prerogative as laid down by the Catholics—a fact which, if mentioned by Mr. Abbot, would have sufficed to show that his argumentation is directed against a universal principle rather than against a specifically Catholic claim.

He continues :

“The *Catholic World*, for January, speaks in the same strain, laying the foundation for the Catholic demands in a seemingly very harmless proposition : ‘Whatever you do keep your hands off the family altar. Do not set foot into the hallowed precinct of the domestic sanctuary. The family, though subordinate, is not to be violated by the State. Parents have rights which no government can usurp.’ Those rights are intended to include absolute control over the education of children.”

And so, indeed, they are. If however this proposition is not *really*, but only *seemingly* harmless, why did not Mr. Abbot avail himself of the opportunity for revealing the hidden meaning of the same, and the harm of which it would be the source? Let him reflect, that a lecturer who substitutes insinuation for argument, has no right to the respect of an intelligent audience.

“Rev. Father Müller, in his book called *Public School Education*, defines the doctrine of parental prerogative as follows : ‘It is not on the State, but on parents, that God imposed the duty to educate their children, a duty from which no State can dispense; nor can fathers and mothers relieve themselves of this duty by the vicarious assumption of the State. They have to give a severe account of their children on the day of judgment, and they cannot allow any power to disturb them in insisting upon their rights and making free use of them. The State has no more authority or control rightfully over our children than over a man’s wife. The right to educate our children is a right of conscience and a right of the family. Now these rights do not belong to the temporal order at all; and outside of this the State has no claim, no right, no authority.’ ”

This excellent passage from Rev. Father Müller’s book contains not only a statement of our claims, but also the proof of their reasonableness and justice. To quote it, as Mr. Abbot does, and then to throw it aside without the least attempt at refutation, is an act of dishonesty; but it was the only course open to an enemy of religious truth. Mr. Abbot adds :

“Again, condensing into a pregnant phrase the whole Catholic theory of parental prerogative, Father Müller emphatically declares, and I would solicit special attention to the declaration : ‘*The social unit is the family, not the individual.*’ ”

The reason why our lecturer solicits special attention to this declaration is, that he has at hand a queer set of masonic implements, with which he will soon endeavor to demolish this cardinal principle of social life. We may be sure that the attempt will end in failure; but, even supposing that the social unit is the individual,

as he imagines, we do not see how this would suffice to destroy "the whole Catholic theory of parental prerogative," which is not a special whim of Catholics, as the lecturer falsely insinuates, but a universal principle admitted and acted on in all times, by all civilized nations, under all forms of governments and religions.

Mr. Abbot continues:

"Bishop McQuaid thus stated the same general position in a lecture at Rochester, N. Y., in March, 1872. 'Parents have the right to educate their children. It is wrong for the State to interfere with the exercise of this right. By the establishment of common schools at the expense of all taxpayers, the State does interfere with this right, especially in the case of poor parents, who find it a burden to pay double taxes.' Last Sunday the Bishop expressed the same general views as follows: 'The last to be heard and consulted is the one to whom the settlement of the question first and finally belongs—the parent of the child. . . . In despite of all, the responsibility of the education of this child falls upon him, and on no one else. . . . Parental rights precede State rights. . . . A father's right to the pursuit of happiness extends to that of his children as well. . . . Parental rights include parental duties and responsibilities before God and society.' After quoting various authorities in defence of his position, the Bishop continued: 'It is the Christian view of parental rights and duties which is here given. . . . The doctrine coming into vogue, that the child belongs to the State, is the dressing up of an old skeleton of Spartan paganism, with its hideousness dimly disguised by a thin cloaking of Christian morality.' "

It is remarkable, that Mr. Abbot, in making these quotations, avoids giving any of the reasons by which the Bishop proved his conclusions. Let our reader glance at the first three or four pages of Bishop McQuaid's lecture, and he will understand how prudent Mr. Abbot has been in quoting but detached sentences. The same high prudence he has shown in quoting from Father Müller's book and from Chief Justice Dunne's lecture. Whether such a discriminating prudence does credit to a lecturer who undertakes to refute the Catholic view of parental rights, we leave to our readers to decide.

Mr. Abbot, thinking that he has given sufficient evidence of impartiality by such quotations as we have seen, continues thus:

"I have quoted enough, I think, to give a fair view of this theory of parental prerogative, on which the Catholic protest against the public school system is founded. Its principal points are as follows, restated in something like logical order.

"1. The social unit is the family, not the individual; and in the family the father is the supreme authority or head, both the wife and the children being required by the Catholic Church to 'obey' him."

"2. The father, representing the family, is charged with all the rights, powers, and responsibilities concerning the education of the children. The State has absolutely no share either in the rights, powers, or responsibilities; for all education must be Catholic, and the State has neither capacity nor authority to impart it."

"3. The State, consequently, by establishing a common school system, and taxing all citizens to support it, violates the sanctity of family rights, invades and usurps the parental prerogative, and oppresses the father's conscience by requiring him to support a system of schools to which he cannot send his children, and by which all these wrongs are committed."

"Here we have the core and pith of the Catholic protest against taxation for the

public schools, so far as it is deemed wise to address it to the general intelligence of the American people. It is the side of the Catholic conscience which is turned to the outside world, although there is another side of it, which is turned towards the Catholic Church."

O shame! It requires either a stolid ignorance or a heartless soul, full of venom and hypocrisy, to utter before the public a charge of duplicity against such respectable and respected citizens, as Father Müller, Bishop McQuaid, and Chief Justice Dunne. Mr. Abbot's impudence in affirming that "there is another side" which these men wisely conceal from "the intelligence of the American people" is indeed worthy of the editor of the *Index*, but it is a blunder for all that; for, if these gentlemen were to ask an explanation about that "other side," he would be unable to cite a single fact in support of his mendacious insinuation, and he might be compelled to swallow his falsehood. But without insisting any further on the meanness of such an unjustifiable assault, we have something else to point out concerning his manner of recapitulating our claims.

First. Is it only the Catholic Church that requires "both the wife and the children to *obey* the head of the family?" Are Protestant fathers to obey their children? or Protestant husbands to obey their wives? Or is obedience to be banished from non-Catholic families altogether? Then, why should boys and girls obey their teachers? Why should teachers obey their superintendents? Why should even Freemasons obey their grand-masters? But, if obedience is a necessary condition of all society, why does Mr. Abbot speak as if the Catholic Church alone required children to obey their parents?

Secondly. Where did he find that the Catholic Church denied to the State any share in the education of children for the reason that "all education must be Catholic?" Did we ever pretend that the Jew, the Protestant, or the Mormon, must be educated in Catholic schools? Even the Popes themselves have always allowed the Jews in Rome to suit themselves with a Jewish education. Does Mr. Abbot suppose that American Catholics are more Catholic than the Pope? Is this that "side" of our conscience which Catholics do not turn to the outside world? No, Mr. Abbot, it is Freemasonry that has two "sides," the one to show, and the other to conceal; the whole world knows it. But, as for us, we have no secret oaths, and we make no mystery of our doctrines and aims.

But let us proceed. He says:

"We see that, so far as this protest is addressed to the universal reason of mankind, it plants itself on a doctrine of 'parental prerogative,' which is at bottom a general social theory; namely, that society has for its ultimate unit the *family*, not the *individual*, and that all the educational rights, powers, and responsibilities of the family are concentrated in the father as the divinely constituted head of the family."

We beg pardon of Mr. Abbot; but our protest is "planted" not only on the doctrine of parental prerogative, but also on the well-recognized inability of the State to perform the duties of educator. It is this inability that disqualifies the State to impose its educational tax. Moreover, we do not say that all the educational rights of the family "are concentrated in the father." The children have their rights perfectly distinct from the rights of their father, whose duty it is to protect them. But let us follow our lecturer.

"Whether, therefore, the protest of the Catholic conscience against the public school system is an intrinsically reasonable conscience or not, is a question which only can be determined by examining the social theory on which it rests. Should this theory not prove to be inherently reasonable, but to involve unreason and injustice of a grave character, then the school question will be fundamentally changed. It will no longer be the question whether we ought to abandon the public school system out of deference to the rights of an oppressed minority, but rather how we should most justly and most tenderly deal with the honest but unenlightened and dangerously misguided conscience of a sect which is discontented with the essential principles of republican institutions."

Mr. Abbot is willing to deal with us "most justly and most tenderly." He dreams a victory, but he will not abuse it; quite the contrary. Meanwhile, to show us how justly he can afford to deal with us, he calls us "a sect," which we are not; and to prove his tenderness and kindness towards us, he assumes that we are "honest" in deed, but "unenlightened," and even "dangerously misguided" so long as we prefer the light of the Gospel to the smoke of masonic theories, and the guidance of the Church to that of *The Index*. He also takes care to remind us that the adversaries of the godless schools are only "a minority," which is true, if he refers to Catholics alone, but very probably false, if the feelings of other religious denominations be taken into account. Lastly, he imagines, that so long as we defend parental rights, we are in conflict "with the essential principles of republican institutions." The remark is silly. Our readers who know something of the world's history, need no assistance from us to pronounce their judgment.

Mr. Abbot continues:

"This is certainly a question of the greatest gravity; but it is not so grave as one which involves the possible abandonment of all State education."

The gravity of this last question, from the point of view of our free-thinkers, is undeniable; for the fall of State schools would put an end to their usurped supremacy, and take from their hands the money of the people which they are now squandering for the glory of their fraternity. This explains the great interest felt by Mr. Abbot in the cause of State schools. But to our Christian people the abandonment of all State education is not a very grave question; it is only a return to common sense, and a legitimate corollary of civil and religious freedom.

"If the Catholic protest is actually not based on sound reason and impartial reverence for the rights of all, if it turns out to be the stealthy and masked attack of an ambitious hierarchy on the bulwarks of popular liberty, our minds will be at least relieved of much perplexity and embarrassment."

Perfectly true. But if the stealthy and masked attack on the bulwarks of popular liberty turns out to be the work of Mr. Abbot's friends, a truth which no amount of tergiversation can obscure, it will be evident that the appeal of the lecturer to "sound reason and impartial reverence for the rights of all" is either unmeaning or hypocritical. Freemasons, we have said, have long been in the habit of charging the Catholic Church with all the evils which they themselves were actually maturing or perpetrating. If the fact needed confirmation, the sounding twaddle just adverted to would furnish additional evidence of it.

IS THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL THEORY A RELIC OF BARBARISM?—Mr. Abbot continues as follows :

"What, then, is the intrinsic character of this doctrine of parental prerogative? Is it true or false? Remembering clearly the chief features of the Catholic social theory which lies at the bottom of the so-called parental prerogative, namely, that the social unit is the family, not the individual, and that all powers and rights touching the education of children are vested in the father as the head of the family, you will gain a clearer insight into the truth of this matter if, instead of giving you any reflection of my own, I read to you some pretty copious extracts from a book which every well-read person will recognize at once as one which enjoys a world-wide reputation of the highest possible character. I refer to the treatise of Sir Henry Sumner Maine on *Ancient Law*, a work which, by common consent, ranks among the ablest and most valuable productions of the century. What he has to say on this subject will hardly be gainsaid by any but the uninformed, and I prefer to give his views in his own language without attempting to translate them into my own."

Sir Henry Sumner Maine has a good reputation as a lawyer, and we wish to say nothing against him. Yet, if his views were contrary to the Catholic doctrine, we should not be embarrassed by his authority. What is the authority of an able man, or of a hundred able men, when contrasted with the authority of the Church, and the verdict of nature itself? Mr. Abbot's argument comes to this: "A learned English jurist opposes the Catholic doctrine; therefore the Catholic doctrine is false." Oh, most lame and impotent conclusion!

This answer might suffice. But we must add that the words of Sir Henry Maine do not warrant Mr. Abbot's conclusion, namely, that the Catholic social theory is "a relic of barbarism." We will copy from the passage quoted by our lecturer the phrases on which he pins his arrogant conclusion, and we will barely insert a few parenthetical remarks of our own, which Mr. Abbot would do well to consider.

Sir Henry Maine says: "The effect of the evidence derived from

comparative jurisprudence is to establish that view of the primeval condition of the human race, which is known as the Patriarchal theory. . . . Society (*political* society, as the author explains later) in primitive times was not what is assumed (only *assumed*, but by no means proved), to be at present a collection of individuals. In fact, and in the view of the men who composed it, it was an aggregation of families. The contrast may be most forcibly expressed by saying that the unit of an ancient (ancient, but not necessarily *barbarous*, as Mr. Abbot would have it) society was the family; of a modern (that is, revolutionary, socialistic, and masonic) society the individual. . . . In some of the Greek States and in Rome (that is, in the most civilized nations of antiquity) there long remained the vestiges of an ascending series of groups out of which the State was at first constituted (and when those vestiges disappeared their political organization lost its natural support and crumbled down and finally became the prey of barbarian valor). The family, house, and tribe of the Romans may be taken as the type of them, and they are so described to us that we can scarcely help conceiving them as a system of concentric circles, which have gradually expanded from the same point. The aggregation of families (in the best times of the great Roman Republic) forms the gens or house. The aggregation of houses makes the tribe. The aggregation of tribes constitutes the Commonwealth. . . . No doubt when with our modern (socialistic) ideas we contemplate the union of independent communities, we can suggest a hundred modes of carrying it out (with or without regard to pre-existing rights), the simplest of all being that the individuals (women and children too?) comprised in the coalescing groups shall vote or act according to local propinquity; but the idea that a number of persons (the most stupid and wicked ones, as well as the wisest) should exercise political rights in common (and have exactly the same weight in deciding political or social questions), simply because they happened to live within the same topographical limits, was utterly strange and monstrous to primitive antiquity (and to all civilized nations up to the present century). . . . This was the principle of local contiguity (which is no principle at all) now recognized everywhere (by demagogues, schemers, and rotten administrations) as the condition of community (or rather communistic prevalence) in political functions."

It is plain that Sir Henry Maine considers universal suffrage as the simplest mode of exercising political functions; and it is in this sense that he calls the individual *politically* a social unit. In other terms, the number of votes that decide any political question is made up of units, and these units are the votes of individuals.

But does this system of political voting imply that voters alone as individuals constitute society? Far from it. If the ultimate element of society is the *voting* individual, then the wife and children of the voter are no part of society, and society owes nothing to them. But, if they, too, are a part, and a most important one, of society, then it is evident that, since they are not personally entitled to vote on political issues, the protection of their interests devolves on him whose vote is recognized by the law. The law, of course, may not care whether the voter is the head of a family or not; but the fact is that the head of a family as such acts for all the members of the family, whose rights and interests he is bound to protect. And thus the individual, this pretended "social unit," is in fact, even according to the modern system, only the head of a social unit (the family), and its natural representative.

Our lecturer clinches the long passage just quoted by the following words:

"We thus see clearly, that the Roman Catholic social theory, according to which (in the very phrase of Father Müller himself) the social unit is the family, not the individual, appears to be a mere relic of primeval barbarism, the survival of an antiquated and fossilized conception, utterly out of harmony with the pervading spirit of modern society."

This conclusion disappoints all logic. Sir Henry Maine would scarcely concede, and certainly did not assume, that the Romans were "primeval barbarians." His words, therefore, do not warrant Mr. Abbot's assertion. We might, on the contrary, infer from them, that our Catholic social theory is the real foundation of civil society, that it has been constantly recognized by the most civilized and powerful nations on earth, that it is not an antiquated and fossilized conception (since even Mr. Abbot acknowledges that it has *survived* in the universal Church), but a permanent dictate of reason, and that it cannot be called "a relic of primeval barbarism" any more than could the theory and the practice of eating and drinking, which Mr. Abbot surely does not condemn, though he knows that it was in use among primeval barbarians. The duties, the rights, and the wants of nature are independent of the whims of speculators and politicians; they will always assert themselves, and they will continue to rule modern society in spite of the "pervading spirit" of modern socialism and Freemasonry, which is nothing but a disease of society. It would be useless to insist any longer on this point. Mr. Abbot may insult us, as he does; but all men of judgment, who have paid a moderate attention to the teachings of contemporary history, will say that the "relics of primeval barbarism" have been treasured up by the secret societies and by the Bismarckian Liberals, not by the Church.

And now Mr. Abbot goes a step further. He says:

"A closer investigation only reveals this fact most plainly. The parental prerogative of Bishop McQuaid is nothing but a modification of the *patria potestas*, or fatherly authority of the ancient Roman law."

This new argument, like the preceding one, attacks in Bishop McQuaid all mankind at once. It amounts to this: "The parental prerogative is a modification of the *patria potestas*. But *patria potestas* is a relic of primeval barbarism; therefore, the parental prerogative is a relic of primeval barbarism." Bravo! Mr. Abbot. If this form of reasoning were admissible, we might say: Mr. Abbot's coat is a modification of raw wool; but raw wool is unfit for the dress of a gentleman; therefore, Mr. Abbot's coat is unfit for a gentleman. Also: The custom of sleeping in bed is a modification of the primeval custom of sleeping on the bare ground; but sleeping on the bare ground is a relic of barbarism; therefore, sleeping in bed is a relic of barbarism. What will our sophist reply? Indeed, the *patria potestas*, as countenanced by the old Roman law, armed with excessive powers the head of the family; but does logic warrant the conclusion that its "modification" must have retained the same objectionable feature?

To support his sophism, our lecturer again quotes a long passage of Sir Henry Maine, which we can turn against him. In this passage we read that, according to the Roman law, "the parent had over his children the *jus vitæ necisque*, the power of life and death, and *a fortiori* of uncontrolled personal chastisement; he could modify their personal condition at pleasure; he could give a wife to his son; he could give his daughter in marriage; he could divorce his children of either sex; he could transfer them to another family by adoption, and he could sell them." Has Bishop McQuaid's parental prerogative the least resemblance to this parental tyranny? "Late in the imperial period," that is, when the influence of the Roman Church had begun to be felt at large, "we find vestiges of all these powers, but they are reduced within narrow limits. The unqualified right of domestic chastisement has become a right of bringing domestic offences under the cognizance of the civil magistrate; the privilege of dictating marriage has declined into a conditional veto; the liberty of selling has been virtually abolished; and adoption itself, destined to lose almost all its ancient importance in the reformed system of Justinian, can no longer be effected without the assent of the child transferred to the adoptive parentage. In short, we are brought very close to the verge of the ideas which have at length prevailed in the modern world." All this has been effected under the direction and by the efforts of the Catholic Church.

Sir Henry Maine adds: "The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of the family dependency, and the growth of individual obligation in its stead. *The individual is steadily substituted for the family, as the unit of which civil laws take account.* . . . Nor is it difficult to see what is the tie between man and man, which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the family. It is *contract*." This, of course, has not been the work of the Church. The Church cannot sanction the "gradual dissolution," but only the "rational limitation" of family dependency; and for this she deserves the best thanks of society. To substitute "the growth of individual obligation" for family dependency, is either a loose or a nonsensical phrase. For, it is evident that the throwing aside of family dependency is a practical impossibility; whilst, even if it were possible, it would by no means increase, but rather diminish the individual obligations of the child. That "the individual is steadily substituted for the family as the unit of which civil laws take account," does not mean that the civil law ceases to recognize the family and the duties of parents to their children or of children to their parents, but only that the civil law now reaches every individual of the family, and is as ready to protect their personal rights as to punish their personal misdeeds. Finally, that the forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the family are replaced by *contract*, if understood of rights and duties of parents towards their children, and of children towards their parents, is such an absurdity as no man in his senses could ever dream of. And we are, therefore, quite certain, that the eminent English jurist has not for a moment entertained such a stolid idea.

Now, what is there in the passage we have thus considered, which can give a pretext to Mr. Abbot for declaiming against the Catholic and universal doctrine of parental rights? Does the English jurist, or any jurist worth the name, maintain that the law has ceased to recognize the family, or has suppressed the rights and duties which bind the members of the family in a social unit according to natural law? And yet Mr. Abbot has the audacity to say:

"We are now in a condition to understand precisely the value of that parental prerogative, on which Bishop McQuaid and other Catholics base their claim that the school system violates parental rights. It is the old skeleton of Roman paganism dressed up with a thin cloaking of Christian morality."

The lecturer is here entering into a series of errors, of which the one we have just heard is the first.

"It is the ancient outgrown patria potestas intruding itself into modern society with

its claim of despotic authority for the father over his child, and ignoring both the personal rights of the child, and the collective right of society."

Here are five other errors. First, our parental right is not the outgrown patria potestas of the Romans, which on the contrary has been overthrown by Christianity. Secondly, our parental prerogative does not intrude itself into modern society; for it has always been in possession everywhere. Thirdly, it does not claim, but it absolutely condemns, despotic authority. Fourthly, it does not ignore the personal rights of the child. Fifthly, it fully recognizes the collective right of society, so far as it is a real right and not a dream of free-thinkers.

"It is the galvanized corpse of the old patriarchal theory, good enough for the days of Abraham, who, in obedience to it, undertook to murder his own son, but a disgusting anachronism in the nineteenth century, and in the centennial year."

We have here three errors more. First, the old patriarchal theory about parental rights has never been defunct, that we could galvanize its corpse. Secondly, Abraham did not undertake to murder his own son in obedience to any theory of parental rights, as even children might teach Mr. Abbot. Thirdly, our theory is most needed in the nineteenth century to check the growth of crime, and to unmask the hypocrisy of the Liberals who tyrannize the country with the name of liberty on their lips; and it is most acceptable to all good citizens in a year which reminds us of the respect with which the founders of our liberties and the authors of our independence surrounded the rights of family and religion.

After these nine false assertions, Mr. Abbot argues as follows:

"The school question cannot be justly referred for settlement to the 'parents' alone; the children have something at stake, society has something at stake, and parents must dismiss the notion that their despotic selfishness will be allowed to substitute the rights of one party alone for the rights of three parties to this issue."

This argument, as has been well observed ere now, would prove that parents must consult their neighbors and the general public before they attempt to furnish a bed, a pair of breeches, and above all a breakfast, dinner, and supper to their children; for in all this the children "have something at stake," and "society has something at stake," and "parents must dismiss the notion that their despotic selfishness will be allowed to substitute the rights of one party alone for the rights of three parties to this issue." But, to answer directly, we simply remark that, as a rule, the rights of children in no hands are more secure than in those of their loving parents, and that the rights of society are equally safe whether the parents educate their children at the public schools, at home, or in private institutions; whereas the rights of children, parents, and society itself, are now shamelessly trodden upon by the very system

which Mr. Abbot patronizes, and by the "despotic selfishness" of the State, as we have abundantly proved. The present school question has originated in a usurpation of common rights by organized enemies of Christianity. Let the usurpation cease, and the question will be ended. This is the only possible solution.

But Mr. Abbot continues :

"The Catholic social theory, with its claim that the family, not the individual, is the social unit, is the unburied skeleton of prehistoric barbarism, the most ancient and best authenticated relic in the keeping of the Church ; while the parental prerogative, which is so confidently relied upon to crush the great public school system under its elephantine tread, is nothing but the pale and powerless ghost of the ancient Roman *patria potestas*, with not enough substance in it to crush life out of a daisy."

Is it not amusing to see a grave man like Mr. Abbot fighting so furiously against a "pale and powerless ghost?" The truth is, however, that the ghost has a body, that is, two hundred millions of Catholics, and many other millions of various creeds all over the world. This is a very substantial and ponderous body ; and it is upon it, not upon a mere ghost, that Mr. Abbot heaps insult and contumely, though he declares it to be only the "unburied skeleton of prehistoric barbarism." Prehistoric, of course, means fabulous ; for we have the history of the first man, and this man was not a barbarian.

A STALKING-HORSE OF THE POPE.—The "pale and powerless ghost," after having become a "skeleton," is now to assume the form of a "horse." In fact, Mr. Abbot tells us that "parental prerogative is a mere stalking-horse of the Pope." This we did not expect. Bishop McQuaid had been altogether silent about the Pope ; he had treated his subject "before the universal bar of reason," "just as if no Pope had ever sat on the throne of the Vatican," as Mr. Abbot himself testifies. It was, therefore, quite unnecessary to drag the Pope into the controversy. But how could an infidel neglect the opportunity of reviling the holy and venerable Father of the faithful ? He says :

"But I have not got through with this parental prerogative as yet. It is a most shrewd and sagacious appeal to the very democratic instinct to which it is really opposed. It is an endeavor to rouse the jealous independence of the American father in repulse of a purely illusory attack on his reserved parental rights. That he has parental rights I am the last to deny ; I am a parent myself, and not slow to defend the rights of a parent. But it is tyranny for a parent to forget or disregard the rights of his child ; and it is usurpation for a parent to defy or despise the rights of society. Let the parent by all means stand firmly by his true parental rights in the school question, but let him be intelligent and self-restrained enough to recognize that he is not proprietor of all the rights in the case. Children are no longer the absolute property of the father."

All this is idle talk. Mr. Abbot seems to be ignorant that the right of providing and controlling education is not a right of "ab-

solute property." This ignorance, whether real or pretended, spoils his declamation and makes it ridiculous.

"The plea of parental prerogative is well calculated to create a sense of wrong where no wrong exists; to sting ignorant parents into claiming a jurisdiction that does not belong to them, and to induce them to look on the Catholic Church as the bold champion of their rights against the assault of a tyrannical majority."

Indeed! Our children are robbed of religious education in the public schools, and "no wrong exists!" And if parents see the wrong, they are "ignorant parents!" If they claim redress, they claim "a jurisdiction that does not belong to them!" To whom, then, belongs the jurisdiction? To venal politicians, or to masonic lodges? We have not yet abdicated our rights, nor will we ever resign them into the hands of these public enemies. And if our exertions in the cause of Christian education induce men to look on the Catholic Church as the bold champion of parental rights and of popular liberties, Mr. Abbot has no reason to complain; for he knows full well that the course we have taken in the matter has been forced upon us by his very friends, the self-styled Liberals, whose tyrannical spirit prevents the possibility of looking upon them as the champions of popular rights. Yes, the Church is the bold champion of popular liberties and of popular rights against the assaults of tyrannical majorities and of despotic rulers. Who can deny it?

"Such parents as these need to have their eyes opened; they are unsuspecting dupes."

This was the language of the serpent to Eve. Apparently Eve was an unsuspecting dupe of her Creator! It was but natural that the serpent should wish to open her eyes!

"When the Catholic Church pleads 'parental prerogative' to break down the beneficent public school system, and seemingly champions the right of parents against the oppressions and aggressions of the non-Catholic majority, such parents ought to see that the Church does not recognize any parental prerogative at all *as towards itself*."

Parents know this, and find it just and right. Must they, in order to please Mr. Abbot, exercise their parental prerogative in a manner contrary to their Catholic conscience? Or should the Church say: Your parental prerogative gives you the right to have your children poisoned by the *beneficent* public school system patronized by your enemies?

"No sooner has the Church succeeded in rescuing the Catholic parent from the imaginary jaws of the State, than it immediately proceeds to devour both parent and child with its own jaws."

That the jaws of the State are *imaginary*, is a very ingenious idea; but, if these jaws are imaginary, how could they have devoured in twelve years 1,999,000 Catholic children, as a Methodist

minister exultantly averred? As to the jaws of the Church, Catholic parents are not afraid of them. Catholics are the body of the Church, and the Church does not devour her own body.

"It claims for the parent, so far as the State is concerned, absolute and undivided authority over his child; but as the divinely deputed parent of all Catholics, it claims for itself absolute and undivided authority over both parent and child."

Certainly. Were the Church to claim less, she evidently would betray her duty to God and to her children. We recognize her divinely received authority, and we cheerfully submit to it. What business has Mr. Abbot to meddle with our convictions?

"It is well to understand this matter thoroughly. Whatever parental rights, or parental prerogative the Church may claim for Catholic parents, it concedes to them no rights whatsoever that are inconsistent with its own autocratic dominion over them."

How *autocratic*? Poor Mr. Abbot has the misfortune of not knowing the Church. He knows only the secret societies, and for this reason he cannot conceive of an authority which is not harsh, autocratic, and overbearing.

"Let no one for a moment imagine that the Church would tolerate any exercise of parental prerogative which should withdraw Catholic children from parochial schools to place them in the public schools. That sort of parental independence it is swift to punish with the severest penalties in its power to inflict. I must adduce some evidence of this statement to convince you that I am not talking at random."

To convince whom? The Catholic parents are already convinced that they cannot without sin neglect the Christian education of their children or disregard the warnings of their mother—the Church. They know also that sin deserves punishment. All Protestants also, and even all infidels, are convinced that every organized society has its constitution and by-laws, which cannot be infringed by its members without incurring penalties. It is, therefore, lost time to labor to convince them that the members of the Catholic Church cannot violate Catholic laws without incurring the penalties sanctioned by the Church. Mr. Abbot might just as well have tried to convince his audience that water is watery, and that talkers have a tongue. Yet it may be interesting to follow our lecturer in his superfluous endeavor, inasmuch as we shall see how the Catholic language can be appreciated by a stranger to Christianity. He says:

"In the list of 'damnable heresies' known as the *Syllabus Errorum*, denounced and condemned by Pope Pius IX., in 1864, the forty-eighth, is as follows: 'That method of instructing youth can be approved by Catholic men, which is separated from the Catholic faith and from the power of the Church, and which has regard, or at least principally to a knowledge of natural things only, and to the ends of social life on this earth.' The condemnation of this proposition is the explicit condemnation of all secular education by the supreme and infallible head of the Church, and it forbids all Catholics to sanction or approve anything but strictly Catholic education."

We beg to make three passing remarks. First, the *Syllabus* is not a list of "damnable heresies," but of condemnable propositions, whether heretical, or simply false and mischievous. Secondly, those words: "Which has regard, or at least principally, to a knowledge of natural things only," make no sense. They should read: "Which has regard only, or at least principally, to a knowledge of natural things." Thirdly, the *Syllabus* in this proposition does not condemn *secular*, but only *secularistic* education. The Church favors and encourages the teaching of all the branches of secular knowledge; what she condemns is only the banishment of religion from the school.

"The whole warfare of the Catholic Church in this country against the public school system is the direct consequence of obedience to this command of the Pope, and the Church could not possibly recognize any parental prerogative which should dare to dispute it."

It is evident that we cannot consistently with our principles dispute the official decision of the head of the Church. But, even before that decision, we knew that no "parental prerogative" could withstand the right of Catholic children to receive a Catholic education. It is not true, therefore, that "the whole warfare of the Church against the public school system is the direct consequence of obedience to the *Syllabus*." To speak only of America, and of our own time, Bishop Hughes, as Mr. Abbot himself informs us, "began his attack on the public school system since 1840," that is twenty-four years before the *Syllabus* was issued. Moreover, what shall we think of the Protestant conventions, which have condemned the public school system? Did they, too, condemn it in obedience to the Pope?

"Further, in answer to the question, 'Who is bound to obey the Church?' the Catholic Catechism replies: 'All baptized persons; for we are commanded by Jesus Christ himself to obey his Church.' What parental prerogative is left outside of this obligation of universal obedience?"

We fully admit this excellent doctrine; for Jesus Christ's command is the rule of our conduct. Can Mr. Abbot find it strange? Must not Christians obey Christ? and yet our "parental prerogative" is not curtailed by our obedience; for the Church commands nothing contrary to the natural rights of parents.

What follows we copy without comment, nay, with special pleasure:

"But I do not adduce merely abstract declarations of *Syllabus* or Catechism. The Dubuque *Daily Telegraph* of January 3d, only seven weeks ago, had this paragraph: 'Father Ryan announced in St. Patrick's Church yesterday, that the rule heretofore adopted of refusing the Sacraments of Penance and Holy Eucharist to parents who send their children to the public schools would be enforced and adhered to henceforth. He spoke emphatically on the matter, and advised parents who send their children to the

public schools not to attempt to approach the sacraments while they persist in refusing obedience to this law of the Church, alleging that such is the law.' Remember, that to refuse the sacraments to a Catholic is practically to condemn him to an eternal hell."

"There can be no doubt that this is the law of the Church. Bishop Gilmour, of Cleveland, explicitly declared it to be the law in his Lenten Pastoral of 1873, as follows: 'We solemnly charge and most positively require every Catholic in the diocese to support and send his children to a Catholic school. When good Catholic schools exist, where it may be honestly said a child will get a fair common school education, if parents, either through contempt for the priest or through disregard for the laws of the Church refuse to send their children to a Catholic school, then, in such cases, but in such cases only, we authorize confessors to refuse the sacraments to such parents as thus despise the laws of the Church and disobey the command of both priest and bishop.'"

After these quotations, which might have been multiplied without end, and which evidently prove the existence of a very wise and necessary law concerning the obligations of Catholic parents in regard to the education of their children, Mr. Abbot adduces the following fact:

"In Rhode Island, according to the New York *Independent* of February 10th, 1876, 'it seems that the father of a Miss De Fray made an affidavit in which he swore that the mother of the child had been excluded from the sacred rites of the Catholic Church, because she allowed her daughter to attend the public school, and was told that so long as she persisted in doing so, she would not be entitled to the privileges of the Church.' In consequence of this oppression, a bill has actually been introduced into the Rhode Island legislature to prohibit such interference with family affairs. In other words, the State, which is denounced as violating parental rights, is actually invoked to protect Catholic parents from violation of these very rights by their own priests."

This is simply ridiculous. The priest who denies the sacraments to bad Catholics, by no means interferes with the family affairs. When parents forget their duties towards the members of their family, they commit a sin; and this sin cannot be pardoned without repentance and atonement. The priest has no power to absolve unrepentant sinners; and no "bill introduced into the Rhode Island legislature" can confer on him such a power. The priest, therefore, will not change his ways, but will merely laugh at the ignorance of those who introduced the bill. Nor is it true that "the State is actually invoked to protect Catholic parents from violation of their parental rights;" it is rather invoked to protect them in the open violation of their parental duties. Mr. Abbot should have had sufficient perspicuity to see this manifest truth.

He continues:

"I must not fail to add some personal testimony of my own to the same effect. Last Sunday evening Bishop McQuaid lectured on 'Catholic education for Catholic children,' in St. Mary's Hall, Cambridgeport; and, desiring to hear him speak on this subject to a Catholic audience, I attended the lecture. Among other things, he said substantially this (I may not give the exact words in every part, but I know I give the exact substance of his words): 'Now I am going to read to you from the *Syllabus*, which is a bugbear to many people as if it were the horn of the beast of the Apocalypse thrown into the world to make mischief. But the *Syllabus* is only the condensation of

great truths which the world needs for its salvation.' He then read the extract I have already quoted condemning so emphatically all Catholics who approve of any education apart from the faith and power of the Church, and said with a lowering of the voice and an intensity of manner and tone, which well conveyed the verbally suppressed menace: 'Whoever does not believe in the *Syllabus* as the infallible truth of God, *ceases to be a Catholic*. He may perhaps attend Mass and go to confession; but'—and he spoke with an emphasis sure not to be misunderstood—'I would not like to have the absolving of him.' Such is, then, the extent of the parental prerogative which the Bishop so eloquently claimed for Catholic parents on Sunday afternoon, and as eloquently scattered to the four winds of heaven on Sunday evening."

Mr. Abbot is greatly deceived if he thinks that Bishop McQuaid contradicted in the evening what he had maintained in the afternoon. Though a free-religionist, Mr. Abbot should have been able to understand that there is no right against duty. Parental rights are, therefore, measured by parental duties, and consist precisely in the right of fulfilling such parental duties according to the dictates of their own conscience, without hindrance or interference on the part of outsiders. Now, Catholics know their parental duties; they know that they are guilty before God and before their conscience, if they expose their children to the mischievous influence of a godless system, when they can bring them up in Catholic schools. Hence it is not Bishop McQuaid that sets a limit to parental rights; it is the conscience itself of the Catholic parents. To please Mr. Abbot, the Bishop should have said to his Catholic audience: "Know, that your parental rights extend beyond the dictates of your conscience, and therefore you have the right to act against your conscience, and to expose your children to the pernicious influence of godless schools." Because the Bishop did not use this absurd language, Mr. Abbot declares that the Bishop "has scattered to the four winds of heaven" on Sunday evening what he had just established on Sunday afternoon! Indeed, free-religionism makes men very malignant or very stupid. This remark is strikingly confirmed by what Mr. Abbot immediately subjoins:

"Nothing can be plainer than that the Catholic conscience hurled against the school system is not the free and independent conscience of individual Catholic parents, but rather the conscience formed irresistibly in them by the clergy to whom they listen with fettered minds, massed like an obedient and well-disciplined army in defence of the Church. It is not the unbiassed conscience of the parents as such, left to form their candid opinions in profoundly respected liberty, but the coerced and yet honest conscience of spiritual slaves. It is, in short, not the conscience of free parents at all, but the organic conscience of the Church of Rome, knowing its own interests, oblivious of everything else, and determined to protect them at all cost. It is the conscience of the priests, the bishops, and the Pope, using the consciences of the laity as mere pawns in their desperate game with modern civilization."

Well, we know that every good Freemason must always be ready to swear that it is the Church, not Freemasonry, that attacks

civilization, and uses men like pawns in a desperate game. The wolf will never fail to accuse the lamb which it is eager to devour. Of course, the Catholic laity must form their conscience upon the same principles on which the priests, the bishops, and the Pope form theirs; for we are all guided by the same natural reason and by the same Gospel. We therefore concede that the Catholic conscience is not free and independent. But is there in the world a free and independent conscience? Is there a conscience which does not depend on certain principles, of which it is the necessary practical conclusion? Can Mr. Abbot himself boast that his conscience is free and independent? The whole question, therefore, will be not whether the individual conscience of Catholic parents is free and independent, but whether individual Catholics are free and independent in the adoption of the principles on which they form their conscience? This question is easily decided. The Catholic must form his conscience on Catholic principles as understood by the Catholic Church. So long, therefore, as a Catholic remains Catholic, he is not free and independent in the adoption of his ruling principles. Honest Mr. Abbot is scandalized at this. He holds that Catholics "must be left to form their candid opinions in profoundly respected liberty;" that is, must be left in ignorance of the Catholic doctrine, that they may not be biassed or fettered by truth (which is the enemy of free thought), but may become accessible to doubt, perplexity, and seduction (which is undoubtedly more in accordance with the spirit of *modern* civilization), and thus be left to form a "candid opinion" that their Catholic children must receive a pagan education.

Every one will say that this method of forming the Catholic conscience is absurd; but Mr. Abbot, as a man of progress, protests in the name of modern civilization that our present method "fetters the mind," makes "spiritual slaves," destroys the possibility of "candid opinion," and reduces men to "mere pawns." To which we reply, that if our present method satisfies us, free-religionists have no business to trouble themselves with the subject. We are glad that our minds are "fettered" by truth. Truth alone can make man free. Truth is the ballast which prevents mankind from foundering. When the Church teaches us our duty, we obey, not as "spiritual slaves," but as loving and grateful children. Our "candid opinion" is that every one must be consistent with his own principles, and that it is a great honor to be even a "mere pawn" in a game on the success of which depend the temporal prosperity of our country and the eternal happiness of our children. Is Mr. Abbot sure that he himself is not a "mere pawn" in the organization to which he belongs? Is he sure that he is not a "spiritual slave" of some Grand Lodge, and that his mind is not

"fettered" by the organic conscience of his sect, that is, by prejudice, error, and bigotry? Men must believe something. We know what we have to believe, and why we have to believe; but we doubt if Mr. Abbot can say as much for himself; for, though he believes in free religion and "modern civilization," he would scarcely be able to state clearly what these things are, and on what conscientious grounds he has formed his "candid opinion" in their favor. Can we not entertain some suspicion that his conscience was "irresistibly formed" in him, as in his associates, by men to whom they listened with "fettered minds" as destined to form "an obedient and well-disciplined army" for the destruction of the Church?

But, to conclude, let Mr. Abbot remember, that, true as it is that Catholics must form their consciences according to the teaching of the Church, yet the Church has no worldly means for compelling men to remain Catholic. James G. Blaine, and others whom we need not name, will tell him how any one who does not like what he calls "spiritual slavery" can abandon our ranks without being molested, and enlist in the devil's army with full liberty to form his "candid opinions" till he be called to give an account of them in a world, whose existence he is now at liberty to deny either "candidly" or otherwise, according to his degree of stupidity or of malice. A man who obeys only so long as he is willing to obey, is not a slave. Hence all the big talk of our lecturer about the "spiritual slavery" of Catholic parents is nothing but twaddle.

Mr. Abbot continues thus:

"Let us understand the matter. The battle is between the corporate, consolidated, ecclesiastical conscience of the Roman Papacy on the one hand, and, on the other, the multitudinous, independent, and secular conscience of the American Republic; nothing but that; and this whole theory of parental prerogative, which is now held up high before the gaze of the outside world in order to compass the destruction of the public schools, and now trampled scornfully under feet within the precinct of the Church, in order to build up the parochial schools, has no life, meaning, or veracity, except as the Pope's stalking-horse."

This last insult is too base to deserve an answer. We only repeat, what we have already proved, that the Church does not trample under foot our parental prerogative, and does not hold up this prerogative in order to compass the destruction of the public schools. The Catholic theory only maintains that the public schools must not be *godless*. Let them be denominational, and no one will urge their destruction on the ground of violated parental rights.

"In saying this, I do not in the least question the sincerity of the Roman priesthood. Ambition is a terribly sincere thing; despotism is a terribly sincere thing."

Our priesthood must be very bad indeed, if their sincerity cannot be accounted for except by ambition and despotism. Are, then,

Freemasons so wicked, or so dull, that they cannot explain our conduct by anything short of false imputation? The rogue of course thinks that all men are rogues; but, if our priests are despots because they urge on us the discharge of a recognized duty, what name shall we give to those "enlightened" gentlemen who have fastened on the protesting consciences of millions the monstrous despotism of the godless school system?

"But the American citizen who is deceived by this talk of 'parental prerogative,' and consents to abolish the public schools out of tenderness for parental rights, unbolts and unbars the cage of a tiger, whose first leap will be at his own throat."

Who does not see the buffoonery of this threat? No, Mr. Abbot, you do not believe what you say. That there is "a tiger" somewhere, is a matter of fact; but unfortunately it is not confined in a cage. We can show on the body of the Catholic Church the marks of its bloody ferocity, and we see every day how it mangles and devours the children of American citizens. Look at the godless schools, and you will see the tiger.

"The Church cares nothing for parental rights except as an outer wall of defence against the Republic's just claim to establish schools for the education of her own children."

This is a manifest calumny. On the other hand, the Republic is no mother, and has no children. Again, the Republic has neither parental rights nor parental duties. Moreover, the Republic has no just claim to give a godless education to Catholic children, or to tax them for the benefit of free-thinkers.

"Before the Church the parent has no right but to obey. The Pope commands the bishops, the bishops command the priests, the priests command the parents, the parents command the children; and the burden of the command is evermore the same: *Believe and obey!* That is the beginning, middle, and end of 'parental prerogative.' Shall any freeman be so simple as not to know slavery when he sees it? No."

Our lecturer omits to say that there is a God who commands Popes, Bishops, Priests, parents, and children "to believe and obey." Will Mr. Abbot say that there is no God? Of course, if there be no God, there are no rightful superiors, for God is the source of all authority. In such a case no pope, emperor, president, or other human being has a right to command, and no one has the duty to obey; and if any one be compelled to obey, he is treated as a slave. But the American Republic and the American Constitution recognize a God, and condemn the doctrine that all obedience is slavery. In our Republic the general commands the colonels, the colonels command the captains, the captains command the soldiers, and the burden of the command is evermore the same: "Hark and obey." This is the beginning, middle, and end of military discipline. Shall any American be so stolid as to conclude that the army of the United States is a herd of slaves? Answer, Mr. Abbot!

LAST SUMMER'S EXPEDITION AGAINST THE SIOUX
AND ITS GREAT CATASTROPHE.

IN the old geographies of the country an immense tract was left blank except for the words, printed across it in large letters, "*The Great American Desert.*" Through a portion of this country I propose to take my readers in the present paper.

The Great Missouri River, heading in the heart of the Rocky Mountains, at about the intersection of the forty-fourth parallel with the one hundred and eleventh degree of west longitude, flows directly north for nearly four degrees, then turning to the eastward continues in that direction for about eight degrees more, and then after its junction with the waters of the Yellowstone at old Fort Union, near Fort Buford, doubles on its course and flows south-eastwardly for hundreds of miles towards its union with the Mississippi. The northern portion of this great bend of the Missouri River was the scene of events during the spring and summer of the Centennial year, in a search for General Sitting Bull and the hostile bands associated with him, some of which we will describe.

With its head waters only a few miles to the south and east of those of the Missouri, the Yellowstone River also flows directly north for over a hundred miles, passing through the National Park and then turning to the eastward pursues its northeastwardly course for nearly five hundred miles to its junction with the Missouri at Fort Buford. Where it turns to the eastward the Yellowstone is only about twenty miles from Fort Ellis, at the head of the Gallatin Valley; and a few miles lower down it receives the waters of Shields's River, the only *northern* tributary it has throughout its whole course. From the *south* it receives numerous streams, heading in the mountain ranges far to the southward. The largest of these are Clarke's Fork, the Big Horn, Tongue, and Powder Rivers, all streams named by the Lewis and Clarke expedition of 1806. The largest of them all, the Big Horn, runs for several hundred miles directly north, and joins the Yellowstone at a distance of over two hundred miles from Fort Ellis, and furnishes about as much water as the main Yellowstone. It drains an immense area of country, and has numerous tributaries from the east and west. About forty miles from its mouth, it receives from the southeast the waters of the Little Big Horn, around whose name mournful memories will linger for many years to come.

On the Big Horn, seventy-five miles from its mouth, are the ruins

of old Fort C. F. Smith, and eighty miles to the southeast those of Fort Phil. Kearny, the scene of the Fetterman massacre in 1866, the perpetrators being the same tribe which ten years later made a spot on the Little Big Horn, not a hundred miles away, mournfully notorious by the slaughter of the gallant Custer and his three hundred men. A few miles below the mouth of the Big Horn and on the left bank of the Yellowstone, stands, or stood, Fort Pease, named after a former agent of the friendly Crows, on whose reservation, extending south of the Yellowstone and far to the eastward of the Big Horn, General Custer's battle took place on the 25th of June. Fort Pease is not, and never was, a military post. It was established as a trading and "wolfing" station, was formed of little log huts connected by a line of stockade, and was occupied by a party of hunters and trappers, whose principal occupation consisted in collecting furs from the numerous wild animals inhabiting the country. The most valuable of these are derived from the wolves, which exist there in great numbers, and those who collect the skins are known in the western country as "wolfers." The skins are most valuable in the winter season when the fur is heavy and soft, and the method of securing them cruel in the extreme. During the severe weather of winter when the ground is covered with snow the wolves in immense numbers range over the whole country, especially at night, in search of food. The quick nose of the wolf soon discovers the location of any dead animal, and it is at once eagerly devoured by the half-famished animals, whose cries bring others to the scene of the feast. The "wolfers" after slaying a deer, antelope, elk, or buffalo, removes the skin, takes such portion of the meat as he wants, and then taking from his pocket a little bottle of strychnine proceeds whilst the flesh is still warm to impregnate it with the poison. The next morning when he visits the scene he has only to follow the wolf-tracks in the snow for a short distance to discover the bodies of all the wolves which have participated in the feast, lying where the poor animals have expired in the most intense agony. He removes the valuable skins at his leisure, or if the weather is cold waits for a milder day to perform the skinning operation.

So violent is this poison that it is said that another animal eating of the flesh of a poisoned one rapidly falls a victim to the deadly taint, and the stomach of a poisoned wolf will retain its fatal properties for a long time to come, as many a hunter with valuable dogs has found to his cost. This active poison, strychnine, is sold in immense quantities throughout this whole western country, and is, I believe, the only one used; the more common one, arsenic, producing, as is well known, no effect upon the dog-kind. The Indians are very much prejudiced against its use, and it is said they

have a superstition that where it is used on dead buffalo it destroys the grass, and drives the buffalo away. The Sioux in the vicinity of Fort Pease early testified their hostility towards the "wolfer" party, and took every occasion to waylay and kill any of them who imprudently wandered too far from the post. They even threatened the post itself with attack, and so belcaguered the little garrison in the winter of 1875 and 1876 that it was with difficulty any of them could get out for procuring the necessary food or fuel. In the early spring of 1876 their cries for help became so loud that in February a command was ordered from Fort Ellis to go to the relief of Fort Pease. Four companies of cavalry started on the 22d, made the march of over two hundred miles down the Yellowstone, crossing the river several times on the ice, and returned to Fort Ellis in less than a month with the rescued trappers, having seen no Indians on the trip.

The Sioux did not confine their hostile acts to parties, like the one at Fort Pease, immediately on the borders of their hunting-ground. For several years, murdering and thieving war parties had invaded the white settlements of Montana, carrying consternation wherever they went. Cattle were slaughtered, horses stolen, and men killed in the settlements east of Fort Ellis, in the summer of 1875, and during August of that year several soldiers, whilst hunting and fishing in the vicinity of Camp Lewis, a post established for the protection of a mail and freighting route from Helena to Carroll on the Missouri River, were killed. These depredations were all supposed to be committed by men belonging to a tribe presided over by a chief called Sitting Bull, a rather notorious Sioux who prided himself greatly upon standing aloof from the whites, never going to an agency and never trading with one personally, although he was not averse to trading with the agency through others. His home camp was supposed to be on the dry fork of the Missouri, a stream which running north empties into that river just above Fort Peck (a trading post and agency for the northern Indians). These war parties from his camp, operating during the summer season, would pass over vast distances on their fleet little ponies, commit their depredations, and be off hundreds of miles away before anybody but the poor victims would know anything about it.

But Montana was not the only region which suffered from these depredations. Similar transactions were taking place to the southward along the northern borders of Wyoming and Nebraska, and in the Black Hills (a region guaranteed by solemn treaty to the Indians), the "irrepressible conflict" between barbarism and the invading gold-seekers was carried on, and, as may be imagined, did not tend to bring about peaceful relations between the government

and the Sioux nation. At length the government, having through its agents *starved* many of the Indians into leaving the agencies in order to get food, ordered them all back there in the depth of winter at the penalty of being proceeded against by the military, and early in March the troops took the field from the south, struck Crazy Horse's camp on Powder River, and returned.

On the very day of this occurrence (17th), five companies of infantry left Fort Shaw, and, in the midst of snow and mud, commenced their march of one hundred and eighty-three miles for Fort Ellis, whilst another company from Camp Baker dug its way through the deep snowdrifts of a mountain range, and proceeded towards the same point. These troops reached Fort Ellis in the latter part of March, probably the most inclement month of the year, and, in the midst of heavy storms of wet snow and sleet, and over roads which were simply horrible, were pushed across the divide which separates that post from the waters of the Yellowstone, under the supposition that they were moving to co-operate with General Crook's column from the south. On the 1st of April, the four companies of the Second Cavalry left Fort Ellis to follow the same road, and overtake the infantry. It proved anything but an April day. The steep and rocky road was intersected in places by streams and marshy spots where our heavily loaded wagons sunk to the hub, and on the 3d a furious storm of wind and drifting snow assailed us, so that it was midnight on the 4th before the train reached Shields's River, a distance of twenty-eight miles. This was slow progress, indeed, if we wished to co-operate with General Crook's column, the account of whose fight, some four hundred miles away, had just been received by telegraph.

The military was started out to punish and bring to subjection the hostile bands which were defying the government. These were known to be not numerous, and they were, during the summer months, in the habit of roaming at will over the vast uninhabited region I have described in the great bend of the Missouri River, hunting the buffalo, laying up their supplies of skins and meat for the winter, and varying their operations by sending out small war parties to raid upon the white settlements, or fighting the Crows, against whom they were at deadly enmity. If these were all the troops had to contend with it was natural to suppose that the moment General Crook commenced to press them from the south, these bands would move north, and, if not interfered with, would, if the pressure continued, cross the Yellowstone, and perhaps even the Missouri. Hence the necessity for other columns of troops with which to strike these moving bands on the march, or interfere to prevent their crossing to the north of the Yellowstone. For this purpose two columns moved, one from the east the other from

the west, and marched towards each other. But two weeks before the Montana column started from Fort Ellis, General Crook had struck his blow, and hence the necessity for pushing forward down the Yellowstone as rapidly as possible, for the Indians, if moving north, would succeed in getting across that stream before the yearly spring rise, and before either the eastern or western column could interfere.

The original intention was to move the Montana column directly on Fort C. F. Smith by what was called the Bogeman wagon-road, then to cross the Big Horn River and move eastward, with the expectation of striking any hostile camps which might be located in that vast region watered by the Little Big Horn, Tongue, and Rosebud, but, on the receipt of the news of General Crook's fight, it was deemed advisable to move this column directly down the Yellowstone, and to keep it north instead of south of that river. This rendered necessary a change of our depot of supplies from the new Crow agency on the Stillwater, one hundred miles from Fort Ellis, to the north side of the Yellowstone River. For, in a few weeks that stream would be entirely impassable from the melting of the spring snows. A train with a month's supply of forage and rations had already been forwarded to the Crow agency. The troops found no difficulty in fording the Yellowstone River, and on the 7th the cavalry overtook the infantry in camp on the Yellowstone above the mouth of the Stillwater, where the whole command was luxuriating on the delicious trout caught in the greatest quantity from the clear and almost ice-cold waters of the Yellowstone.

I had in the morning sent forward a courier to the agency, calling a council with the Crows with a view to obtaining some of them to accompany the troops as scouts, and had requested Mitch Bowyer, a noted guide and interpreter, to meet me that night in my camp. This man I had never seen, but he had served with troops before, and bore the reputation of being, next to the celebrated Jim Bridger, the best guide in the country. Whilst seated in my tent the next morning, a man with the face of an Indian and the dress of a white man approached the door, and almost without saying anything seated himself on the ground, and it was some moments before I understood that my visitor was the expected guide. He was a diffident, low-spoken man, who uttered his words in a hesitating way, as if uncertain what he was going to say. He brought the news that the Crows were waiting to see me, and mounting my horse I was with a small party soon on the road to the agency, which we reached after a disagreeable ride of eighteen miles through a severe storm of wet snow. The agency, situated amidst bleak and barren hills, was surrounded by the teepees of some three thou-

sand Crows, scattered in family groups all over the little valley of Rosebud Creek,¹ a branch of the Stillwater.

The next day, Sunday, the chiefs assembled in council to hear my "talk" and the proposition to furnish us scouts. Somewhat to my surprise the proposition did not appear to be favorably received, and when an Indian does not want to do a thing he resembles a white man a good deal, and has a thousand and one excellent reasons why he should not do it. They listened in silence to the interpreter as he translated, or *appeared* to translate, what I said. For when he came to translate their answer to me he strung his English words together in such a fearfully incongruous way as made me tremble at the idea that my eloquent appeal to the chiefs had been murdered in the Crow tongue, as he was murdering the English in conveying to me their answer.

These Indian interpreters are a peculiar institution. As a class, they are an interesting study, and will bear generally a good deal of watching. A white man, usually a renegade from civil society, takes up his abode with a tribe of Indians, adopts their mode of life, takes unto himself a squaw, picks up gradually enough of their signs and words to make himself understood, and when the Indians come in contact with the whites becomes, in the absence of any other means of communication, an "interpreter." He may not understand the English language, or be able to put together a single intelligible sentence, and it does not mend the matter much if he happens to be a French Canadian, for then broken French, broken English, and broken Indian are mixed up in a hodge-podge which defies all understanding and makes the listener sometimes give up in despair. I suspect many an Indian commissioner would stand aghast could he have *literally* translated to him the perfect jumble of words in which the "interpreter" had conveyed his eloquent and carefully prepared speech to the ears of his red audience. For this reason it is a matter of some importance in communicating with Indians to make use of the plainest language and the shortest sentences, and even then you are by no means sure that anything like what you intended is conveyed to your listeners, especially if what you say does not happen to meet the peculiar views or interests of the one who, for the want of a better term, is called an "interpreter." The one who officiated on this occasion appeared to try to be making up by gesticulations and a loud voice for any defects in his knowledge of language. I believe he did finally succeed in conveying to the Indians the information that we wanted twenty-five of their young active warriors to accompany us to the field and serve as the "*eyes*" of the expedition, in spying out the

¹ This must not be confounded with the other Rosebud lower down.

country and giving us information regarding the location of the Sioux camps.

The talk was received in silence, followed by a very earnest discussion amongst themselves, after which two of the principal chiefs, Iron Bull and Blackfoot, replied to the effect that if the young men wanted to go they could go, but that if they did not want to go they (the chiefs) could not make them; that they were friends to the white man and desired to remain at peace with him; appealed to the Almighty (the interpreter called him *Godalamily*) as to the sincerity of what they said, and ended with what I fear is a very common appeal now amongst Indians, for more flour and beef than was issued to them. But one single man seemed to talk in favor of going to war, but they asked time to talk about it amongst themselves, for such weighty matters are never decided in a hurry, and have to be discussed with due deliberation and the appropriate amount of smoke. So the council broke up without any definite conclusion being reached, and I began to think we should have to enter the Sioux country blindfolded. I soon discovered, however, that only the "old fogies" had spoken in council, and that as soon as "Young America" had a chance to be heard in the camps our chance for obtaining scouts improved, and the next morning the whole number required came forward and were sworn into the United States service. This ceremony was peculiar. We wished to bind them to their contract in some way, and in casting round for a method were informed that the Crow's way to take an oath was to *touch with his finger the point of a knife*. After this solemn proceeding if he failed to stand up to his pledges he was a disgraced man; but what was far more likely to keep him faithful was the belief that a violation of the oath laid him open to direful calamities in the way of disease and misfortune, not only to himself, but to all the members of his family! All the volunteers were paraded, and an officer presented to each in succession a hunting knife, on the point of which each one gravely placed the tip of his forefinger and the deed was done. They thus became United States soldiers for three months, and were to receive soldier's pay, rations, and clothing. After all had gone through the ceremony, one of them took the knife and gravely presented the point of it to me. When asked why he wished to swear me, he said he wished to bind me to do what *they* said; but I told them I could not do that, for the obligation to obey was on their side alone. The officer who swore them in offered to swear that he would see they got all the pay, rations, etc., they were entitled to, and as all they wanted apparently was some kind of a mutual obligation, they readily consented to this, and the officer solemnly touched the point of the knife.

I will not burden my readers with the long list of the long names

of the twenty-five warriors who thus engaged to join us in our campaign against the Sioux, but will mention simply the names of several who afterwards became noted amongst us.

Ee-suh-seé-ush, whose English name was "Show-his-Face," was an old man, who went along with no idea of engaging in the labors of war, but accompanied the party simply to give it character, and bestow upon the younger members the benefit of his advice. He was early looked upon as what in Western phraseology is called a "coffee-cooler," a fellow who loafs around the camp-fire, and whose principal occupation consists in cooling *and* drinking coffee from a tincup. From his supposed resemblance to a venerable senator from the State of Pennsylvania he soon became known in the camp as "The Senator."

Iss-too-sah-shee-dah, Half-yellow-Face, was a large, fine-looking Indian, who afterwards became a great favorite with us, and was one of the six Crows who accompanied the Seventh Cavalry and was present with it in its fight on the 25th of June.

Meé-uah-tsee-us, White Swan, also accompanied the Seventh Cavalry, and was badly wounded in the battle.

Shuh'-shee-ahsh, Curly Hair, was quite a young man and became noted afterwards as the one single person who, of all those taken into action under the immediate command of General Custer, made his escape.

On the 10th our wagon train arrived from the camp, our supplies were loaded up and ready to start the next morning for the depot to be established on the north bank of the Yellowstone. That night a furious storm of wind and snow raged, and we opened our eyes to find the ground covered with two feet of snow and rapidly deepening. To remain stationary, however, was simply to contemplate the possibility of being snowed up in the mountains for a week, perhaps longer. As soon, therefore, as the harness could be dug out of the snow, and the teams hitched up we started to plough through the deep snow notwithstanding the storm, which still raged directly in our faces. As we receded from the mountains, however, the snow decreased in depth, the storm abated, and the train reached camp late at night, the only mishap being the loss of two mules drowned in crossing the Yellowstone at a ford which was quite a deep and rapid one.

All the supplies and extra baggage which we could not carry in our wagons we now prepared to leave here under charge of one of the infantry companies, and, with the remainder of the command and our heavily loaded wagons, we resumed the march down the Yellowstone. The ground was, however, very soft from the melting snow, and the teams labored slowly along. For several days we made but little progress, and only reached Baker's battle-ground, a

distance of forty-three miles, on the 15th. This was the scene of an attack made by Indians in 1872 upon a body of our troops engaged in escorting the engineers of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company.

Below this, in order to avoid the rough broken ground extending for miles along the north of the river, we were obliged to cross once more to the southern bank, at a ford which was deep and rapid, and came very near proving fatal to one of our officers. His horse yielding to the force of the swiftly rushing current soon got out of his depth, and in an instant both he and his rider disappeared beneath the surface of the water. Soon the horse's head came up and then the rider's; but to the horror of the lookers-on the horse seemed to be utterly incapable of swimming, and engaged in frantic struggles, without aim or object, in the course of which he nearly fell over backwards on his rider. The current fortunately, as it swept them along, carried them close enough to the river-bank to strike bottom, when horse and rider, the latter still clinging to the bridle, but chilled with the ice-cold water, were pulled ashore.

On the south side of the river there is no longer any road, and we have to make our way as best we can through the thick heavy sage brush of the valley to Prior's Creek, which we find a deep rushing torrent of muddy snow-water, with high banks. Crossing this delays us so long that the day is far towards its close when we go into camp, chafing at having made only seven miles.

The next day brought us to the far-famed Pompey's Pillar, almost under the shadow of which we camped. It is an irregular mass of sandstone, rising several hundred feet above the level of the valley on the south side of the river, and evidently belonged originally to a corresponding bluff on the opposite side of the river, from which it has been separated by the wearing away of the intervening rock. The account of Lewis and Clarke mentions that a fine view of the surrounding country was had from the top of Pompey's Pillar, which was ascended by Captain Clarke for that purpose the day the expedition passed the pillar, which is stated in their journal to have been the 25th of July, 1806. I climbed up the not very steep ascent on the eastern side, and whilst resting on one of the ledges read over the names, which, in travellers' fashion, were roughly scribbled over the face of the soft sandstone, until I came to this:

Wm Clarke
July 25th 1806

My first thought was that some later visitor had amused himself by inscribing the great explorer's name on this landmark; but an examination of the more recent inscriptions showed them all to be light-colored, whilst the lines of this one were of the same tint

as the face of the brown sandstone upon which the writing was placed, and I remained satisfied that I stood face to face with Captain Clarke's name inscribed nearly seventy years before. I continued the ascent, pondering over the different circumstances surrounding me in this Centennial year of the country, and those under which Captain Clarke climbed up when the nation was but thirty-one years old, and this whole region one vast wilderness. On reaching the top I found myself standing upon a grass-grown mound surrounded on three sides by a sheer precipice of perpendicular rock, down which it made one's head swim to look. To the north, across the beautiful clear river, rose a mass of rough broken hills, whilst to the south and west extended the broad flat plain of the river bottom, bordered on the north by a curved line of timber which marked the course of the river, and to the south by a range of bluffs which, opening in one place to allow the passage of Fly Creek, permitted the eye to range far up its little valley towards the mouth of the Little Big Horn River, afterwards to play so prominent a part in the history of our campaign.

With a view to the examination of that region the command laid over here one day, and scouts were sent off in that direction. They returned without having seen any sign of Indians, but reported that the whole valley of the Big Horn was black with countless herds of buffalo quietly feeding, the best of signs that no Indians are close about, and yet the best in the world that they are not very far away; for the buffalo herd is the natural *commissary* of the Indians on the plains, and they constantly follow this moving depot of supplies. When they commence to hunt them, the buffalo immediately about the hunting-grounds stampede and run for miles, pushing the rest of the herd before them. Hence, if the buffalo are quietly feeding you may be sure there is no pressure from behind, and no Indians near. But if on the contrary the herd is found to be moving, you may look out for Indians, as surely as you look for cars behind an approaching locomotive.

Ordinarily on reaching camp both officers and men are so tired out with the march that as soon as the evening meal is finished, and the night guard posted, all are ready to seek that sleep, the want of which tells fearfully upon the physical forces the next day, and usually by nine o'clock, frequently earlier, the whole camp except the sentinels are wrapped in deep slumber, which is enjoyed securely, with the knowledge that several pairs of eyes are peering out into the darkness and the same number of pairs of ears eagerly on the alert to detect the approach of any prowling Indians who may be seeking an opportunity to steal our animals. But after a day's rest the powers are recuperated, groups are formed around the blazing camp-fires, and the still night re-echoes with songs sung

in full chorus. Such an evening was spent under the tall cottonwoods of our camp at Pompey's Pillar, and long after the campfires were out and everything was still, the thoughts of many of us wandered off towards those "true loves," who, in the words of the ringing chorus, still echoing in our ears, were, so far as communicating with them was concerned,

"Playing the grand in a distant land,
Ten thousand miles away."

During the next day's march the bluffs on both sides abutted so closely on the river as to force us to ford the stream twice within a distance of two miles, and now haste becomes all the more necessary, for the river is evidently rising, and we must make our last crossing so as to be on the north side before it becomes impassable. Our guide, Mitch Bowyer, is of inestimable value now, for he rides forward to search for a crossing, and is an indefatigable worker, riding his hardy little pony into the ice-cold water sometimes to a swimming depth, testing the crossings where anybody thinks there is a chance to get our wagons over. At last the shallowest point is found, and although deeper than is comfortable we must take to the water, for we cannot afford to wait another day. A company of cavalry, with its old soldier captain at its head, mounted on his old and long-trying favorite, "Dick," enters the ford, stringing out in a long curved line behind as brave old "Dick" breasts the rushing and rapidly deepening stream. Higher and higher rises the water, and just as we begin to think some of the smaller horses will have to swim, "Dick's" shoulder commences to emerge, and the worst is passed. Now the wagons, covered with infantrymen, start in, and as they approach the deepest part some of the smaller mules barely have their backs above the water, but still they struggle on, seeming to understand as well as their drivers that when crossing a river is no time "to swap horses." Suddenly down goes the forepart of one of the wagons, and for a moment it is a matter of doubt whether a wheel is broken or is in a hole. The mules struggle and plunge, fall down and get up again, the drivers, outsiders, and men shout out their loudest yells to encourage the frantic animals, and at last the long line of wagons reaches the opposite shore, water pouring from every crack of the wagon-bodies, which makes us hope that the bottom layer of each load is bacon rather than "hardtack" and bedding. Our dripping teams are given a short rest, mounted officers and men pour the water from their boots, and we all feel relieved that we are on the right bank of the river at last. A few miles further, and from the top of the bluffs bordering the valley of the Yellowstone we catch sight of the walls of Fort

Pease, still standing, with a little United States flag fluttering in the breeze.

The next day a courier arrived from Camp Supply, bringing an important dispatch from department headquarters. It had reached Camp Supply just after the departure of two couriers with our mail, and an energetic young son of one of our officers started with it, accompanied by a single soldier, to ride a hundred miles and bring it to me. He followed our trail, saw nothing of the other couriers, crossed, with great difficulty, the river at our last ford, and reached our camp in safety. The dispatch was dated at St. Paul on the 15th (six days before), and informed me that General Crook would not be prepared to take the field before the middle of May, that the third column had not yet started, and directed that I proceed no farther than the mouth of the Big Horn unless sure of striking a successful blow. Our camp was, therefore, moved down to Fort Pease, and for three weeks we were engaged in what to a soldier is the hardest of all duties—*waiting*.

Advantage was taken of this delay to send back our wagon train under charge of a company, to bring up the rest of our supplies, and to thoroughly examine the valleys of Little and Big Horn in the direction of old Fort C. F. Smith. This latter was accomplished by a scouting party of two companies of cavalry, which left us on the 24th and returned on the 1st of May, having seen no signs of Indians during the trip.

On the 30th, some of our Indian scouts returned from the Rosebud, reporting that country free from any signs of Indians, and it began to look as if they had all fled to the agencies. Our Crow scouts are kept constantly on the alert, some of them being out every day, early and late. They appear to be of a nervous, excitable temperament, and some of them came running in one day to announce the approach of a party of Sioux. A mounted party was at once sent out to reconnoitre, and came back with the information that the scouts had seen one of our hunting parties, and took them for Sioux.

Fort Pease is situated directly on the bank of the river, at the edge of a wide open prairie. Directly opposite, on the other side of the river, a steep rocky bluff rises up almost perpendicularly from the edge of the water, and this our scouts were in the habit of using as a lookout, crossing the river in a small boat, several of which were found at the fort when we arrived there. The 1st of May was a bright clear day, and about noon the whole camp was startled by hearing loud and continued yells from the opposite bluffs. Immediately the Crows in camp seized their arms, and started on a run for their pony herd, grazing about a mile from camp. Looking up to the top of the bluff, four Indians could be

seen running in single file at the top of their speed, and uttering the most piercing screams. They looked as if about to pitch over the perpendicular bluff into the river below; but just before reaching the edge, the leader commenced circling around, followed by the others, all uttering the wildest shrieks, and then all disappeared behind a projecting point, to reappear soon after at a lower point, still on the full run. The running in a circle was the signal for "an enemy in sight," and word was sent to draw in the herd. In an incredibly short space of time the scouts had crossed the river, and came panting into camp with the information that they had seen a large war party of Sioux coming out of the valley of Tullock's Fork. As I was expecting the scouting party from Fort Smith, I suggested that it might be that; but they declared they were not white men, did not move like them, and were far too numerous to be our scouting party, and altogether were so positive and confident, and moreover apparently so hurt that I should think they could confound white men and Sioux, that I began to have serious misgivings in regard to the safety of our two little companies of cavalry, and to imagine that they had met with serious disaster, and the victorious Sioux were now coming in to pay their respects to us. Hence I was very much relieved when, a few hours later, our friends, dripping from the deep ford of the Yellowstone, rode into camp and reported the result of their scout. The Crows looked crestfallen at the idea of their false cry of "the wolf," but were soon to learn by sad experience that the "wolf" was even closer than they thought, for the very next day a heavy windstorm set in, and all that night the camp and vicinity were swept with driving clouds of dust, through which objects could be seen only at a few paces' distance. Just such a night do Indians select for their thieving expeditions, and early the next morning one of our white scouts came into camp and exhibited, with a rueful countenance, a picket-pin with two bits of rope cut off close to the pin-head. The night before, that picket-pin had been driven into the ground a hundred yards outside of our line of camp sentinels, the bits of rope were thin lariats, and at their opposite extremities were tied to graze two of his own animals, a horse and a mule. Now, all of his property that remained was this picket-pin and the cleanly severed ends of his lariats. All our own animals were inside the line of sentinels, as his two should have been. We had never been able to bring our Crows sufficiently under military control to induce them to keep their ponies in camp at night, and they were permitted to roam at large night and day in search of subsistence. The lonely picket-pin demonstrated beyond doubt that "the wolf" had come, and that the thieving Sioux had paid our camp a visit. It did not take long to make the discovery that

the whole pony herd of the Crows, some thirty in number, had, alas, disappeared, and the scene which followed was absurd in the extreme. The Crows assembled at their camp and *cried* like children whose toys had been broken. There is nothing unnatural in a crying child, and the manly grief of a broken heart excites one's sympathy, but to see a parcel of great big Indians standing together and blubbering like babies, with great tears streaming down their swarthy faces because they had lost their horses, struck every one as supremely ridiculous. Scouting parties were sent out, the trail of the marauders discovered leading down the river, and signs found which left no doubt of their being Sioux.

On the 8th our train, with the two companies, arrived from Camp Supply, and the whole command being now together, with wagons enough to carry all our stores, I decided to move farther down the river. There were evidently nothing more than small war parties about us, and my reiterated instructions were to guard as much as possible against the Indians crossing the Yellowstone to go north. The principal crossing-places were lower down near the mouth of Rosebud River, and on this side. We moved on the 10th, but were delayed by bad roads made worse by a furious rainstorm, and on the fifth day had made only fifty-two miles to a camp a short distance above the mouth of the Rosebud. Here we were visited by a heavy hail and rainstorm, which stampeded our animals, flooded our camp, and rendered the surrounding country impassable for wagons. Both sides of the river were kept well scouted, and on the 17th one of our party reported the presence on Tongue River, some thirty-five miles distant, of an Indian camp. The Yellowstone was now a raging torrent of muddy water; but we had, on leaving Fort Pease, brought along several small boats found there, and with the assistance of these it was determined to throw a force across the river, and by a night march, surprise the camp on Tongue River. Pack saddles were now got out, extra ammunition and rations issued, and preparations made to cross the river with the whole force except one company, which was left at our camp in charge of the train. The crossing-place selected was about a mile above the camp. The boats were pulled up there and used to cross over the men, saddles, etc., of a company. The horses of the company were then brought down to the shore and an attempt made to drive them into the water. They resisted stoutly; but a few finally entered the water, which was cold and rapid. But no sooner did they lose their footing and commence to swim than, turning round, they returned to our shore, followed by the few which had ventured in after them. Again and again were they forced to the water's edge, but with the same result, and finally the whole of

them broke from the men around them and stampeded back to camp. Several hours were consumed in these fruitless efforts, and then a different plan was tried. One of the oldest horses was selected, and to his tail was firmly tied the halter of another; to the tail of this one another, and so on till a long line of half a dozen were tied together. A rope attached to the leader was now taken into the boat manned by rowers and the boat pulled out from shore. The leader quietly followed, dragging his trail behind him, whilst the loose horses, seeing so many going in, followed in a body, urged on by the shouting men. Soon the deep water was reached and the leader began to swim, followed in fine style by the others, and everything was looking favorable for the passage of the horses at last, when suddenly the whole scene changed and one of the most indescribable confusion followed. From some cause or other the boats became unmanageable in the swift current, and instead of keeping on a straight course with a taut rope stretching to the leading horse, it floated for a moment at the mercy of the current, the rope became slack, the rear horses continued to swim forward, the third or fourth horse got across the line in front of the leader, and in an instant the water was filled with a tangled mass of frantic animals struggling for life. Most of the hitching halters held, and the longer the poor creatures struggled the worse entangled they became. Some soon became exhausted and sunk beneath the ice-cold muddy torrent; some few continued across and landed on the other shore, but most of them returned, whilst one powerful beast waded back, pulling after him a comrade which had fallen exhausted and died in water so shallow that only about one-half his body was covered. Four horses were drowned outright, and the rest so frightened that they could not be again made to approach the water. It was now late in the afternoon, the attempt to cross the river was abandoned, the few men and horses thrown across were brought back and the troops returned to camp. We were now, perforce, confined in our operations to the north side of the river, up and down which mounted parties were constantly kept on the move, and occasionally two or three of the Crows would cross and reconnoitre the south side, or start on horse-stealing expeditions; but in each case they returned unsuccessful and disappointed.

One day whilst seated in my tent I heard the distant cry of a wolf. Wondering at the bark of a cayote in broad daylight, my attention was attracted by a great commotion amongst the Crows, several of whom with their guns started on the run for the river-bank, repeating the wolf-like cry. It was answered from across the river, and jumping into one of the boats they soon returned with two of their number, who had gone off on a horse-stealing expedition, and now,

having been unsuccessful, were coming back, and took this way of informing their friends of the fact.

On the 18th two companies of cavalry were started on a scout to the mouth of Tongue River, and two days afterwards the Crows reported a heavy force of Indians moving towards the mouth of the Rosebud, evidently with the design of crossing the Yellowstone. Leaving one company of infantry in charge of the camp, the remainder of the command was pushed hastily down the river, and bivouacked for the night just below the mouth of the Rosebud. No Indians, however, were seen, nor any indications of a projected crossing, and the next day the remainder of the camp was brought down to the new position, and the two companies from below joined us. They had gone down as far as the mouth of Tongue River, had seen a party of about fifty Indians trying evidently to get across to our side, and not having themselves been seen, had laid in wait for them several hours. But the Indians after several attempts to cross, had evidently given it up, and proceeded up the river on the other side. On leaving, however, they had concealed their extra ponies in the timber, and with the idea that they had left no guard to look after them, Mitch Bowyer and one of the Crows with the scouting party conceived a bold attempt to capture these ponies. Stripping, and without a weapon of any kind, they swam the Yellowstone, and crept through the timber to within sight of the grazing animals, which they found under charge of two Indian boys. To get to them they were obliged to pass an open space, and no sooner did their naked forms leave the shelter of the timber than they were perceived by the watchful boys, who with loud shouts hurried the band of ponies off into the hills beyond their reach, and Mitch and his companion had nothing to do but to swim back to their own side of the river.

We had in the command a number of fine shots, and permission was constantly given these men to hunt, and by them the country in the vicinity of our camps and line of march was kept very well scouted. One of these parties reported on the 22d that they had been fired upon by Indians in the hills that day, but they were evidently not in great force, for the scouting parties sent out discovered but few pony tracks, and saw no Indians. The next morning early the pickets reported firing in the hills. Several hunting parties were out, but the firing being continued, and a number of horsemen making their appearance on the bluff about three miles from camp, two companies of cavalry were at once sent out in that direction, and it was then for the first time discovered that two men belonging to one of these companies and a citizen teamster were absent from camp without authority. Why they should go without permission when all they had to do was to ask for it, I could not

imagine, and it is a singular fact that of all the parties out that morning this one of three was the only one to encounter Indians. The cavalry started at once for the point where the horsemen had been seen to disappear on the bluffs. On reaching the foot-hills the party found itself in the midst of a succession of knolls rising higher and higher, and forming a number of narrow valleys. The men appear to have entered one of these blindly without taking any precaution in the way of a lookout. They were doubtless watched from the high ground, and parties of Indians posted out of sight behind the hills on each side permitted the three hunters to advance until surrounded on all sides, and then making their appearance, delivered their fire from several directions upon the doomed men. The bodies were found stripped, shot in several places and horribly mutilated, with heads beaten in, and one of the men had two knives, taken from the bodies of his dead comrades, driven into the sides of his head. The knife of the third man was afterwards recognized and picked up on Custer's battle-field. When the cavalry reached the top of the bluffs, not an Indian was to be seen. The trail was followed for some miles, but the only thing seen of the party was a single horseman rapidly disappearing on a distant hill. The bodies were brought into camp and laid side by side to rest under a large cottonwood tree, upon the trunk of which, after removing the bark an appropriate inscription was placed, and heavy logs piled up over the grave to guard against the action of wolves. As the scouting party came into camp about sundown, quite a number of heads appeared cautiously above a distant hill on the other side of the river, and from this time forth our camp was doubtless very carefully watched.

We had now been out nearly two months, and our supplies were becoming short. I had sent back to Fort Ellis for more supplies, and had information that they were on the road. For the double purpose of escorting this train in, and taking back a number of surplus contractors' wagons, two companies left our camp in charge of a train the very morning of the murders (23d), and we now had nothing to do but to await the arrival of our supplies, keeping the river above and below well scouted by parties of cavalry. I had received dispatches from General Terry that he expected to reach the Yellowstone at the mouth of the Glendive Creek about the 28th, and on the 27th I called for volunteers to carry a dispatch down the river by boat. Two men who afterwards became quite noted for a deed of great daring, offered their services for the trip. Their names were Evans and Stewart, both soldiers, belonging to Captain Clifford's company of the Seventh Infantry. They were accompanied by a white scout, named Williamson, and just at dark, with muffled oars, they got into their frail bark and noiselessly dropped down the stream on their perilous and uncertain voyage, many of

their comrades assembling on the bank to see them off. The very next morning I received by boat from Fort Ellis an important dispatch from department headquarters. It informed me that General Terry had left Fort Lincoln on the morning of the 15th; that he had received information that the hostiles were concentrated on the Little Missouri, and between that and the Powder River; that he anticipated opposition between the Missouri River and the Yellowstone, and directed me to march at once to a point on the Yellowstone opposite Stanley's stockade, to cross the river, if possible, and advance to meet him on Stanley's trail, and to use one of the steamers which I would probably find there for crossing my command. The point designated was some one hundred and fifty miles from where we then were. A speedy movement was evidently expected, and yet with the region about us infested with hostile Indians, how could we leave the large train of supplies now on the road to follow us with its escort of one small company of infantry? All our wagons were at once unloaded, and the next morning under charge of two companies started back to lighten the supply train, and hurry it forward as fast as possible. Notwithstanding a furious *snow*-storm, which raged all day on the 1st of June, our train made good time, and reached camp on the 4th, so that the command was now once more together, and its supplies with it. The morning of the 5th found us on our way down the river once more, every one eager to push forward and join the Lincoln column. But we were now entering upon a comparatively unknown region, and on the second day encountered a single hill which required four hours and a great deal of hard work to get our train up, and, on the third, after a march of twenty-one and a half miles, had made only forty-one miles. Mitch Bowyer informed us that the roads passed over heretofore were good compared with those we should have in the next few days, when we should be compelled to enter a terrible section of the "*Mauvaise terres*."

On the morning of the 8th, our scouts reported Indians in front, and, later on, two who had followed on the trail of two horsemen brought in a package which told us a tale words could not have made plainer. The package consisted of a small sack containing a number of army cartridges, some small round crackers, such as are kept for sale in the subsistence department, and a piece of *cheese*. The last-named article Indians seldom, if ever, use, and would never carry on a trip, so that the contents of this little sack told us as plainly as if the news had been received in a letter that General Terry was close by, and was trying to communicate with us by couriers, and that the couriers were white men. We camped that night in the open prairie on the bank of the Yellowstone, and about two o'clock in the morning, I was waked out of a sound sleep by

loud shouts. Jumping up, I reached the picket-line in time to receive a white man and an Indian, who brought dispatches from General Terry at the mouth of the Powder River. He had reached that stream without encountering any Indians, and invited me to meet him coming up the river on the steamer "Far West" the next morning. I learned too that the sack and its contents picked up by our scouts the day before had been correctly interpreted. It had been dropped by one of two white men who had been sent to communicate with us. They had seen from a distance our Crow scouts, had taken them for Sioux, and had fled back to report the country filled with hostiles, and lose a reward of two hundred dollars which had been promised them if they got through to me with their dispatches, dropping in their flight the articles which were picked up the day after by my scouts, who had never even seen the men who dropped them.

The morning of the 9th I proceeded down the valley with a company of cavalry, and soon had a specimen of the bad lands referred to by Mitch Bowyer as existing in the vicinity of Powder River, north of the Yellowstone. We climbed up an almost inaccessible mountain, being several times obliged to dismount and lead our horses, and on reaching the top had a fine view of the valley of the Yellowstone beyond far down in the direction of Powder River. The muddy rapid stream wound around the foot of the mountain almost directly beneath us, and through the fringe of timber on its banks little puffs of white steam rose up and revealed the presence of a steamer slowly making her way up against the strong current. It was the most civilized scene we had witnessed for more than two months, and as the deep hoarse voice of the steam-whistle broke upon the still morning air, the top of what we afterwards named "Steamboat Point" resounded with a loud cheer of welcome from our little party. Following a buffalo trail down the steep side of the Point we were soon on board the steamer and on our way back to camp, where the men flocked down to the bank to welcome the second steamer which had ever been so far up the waters of the Yellowstone.

The existence of any large camps of hostile Indians in this region was now more than ever a matter of doubt; for General Terry had discovered no trace of any on his march from Fort Lincoln to the Powder River, which he had reached at a point twenty-five miles above its mouth. He informed me that he had heard nothing from General Crook, and intended on his return to Powder River to send a cavalry command on a scout up that river and across it west to the Tongue and Rosebud. If no Indians should be discovered then the only remaining chance would be higher up the Yellowstone, where from my observation there must be some Indians, and if

General Crook should strike them from the south, it would be all the more necessary for us to guard the line of the river and prevent any escape to the northward. He therefore instructed me to retrace my steps and await his arrival at the mouth of the Rosebud, and as dispatch was now of more importance than ever I agreed to start the cavalry part of my command that afternoon. The General had no guide at his disposal acquainted with the country south of the Yellowstone, and I suggested that he take Mitch Bowyer, who had proved so valuable to us, and as I knew well acquainted with that country. Mitch, always ready and willing, assented at once, and as soon as he and his horse were on board the steamer started down the river, and preparations were at once made to commence the march back. Before, however, the cavalry was ready to move one of those terrific rain-storms, of which we had had so many, set in. The whole alkali flat around us became one immense quagmire, and a gulch back of our camp, which was dry when we came, was soon a torrent ten or twelve feet deep. This rendered any movement out of the question until the afternoon of the next day, when the cavalry succeeded only in making a few miles, and the next day (11th) were overtaken by the infantry, having been delayed to build a road and pull up a very steep hill, it being impossible to follow the road used coming down on account of Sunday Creek being impassable from high water. All the bridges built and crossings cut during the trip down were found washed away by the heavy rains, and the low grounds were filled with driftwood brought down from the hills through the gulches, which, except during heavy rains, are entirely deprived of water.

Finally, the whole command was reunited on the 14th at the mouth of the Rosebud, where we waited for the arrival of General Terry, keeping in the meantime the country well scouted up and down the river. Four days afterwards (18th) a party of horsemen was reported by our scouts as coming down the Rosebud, and riding to a point about three miles above our camp. I started a couple of Crows to swim across the river, then higher and more rapid than ever, with a note to General Terry. The Indians stripped and commenced their preparations for their cold swim by rubbing themselves all over with red paint. I had the curiosity to inquire the object of this, and was surprised to learn that it was to protect them against the attack of *alligators*. As the alligator is an animal unknown to the waters of this region, the fact referred to is a curious evidence of the southern origin of the Crows, at the same time that it shows how traditions are transmitted for long ages in a barbarous tribe. Having completed their preparations against the attack of an animal of which perhaps their progenitors long ago had a wholesome dread in more southern waters, the note to Gen-

eral Terry was tied in the scalplock of one of them, and the two men started on the run for a point higher up the river. There providing themselves with a log of dead wood, they plunged into the water, and singing to keep up their courage, they were swept past us down the swift current, and after a swim of nearly a mile landed safely on the other side, and were seen through our glasses to approach the party opposite. All this took time, and being curious to know who was in the party, one of our officers tied a handkerchief to a stick, and commenced waving it from side to side as a signal. It was soon answered in the same way, and before our Crows had reached the opposite bank, the army code of signals was spelling out for us the information we wanted. In this way we learned that the party was composed of six companies of the Seventh Cavalry under command of Colonel Reno, which had been on a scout up Powder River and across the Tongue to the Rosebud, and had seen no Indians, though signs of camps had been discovered on the last-named stream and a large trail leading up it. Our Crows swam back to us with a note from Colonel Reno, and the poor fellows were very much exhausted when they reached us. Could we have known what had taken place only twenty-four hours before on the head waters of the very stream at whose mouth we stood, the information would have been invaluable to us, and probably have given a different shape to our whole subsequent operations. As it was, we were still groping in the dark in regard to the location of the hostile camps, and had every reason to believe that the Sioux with their women and children were solicitous only to avoid us. General Terry was understood to be at the mouth of the Tongue River, and the next morning Colonel Reno started with his command to join him. Our scouts reported seeing large fires in the direction of the Little Horn, and now every one was anxious for the arrival of General Terry, for our last chance for striking the Indians appeared to be in the direction indicated.

Anticipating a move up the river, I ordered, on the 21st, three companies of infantry to proceed up the road to replace the bridges, and repair the crossings over the various streams destroyed by the recent rains. During the morning General Terry reached our camp on the "Far West." After conferring with him, the whole command was at once started up the river, and at his request I accompanied him on the steamer to meet General Custer, who was coming up on the other side with the whole of his regiment. The steamer was run up to the mouth of the Rosebud, and afterwards dropped down to a point below, where Custer had arrived in the afternoon, and gone into camp or rather bivouac. As soon as we were tied up to the bank, he came aboard, and seated in the cabin with a map before us, we discussed the proposed operations. The

large trail found by Colonel Reno leading up the Rosebud and the fires seen in that direction by my scouts led to the belief that the Indians, if overtaken at all, would be found somewhere on the Little Big Horn, a favorite resort, where the grazing was good and game close by. It was therefore arranged that General Custer should start the next day with the whole of his regiment, take up the trail on the Rosebud, and follow it; that my command should march to the mouth of the Big Horn, something over sixty miles distant, be there ferried across the Yellowstone, and march from there to the valley of the Little Big Horn, and up that stream to co-operate with Custer's command. An examination of the map showed that the course of the Rosebud approaches that of the Little Big Horn nearest at a point about as far distant from where we then were as the mouth of the Big Horn was from us. Were then Custer, whose command was exclusively of cavalry, marching with pack-mules, to follow the trail directly into the valley of the Little Big Horn, he would probably strike the Indians long before I could be anywhere in the vicinity with my command, part of which was infantry, and to prevent the escape of the Indians, which was the idea pervading the minds of all of us, it was desirable that the two commands should be as near each other as possible when they approached the supposed location of the camp. The Indians, if struck, would probably not retreat *west*, for in that direction was the formidable Big Horn, beyond which was the whole Crow nation, the deadly enemies of the Sioux. They could not go north without running into my column, nor east without doubling on their course, and exposing themselves to attack from both columns. They would, therefore, in all probability, go south; for, in addition to its being their natural and only practicable line of retreat, was the fact that in that direction lay the Big Horn range of mountains, in the fastnesses of which they would be comparatively secure, and could live on the game and wild berries which abounded there. But if, as we had good reason to expect, General Crook's column was somewhere in that direction, there was a third column against which the Indians incumbered with their families were liable to run. Hence it was agreed that Custer, instead of proceeding at once into the valley of the Little Big Horn, even should the trail lead there, should continue on up the Rosebud, get closer to the mountains, and then striking west, come down the valley of the Little Big Horn, "feeling constantly to his left," to be sure that the Indians had not already made their escape to the south and eastward. General Terry, applying a scale to the map, measured the distances, and made the calculation in miles that each command would have to travel. My command having already started, was to be at the mouth of the Big Horn prepared to cross the Yellowstone on the third day.

The scouts with Custer's regiment were entirely ignorant of the country he was to pass through. Mitch Bowyer, who knew all about it, was to go with him, and in addition, by direction of General Terry, I assigned to duty with him six of my Crow scouts who volunteered for the service. Besides this, General Terry expressed a desire that Custer should communicate with him by sending a scout down the valley of Tullock's Fork, and send him any news of importance he might have, especially as to whether or not any hostiles were on that stream. As he had no one with him suitable for this service, I engaged, by General Terry's order, a white man named Horendem, who had been with my column for some time, was a good scout, and well acquainted with the country he would have to pass over. Horendem stipulated that in case he was called upon to incur the additional risk of carrying dispatches his compensation should be increased. This was agreed to, and he accompanied General Custer's troops.

At noon the next day, General Terry, accompanied by myself and General Brisbin, rode to the upper end of the camp to witness the departure of Custer and his fine regiment. The bugles sounded the "boots and saddles," and Custer, after starting the advance, rode up and joined us. Together we sat on our horses and witnessed the approach of the command as it threaded its way through the rank sage brush which covered the valley. First came a band of buglers sounding a march, and as they came opposite to General Terry they wheeled out of the column as at review, continuing to play as the command passed along. The regiment presented a fine appearance, and as the various companies passed us we had a good opportunity to note the number of fine horses in the ranks, many of them being part-blooded horses from Kentucky, and I was told there was not a single sore-backed horse amongst them. General Custer appeared to be in good spirits, chatted freely with us, and was evidently proud of the appearance of his command. The pack-mules, in a compact body, followed the regiment, and behind them came a rear-guard, and as that approached Custer shook hands with us and bade us good-by. As he turned to leave us I made some pleasant remark, warning him against being greedy, and with a gay wave of his hand he called back, "No, I will not," and rode off after his command. Little did we think we had seen him for the last time, or imagine under what circumstances we should next see that command, now mounting the bluffs in the distance with its little guidons gayly fluttering in the breeze.

A very heavy cold wind was blowing from the north, and our steamer did not start until 4 o'clock in the afternoon. We ran on till near dusk, when we tied up for the night and took in wood. The next day (23d) we ran steadily all day, and just before night

we tied up, the captain stating that he was unable to reach Fort Pease before dark. We arrived there, however, early the next morning, and my command being in position was at once ferried across the river, and at 5 o'clock started on its march up the Big Horn. I had been attacked with very severe illness the night before, had remained in bed all day and was unable to move. General Terry accompanied the command in person, leaving me on board to meet the column at the mouth of the Little Big Horn. The next day at noon (25th) we entered the mouth of that stream, the "Far West" being the first steamer that ever ploughed its waters, and running till dark tied up for the night, little dreaming what a disastrous day had closed over the gallant Custer and his command. The next morning we were early under way again. The river, which was very full, began to be intersected with numerous islands, and the boat experienced some difficulty in finding a navigable channel. We had just finished pulling over a bar, and were approaching a difficult rapid, when two horsemen were seen on the bluffs coming towards us. They were soon made out to be one of my staff officers and an orderly. He came aboard and informed me that the infantry part of the command was only a few miles up the river; that they had had a terrible march the day before over the rough mountainous region lying between the Big Horn and Tullock's Fork, during which the men suffered very much from exhaustion and the want of water, and that General Terry, with the cavalry and Gatling guns, had started ahead for a night's march the evening before. This looked as if he anticipated meeting with Indians, and as I now began to be impatient lest the boat would be unable to reach the mouth of the Little Big Horn that day, I determined to mount my horse and overtake the command at once. It was lucky I did so, for the command was not again in communication with the boat until four days afterwards. After a brisk ride of four or five miles I overtook the infantry marching over a plateau not particularly rough, but intersected by numerous deep ravines, which must have rendered the march of the cavalry the night before very tedious and slow, as the night was dark and rainy. Later in the day we overtook the cavalry as it was leaving the place where it had bivouacked at midnight, and on reaching the head of the column and receiving the command from General Terry, I was informed that our scouts reported Indians in front in the direction of the Little Big Horn. Soon after, the officer in charge of the scouts reported that several Indians had been seen to whom the Crows gave chase, and that they had fled across the Big Horn. In their flight they had dropped articles which showed them to be Crows and not Sioux, and our scouts declared them to be some of the Crows which I had lent General Custer at the mouth of the

Rosebud for scouting purposes. They were directed to communicate with their friends across the Big Horn, bring them back, and ascertain what news they brought from Custer. For, of course, the inference was at once drawn that these Crows had been sent out by Custer to communicate with our column. We were utterly unprepared for the startling report which our Crows brought back after calling across to their friends on the opposite bank of the Big Horn. Our best interpreter had been left sick at the mouth of the river, and from what we could make out by the indifferent one with us, who appeared very much excited and demoralized by the news, Custer's command had been entirely cut to pieces by the Sioux, who, so said the interpreter, "were chasing our soldiers all over the hills and killing them like buffalo."

This startling piece of news was received with incredulity by every one, and the absconding Crows were again sent for, to come back that we might question them, and try to ascertain something near the facts. Whilst the head of the column was halting for the infantry to close up, General Terry and myself walked over to the edge of the bluff overlooking the valley of the Big Horn to await the return of the scouts, and ascertain from them such news as we could. The broad river intersected by numerous wooded islands was spread out at our feet, and from the edge of a piece of timber nearest us our scouts were soon seen emerging, and approaching a buffalo trail which led up the bluffs to the spot where we were standing. As they came nearer we detected signs of grief; and as old "Show-his-face" (the senator) mounted the steep slope on his pony, he was seen to be crying as if his heart was broken, with great tears streaming down his old weatherbeaten face, and uttering every now and then the most doleful exclamations. We had become used to this after seeing them cry at the loss of their horses, and therefore did not attach much importance to it; but when the others arrived and confirmed the previous report, with the information that their friends declared their horses and themselves were too exhausted to cross the river again, and positively refused to come back, it became manifest that the Indians themselves believed in the truth of the report as they heard it.

Of course there was but one thing for us to do, which was to push forward as rapidly as possible and try and clear up for ourselves the terrible uncertainty; for, at all events, the fact seemed undoubted that Custer had come in contact with the Indians, and the sooner we could reach him the better. The march was at once resumed, and we shortly reached the bluffs overlooking the valley of the Little Big Horn, some distance up which huge columns of smoke could now be plainly seen. As we wound along over the rough broken hills seeking for a place to get down into the valley,

I observed that all our Crows, instead of travelling well to the front, as was their custom, stuck close to the column. I ordered the interpreter to take them to the front and report for duty with the advanced guard; but he declared his inability to get them to go, and was evidently himself so badly scared that he produced a bad effect upon the Indians. Finding I could not get them to the front I angrily ordered them to the rear of the column, an order which they obeyed with so much alacrity under the lead of the white interpreter that we saw them no more; and they never stopped till they reached their agency a hundred miles away. This, of course, we ascertained afterwards. They were evidently very badly stampeded, but I attributed this more to the demoralized condition of the white interpreter than to any want of courage on their part; and they afterwards assured me, when they rejoined us at the mouth of the Big Horn, that the interpreter had told them that I said I did not want them any longer.

We had to remain for some time on the high bluffs overlooking the valley of the Little Big Horn, up which the smoke of the fires continued constantly to increase in volume, which gave rise to the hope that, as our guides expressed it, Custer had "got away" with the camp and was destroying it. Such a hope was in consonance with our ideas, for I do not suppose there was a man in the column who entertained for a moment the idea that there were Indians enough in the country to defeat, much less annihilate, the fine regiment of cavalry which Custer had under his command. Distances in this clear, rarefied atmosphere are very deceptive, and, as we moved on, the distance to the smoke which at first appeared to be only a few miles seemed to lengthen out and grow greater under the weary feet of our men, and when we did finally make our way down into the valley and cross the stream at a deep ford we were still some twelve or fifteen miles from the nearest smoke. To afford rest and food to both men and animals the command was halted here; the animals permitted to graze for an hour and a half and the men to make coffee. In the meantime efforts were made to communicate by courier with General Custer, General Terry offering a large reward to any one who would carry through a dispatch. Two of our guides, Bostwick and Taylor, although unacquainted with the country volunteered for the service, and, shortly after they left, the column resumed its march up the broad open valley. After we had proceeded several miles some stray ponies were picked up by the advance guard, which were evidently estrays from an Indian camp. On our left ran the stream bordered with timber and brushwood, and some distance on our right the valley was bounded by low rolling hills. In our front the stream after cutting into the bluffs, crossed the valley from right to left, the

timber shutting out all view beyond, save above its top appeared a sharp mountain peak, on the edges of which could now and then be indistinctly made out a few moving figures, and just beyond this peak the smoke appeared to have its origin. Up to this time no Indians had been seen, but shortly after one of our couriers came riding in from the front, and reported that in attempting to reach Custer's command he had run into a number of Indians in the hills, and was unable to proceed farther. A company of cavalry was now thrown out to the hills on our right, and the column pushed forward as rapidly as the men could march, the infantry responding with alacrity and almost keeping up in pace with the horses. Small scattered bands now began to make their appearance on the tops of the distant hills up the river where the latter began to deflect its course to the northward, and as it grew dark more of them could be seen in the distance.

The condition of affairs regarding Custer's command was now more involved in doubt than ever. If he had defeated the Indians and destroyed their camp, as the fires seemed to indicate, it was difficult to account for the presence of these Indians in our front, who were evidently watching us; whereas, if the report of the Crows was correct, and the Indians had defeated Custer, their bearing was equally inexplicable. This state of doubt was only increased when our other courier came in and reported the result of his attempts to get through to Custer. He had struck into the hills to the southward, and had encountered Indians, who appeared to be friendly, and responded to the signals he made them. He approached some of them on foot, and leading his horse, when one of them he said treacherously fired a shot at him, and he fiercely declared he had recognized him as one of Custer's Ree scouts, and that he would kill him when he met him for firing at him. As night closed around us the command was halted and bivouacked in the open prairie; the scouting parties were called in, who reported seeing quite a large number of Indians on the distant hills, but in the gathering darkness nothing could be plainly made out. After watering and grazing the animals they were all carefully picketed inside the command formed in a square, guards established just outside, and the tired men sank to rest eight miles from the brave little band of fellow-soldiers which, unknown to us, was watching and waiting on those bleak bluffs of the river above.

Every one was astir at the first appearance of day, and after a hurried breakfast of hardtack, bacon, and coffee, the march was resumed up the valley. The trail, forced into the hills on the right by the encroachment of the river, led through rough ground around a bend in the stream, and as the view opened into the valley beyond, we caught sight, through the scattered timber, of a couple of Indian

teepies standing in the open valley. The advance guard with flankers out on the hills to the right now moved rapidly to the front, whilst a party of mounted infantry, which had crossed the river, scouted the hills on that side. As soon as the Gatling guns were passed over the rough portion of the trail, the whole command, well closed up, moved in compact order up through the open valley beyond, every one eagerly pressing forward and anxious to solve the dread doubt which seemed to hang over the fate of our comrades. Silence reigned around us, only a few distant horsemen had been seen, and, but for the presence of a few scattering Indian ponies, the valley seemed to be entirely deserted. The company of cavalry in the advance was seen to push more rapidly to the front, past the Indian teepies, which showed no life, and on beyond at a gallop, whilst our more slowly moving column seemed merely to crawl along. At length we reached the teepies, found them occupied by dead Indians laid out in state, and surrounded in every direction with the remnants and various odds and ends of a hastily abandoned camp. Teepie poles, skins, robes, pots, kettles, and pans lay scattered about in every direction. But we had little time or inclination to comment on these sights, for every thought was now bent upon the possible fate of our fellow-soldiers, and the desire was intense to solve as soon as possible the dread doubt which now began to fill all minds. For, in searching about amongst the rubbish, some one had picked up a pair of bloody drawers, upon which was plainly written the words, "Sturgis's 7th Cavalry," whilst a buckskin shirt, recognized as belonging to Lieutenant Porter, was discovered with a bullet-hole passing through it.

It was plainly to be seen now that a conflict had indeed taken place, but of its extent or results we were still in as much doubt as ever, when a report came to me from the scouting party in the hills to our left that several dead horses had been discovered in a ravine in that direction. Every eye was now strained to the utmost in search of information, and whilst looking up the valley I caught sight of something on the top of a hill far beyond the sharp peak before referred to, which at once attracted my attention and a closer scrutiny. I sprang from my horse, and with a field glass looked long and anxiously at a number of dark objects which might be either animals or stubby cedar trees. The closest scrutiny failed to detect any movement amongst them, and yet I could not divest my mind of the idea that they were horses, and called upon a pair of younger eyes to try the glass. One of General Terry's staff officers took the glass and seating himself on the ground peered long and anxiously at the spots, but finally said "they are not animals." But scarcely had the words escaped him, when we both noticed a very apparent increase in the number of objects on the highest

point of the hill, and now one doubt was solved only to give rise to another. Were the objects seen friends or foes? Had we come in time to save some of our friends, or were the objects on the hill simply a party of Indians watching our approach after having, as the Crows said, destroyed them all? The feeling of anxiety was overwhelming, and the column seemed to crawl along more slowly than ever. The advance was moving ahead fast enough now, and I dispatched a staff officer in haste to ascertain and bring back any information it may have picked up; for I had observed on the peak before spoken of, and opposite which the advanced guard had now arrived, three horsemen evidently observing our movements and watching us closely. They could scarcely, I thought, be white men, for our troops were marching up the valley in two columns, in plain sight of where they sat on their horses, and if friendly they surely would have come down and communicated with us. They did finally come slowly down to a lower hill standing nearer to the river, but there they halted again and seemed to question us with their eyes.

Whilst watching these lookouts and wondering at their strange movements, the officer in charge of the mounted infantry party, in the hills to the north of us, rode up to where General Terry and I sat upon our horses, and his voice trembled as he said, "I have a very sad report to make. I have counted one hundred and ninety-seven dead bodies lying in the hills!" "White men?" was the first question asked. "Yes, white men." A look of horror was upon every face, and for a moment no one spoke. There could be no question now. The Crows were right, and Custer had met with a disaster, but the extent of it was still a matter of doubt; and as we turned our eyes towards the lookouts on the hill above us, as though to question them, we saw them moving, still slowly, however, down closer to the river. Then as they reached a gentle slope they rode on a little faster, and were seen to approach the advance guard, and some one in our anxious group exclaimed, "They are white men!" From out of the timber near the point, a horseman at full speed was now seen coming towards us. It was my staff officer coming with news, and as he approached us on the full run he called out, "I have seen scouts from Colonel Reno, who report their regiment cut to pieces, and Colonel Reno fortified in the bluffs with the remnant." We were still some distance, probably a mile and a half from the objects we had been observing on the hill, and now pushed forward more eagerly than ever, the advance guard being already opposite their position. After we had gone about a mile a party of horsemen was seen approaching, and as we rode forward to meet them we recognized two young officers of the Seventh Cavalry, followed by several orderlies. Hands were

grasped almost in silence, but we questioned eagerly with our eyes, and one of the first things they uttered was, "Is General Custer with you?" On being told that we had not seen him, they gave us hurriedly an account of the operations of the past two days, and the facts began to dawn upon us. No one of the party which accompanied General Custer when the command was divided, about noon on the 25th, had been seen by the survivors, and our inference was, that they were all, or nearly all, lying up in the hills where our scouting party had found the dead bodies.

Whilst General Terry accompanied the officers to Colonel Reno's position on the hill, I proceeded to select a camp for the command. Nearly the whole valley was black and smoking with the fire which had swept over it, and it was with some difficulty I could find grass sufficient for our animals, as it existed only in spots close to the stream where too green to burn. Except the fire, the ground presented but few evidences of the conflict which had taken place. Now and then a dead horse was seen; but as I approached a bend of the creek (for it is little more than a creek), just below the hill occupied by the troops, I came upon the body of a soldier lying on his face near a dead horse. He was stripped, his scalp gone, his head beaten in, and his body filled with bullet-holes and arrows. Close by was another body, also close to a dead horse, lying, like the other, on its face, but partially clothed, and this was recognized by one of our officers as the body of Captain McIntosh. More bodies of both men and horses were found close by, and it was noted that the bodies of men and horses laid almost always *in pairs*, and as this was the ground over which Colonel Reno's command retired towards the hills after its charge down the valley, the inference was drawn, that in the run the horses must have been killed first, and the riders after they fell.

The command was placed in camp here, and details at once set to work to haul away the dead horses and bury the men, both of which were already becoming offensive. Then mounting my horse I proceeded to visit Colonel Reno's command. As I rode a few hundred yards up the river towards the ford, bodies of men and horses were seen scattered along at intervals, and in the river itself several dead horses were lying. The banks of the river at the ford were steep and some six or eight feet high, with here and there an old buffalo trail leading down to the water. The water itself was not over a horse's knee, and close to the bank, on the other side, a series of steep bluffs, intersected at short intervals by steep and narrow ravines, rose up for probably a hundred feet. Up the sides of these ravines, winding about to make the ascent more gradual, numerous paths led, now tramped hard and smooth by the many animals which had recently passed over them. My horse struggled

up the steep path, wide enough only for a single animal, with difficulty, and on emerging from the ravine up which it led, I found myself on a sort of rough broken plateau, which sloped gradually up to the curved summit occupied by the troops. I soon came to a line of rifle-pits facing the space I was crossing, and running from the summit of the ridge down to the bluff overlooking the river, whilst behind this and facing the other way was another line, running in a similar way along the summit of an almost parallel ridge. Between the two were standing and lying, almost motionless, the horses and pack-mules of the command. As I approached the summit of the main ridge which overlooked all the rest of the ground I have described, the evidences of the severe struggle which had taken place here began to manifest themselves. Dead horses and mules were lying about in every direction, and in one little depression on the other slope of the main divide I counted forty-eight dead animals. Here and there, these had evidently been made use of as breastworks, and along the top of the ridge holes and rifle-pits extended, connecting the two lines before referred to. On the far side of the ridge, the ground gradually fell away in lower ridges, behind which the Indians had sheltered themselves and their ponies during the fight.

Standing on top of the main ridge with my back to the river, I overlooked the whole of the ground to the front; but on turning to my left, the ground was seen to rise higher and higher in successive ridges which ran nearly perpendicular to the stream, until they culminated in the sharp peak referred to in my description of the previous day upon which we had seen objects at a great distance down the valley. Several of these ridges commanded in reverse the position occupied by the troops, and we were told had been occupied by the Indians during the fight of the 26th, their long-range rifles covering all the space within the lines. Turning again to the left so as to face the river, the broad open flat where Colonel Reno had made his charge at the commencement of the battle on the 25th lay directly at our feet, whilst off towards the south the bluffs which bordered the valley rose up abruptly, and were succeeded by a gently sloping country intersected by several small valleys, with brushwood lining the now dry beds of the streams at the bottoms, while in the far distance the rugged range of the Big Horn Mountains rose, their tops partially covered with snow. One of the little valleys referred to was pointed out to us as the place where at dusk, the evening before, the last of the Indians disappeared in the distance after passing over, in admirable order and in full view of the command, the rolling plateau which bordered the valley of the Little Big Horn to the southward. Looking down the river in the direction we had come was a point of

timber jutting out into the plain, wheré for a portion of the time the cavalry had fought dismounted; and beyond this, in plain sight from where I stood, was located the village where the fight began; and opposite that, hidden from sight by the high peak so often referred to, was the scene of Custer's fight, where his body was found surrounded by those of his men and horses.

On the highest point of the ridge occupied by the troops, and along what had been the northern line of defence, were pitched a number of shelter tents, and under and about these were lying some fifty wounded men, receiving the care of the surgeons and their attendants. The cheerfulness of these poor fellows under their sufferings, and their evident joy at their rescue was touching in the extreme, and we listened with full hearts to their recital in feeble tones of the long anxious hours of waiting and fighting, during which every eye was strained, looking for the coming succor, hoping for its arrival, yet fearing it would be too late. At one time, so strongly did the imagination affect the judgment, the whole command was convinced that columns of troops could be seen moving over the hills to their assistance, but in directly the *opposite* direction from which they actually came. So strong was this delusion that the buglers of the whole command were assembled and ordered to sound their bugles to attract attention. When we finally made our appearance down the valley, the same thing was done, and it is supposed that it was the gathering together of the buglers on the highest point of the hill which finally decided in our minds that we were looking at men and horses, and not clumps of cedar trees. But we heard nothing of the bugles, for the wind was blowing from us.

Standing on the scene of the conflict, we heard from officers and men the story of the struggle and their experience for the past forty-eight hours. The battle commenced some time about noon on the 25th by the charge of the three companies down towards the village. They reached the point of timber I have referred to as jutting out into the plain. Here they were dismounted for a time, and fought from the timber, and then when the Indians came swarming around them from the ravines in the bluffs, they mounted again, and then commenced the race for the bluffs bordering the river. It must, from their description, have been a race of life against death. Look up the stream, and you will see the ford where Reno's command crossed to enter the fight. The one it crossed to reach its present position lies directly at your feet. Turning now to the left again so as once more to place your back to the river, and looking up to your right and front, you can trace with the eye a little valley winding its way up into the broken ground to the northeast. It was down this valley that Custer's

command approached the Little Big Horn, and near where it joins the valley of that stream is the ford where Reno crossed before the battle. Before reaching that point, Custer, it appears by his trail, turned to the right with his five companies, skirted along through these hills to our front, passed to the right of the sharp peak, and still on, beyond it and out of sight of where we stand. His trail is all that is left to tell the story of his route, for no white man of all those who accompanied him has since been seen alive. To us who stand upon the ground, and make these observations, his fate is still a matter of doubt, and is now to be solved. One of Colonel Reno's companies is mounted and started for the scene of Custer's fight. It leaves our position, and winding along the rolling hills, ascends the high ground to the right of the high peak, and disappears beyond, just as Custer's command would have vanished probably from the sight of an observer standing where we are now.

Whilst this company is away we are busy preparing to remove the wounded down from the hot, dusty hill where they are lying to my camp, where they will be more comfortable and can be better cared for.

After being absent a couple of hours the detached company is seen winding its way back, and as it approaches we all collect round General Terry to hear the report of its gray-haired captain, who won such praises by his indomitable bearing in the fight. He comes forward, dismounts, and in a low, very quiet voice, tells his story. He had followed Custer's trail to the scene of the battle opposite the main body of the Indian camp, and amid the rolling hills which borders the river-bank on the north. As he approached the ground scattered bodies of men and horses were found, growing more numerous as he advanced. In the midst of the field a long *backbone* ran out obliquely back from the river, rising very gradually until it terminated in a little knoll which commanded a view of all the surrounding ground, and of the Indian camp-ground beyond the river. On each side of this backbone, and sometimes on top of it, dead men and horses were scattered along. These became more numerous as the terminating knoll was reached; and on the southwestern slope of that lay the brave Custer surrounded by the bodies of several of his officers and forty or fifty of his men, whilst horses were scattered about in every direction. All were stripped, and most of the bodies were scalped and mutilated. And now commenced the duty of recognizing the dead. Of Custer there could be no doubt. He was lying in a perfectly natural position as many had seen him lying when asleep, and, we were told, was not at all mutilated, and that, only after a good deal of search the wounds of which he died could be found. The field was searched and one after another the officers were found and recog

nized, all except two. A count of the bodies disclosed the fact that some twenty-five or thirty were missing, and we could not, until some time afterwards, form even a surmise in regard to their fate.

The great mystery was now solved, at last, of the destruction of that part of Custer's command. It was possible that some few individuals might have escaped the general massacre; but so far as we could judge all had fallen; and the particulars of that sad and desperate conflict against overwhelming numbers of the savage horde which flocked about Custer and his devoted three hundred when Reno was beaten back, will probably never be known.

THE RED MAN GAUGED BY HIS SPEECH.

1. *Dictionnaire de la Langue des Cris.* Par le Rev. Père Alb. Lacombe, Prêtre, Oblat de Marie Immaculée. Montreal: C. O. Beauchemin & Valois, 1874.
2. *Grammaire de la Langue des Cris.* Same author, publishers, and year.

THE demand for Indian grammars and dictionaries is, we presume, rather limited, and neither authors nor publishers will make fortunes out of them. For the few, however, who need such books they are great treasures, and it would be well if there were many more of them. In fact, every contribution to the better understanding of the aboriginal American tongues, every help toward their easier acquisition deserves a hearty welcome, not only at the hands of practical laborers in the Indian missions and of linguists, but of every patriot and philanthropist. Prejudice and antipathy, whether they exist between individuals or between nations, can have no better ally than ignorance, and no worse foe than more intimate mutual knowledge. Thus stands the case between the Indian and his more gifted, though frequently no less prejudice-ridden white brother. Father Lacombe's dictionary and grammar of the Cree language,¹ the result of twenty years' practical experience

¹ A grammar of the Cree language was published in London, 1844, by I. Flowse. Of this fact Father Lacombe seems not to have been aware. His dictionary is the first that deserves the name, only short vocabularies having been published before in works of travel, etc.

and study, will prove another effective means of breaking down the barrier which the pride of ignorance has, in this western world, raised up between the conqueror and the conquered. Every new Indian scholar, and many such, let us hope, these books will help to make, is sure to become a friend of the race; at least no honest and good man, having once learned to converse with Indians in one of their own dialects, can continue, if he ever did before, to despise them or to doubt their right to a position, however humble, in the family of nations, and to possess and enjoy a little corner in this wide world of ours. And this is not all. Our Indian brethren not only need friends, but friends that understand them and know how to deal with them. The overestimation of the red man's capacity, the supposition that by a certain method of training he may be brought up to the full stature of the white man, or very near to it, has led to practical mistakes as serious as the opposite error which rates the Indian as a being extremely low in the scale of creation, and utterly incapable of any kind of civilization. The pedagogue must know his pupil, and what he is capable of accomplishing, or he will lose much time and labor. There are no better means to gauge the capabilities of the Indian tribes than the theoretical study of their dialects; no more indispensable aid for effectively managing our uncultivated, and often refractory wards, than the practical knowledge of their speech. A more intimate acquaintance with the red man will be gained by the study of his mental physiognomy as portrayed in his speech, and it cannot but greatly aid in piloting us between those two extremes, each equally fatal in its practical effects, either underrating or overvaluing the Indian's capabilities; the aim, limits, and method of the plan of education will at once present themselves in more clearly defined form, and many of the blunders thus far committed, even by the Indian's friends, may be avoided. For those actually engaged in the education of any one of the tribes, the knowledge of its language, it hardly needs to be added, is simply indispensable.

Our aim, in the following pages, will be to present to the reader, in a form as free from technicalities as the subject will allow, a critical examination or appraisal, principally from a psychological point of view, of one of the great branches of Indian speech, the so-called Algonquin or Algic, of which the Cree is one of the most interesting offshoots. The result of our investigation, we are confident, will go far towards elevating the Indian in the estimation of our readers. But no less will it show the very great, and, we are tempted to add, almost measureless difference that exists between his mental constitution and that of our own branch of the human family.

The study of the Algic tongues is certainly a delightful task; not without its thorns, to be sure; but the labor of acquiring any one or more of them, as a key to all others, is more than compensated by the intellectual treat it offers to the student, a treat akin to the intense delight the traveller through strange and never before explored countries experiences, as, following their river-courses and scaling their mountains, he meets at almost every step with novel scenes and remarkable products of nature. No doubt the touch of the Master-hand that made all things according to number, weight, and measure, is perceptible in any human tongue; but as our minds are apt to become blunted to the beauty of objects familiar to the sight, so our mother tongue and those nearly related to it fail to make the impression produced by idioms of a widely different character. Indeed, to fully appreciate the excellence of our happily organized and highly cultivated Indo-European languages, some knowledge of those spoken by the less gifted races is indispensable. We must go abroad, would we learn how we really live at home. As in Europe the study of the Scythian or Ural-Altaic languages has of late become a favorite occupation of linguists, so on this side of the ocean the study of the American aboriginal tongues should naturally recommend itself to the attention of the scholar; and to begin with what lies nearest, much more should be done towards preserving and investigating the dialects of those Indian tribes, at least, whom we are dispossessing, and whom the tidal wave of a superior civilization may eventually sweep out of existence. Says Professor Whitney in his masterly lectures on linguistic science: "Our national duty and honor are peculiarly concerned in this matter of the study of aboriginal American languages as the most fertile and important branch of American archæology."¹ To this let us add that the example of our early missionaries, who first of all and amid fearful difficulties unravelled the mazes of Indian speech, may well spur on their successors toward taking upon themselves so considerable a part of that national task as their in many ways privileged relation to the aboriginal population seems to assign them. It is true their generally isolated position, their distance from large libraries and consequent want of literary helps, and above all the pressure of duties incomparably more important, form great difficulties in the way of their critically examining and comparing dialects which they learn for merely practical purposes. If, nevertheless, they dare to offer to the scientific world the results of their

¹ *Language and the Study of Language.* By William Dwight Whitney. Fifth edition. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1876. The words quoted above, with other pertinent remarks, will be found on page 352. While giving our humble meed of praise to a work of such eminent merit, we do, of course, not wish to indorse the author's opinions on questions controverted between believers in revelation and their opponents of various hues.

personal observation and study, may they not count on the indulgence of the professional linguist who, for the material he works upon, depends so much on their assistance.

The Algic branch of Indian languages holds a prominent place among the small number of aboriginal American tongues that thus far have been subjected to the scrutiny of our modern science of language. It comprises a large number of dialects, the most distant apparently standing to each other in not much nearer a degree of relationship than Latin and Greek. Between those two extremes, the Wapanashki and Satsikaa, several minor groups may be distinguished, with differences of speech ranging from that of mere local dialects (such as are met with in all European countries) to that existing between the most distant members of the Slavonic family; in other words, while the tribes speaking the Wapanashki and the Satsikaa are mutually unintelligible, all the rest have enough in common to understand at least a word here and there of each other's tongues, and thus, with more or less facility, keep up some kind of a conversation. The principal dialects of the northern intermediate group are the Cree or Nehiyaw, the Ojibwa and Ottawa, the Algonquin proper, or, as we shall term it, the Niinaw and the Pottawattamie; and it is upon the examination of their peculiarities that the following observations are based. Most of the examples needed for the support of our criticisms and for the illustration of our theories will be selected from the Ojibwa, which occupies a most conspicuous position among the Algic dialects. Being, with but very slight variations, spoken over a wider extent of country and by a larger number of individuals than any of the rest, it is also understood by what we might call the educated among the surrounding tribes, and has received the greatest share of attention and literary cultivation on the part of both missionaries and linguists. As for the graphical rendering of Indian sounds we shall, for the sake of uniformity, make a compromise between the systems adopted by the writers in or on the several dialects, culling from each what appears most appropriate for our present purpose.¹

In presenting the characteristics of an Indian language to the general reader, or even to the linguistic student, the same deception can easily be practiced that certain writers of travel have, perhaps quite unconsciously, become guilty of in describing peoples and countries. And, in fact, preconceived ideas, want of penetration or

¹ Pronounce the vowels *a e i o* as in *far, get, pin, bone*. In Cree, there is an intermediate sound between *o* and short *u*, represented by *u*. The consonant *g* has always the hard sound and, in many cases, is interchangeable with *k*. *Y* is in every case a semi-vowel, as in *yet*. When two or three vowels follow each other, every one is distinctly pronounced. *Ch* has the sound of *tch*, as in *watch*. All the rest as in English, or nearly so. It should be observed that the writer has had no opportunity to hear the Cree and Niinaw *spoken*.

of judgment, too limited a field of observation, and even erroneous data used as a foundation to build theories upon—all these things have had full play in essays descriptive of our aboriginal languages. Were we, for example, to select our linguistic specimens solely from the extant Algic translations, old or modern, of parts of the Scriptures, our readers would be as certainly led astray as the foreigner to whom the discussions of some scientific society in the "Hub" were presented as a fair example of how American people generally talk. Open, for instance, the book of Genesis, translated by Kahkewaguonaby Ahneshenahba Makahdawekoonahya,¹ and passing over the first verse, whose longest vocable counts but five syllables, launch into the third line; there you will at once be brought to a dead halt by a word-giant of no less than thirty-seven letters in fifteen syllables. In vain you try to pronounce with any degree of ease: wahwanahkahmegezesejegahdasenoogoobun; or, as we would write, wawenakamigizhissijigadessinogoban.² The task might be facilitated by dividing and accentuating, as follows: wāwēn-ākāmīg-īzhīs-sījīgād-éssīn-ógōbān; but the spectre of the long-winded, quadruply sesquipedalian vocable will still haunt you, and your suspicion as to the clumsiness—the general reproach—of Indian speech will hardly be much allayed. "How in the world did those people come to such a monstrous language?" and "Who can ever learn it?" are questions we are wont to hear addressed to us even by educated and intelligent people. Nor will you become more assured if glancing over the paradigms of a grammar you meet with such forms as WayABamigossiawangoban, WayABamissinowangobanenag, etc., the capitals alone representing the root of the verb. And what, if your guide in that primeval forest of Algic speech should bid you look up at a twenty-syllable giant-tree like this: bonibigwakamigibijiganikewininiwissiwangoban! Father Lacombe, like most Indianologists, also takes pleasure in exhibiting and analyzing remarkable specimens of word-conglomerates, such as: kitosawasoniyawibasaskuteniganabiskumisisinowok, or kitayamiewosawasoniyawibasaskuteniganabiskumisisiwawok, etc.

But, now, waiving for a moment the task of explaining those truly hyperpolysynthetic words, let us invite the reader to a party of harmless Ojibwas engaged in one of their ordinary avocations. Do they still speak the same language? Let us listen to them.

¹ Printed for the Toronto Auxiliary Bible Society, 1835. The English name of the translator—probably of mixed blood—is P. Jones. *Anishinabemekatewikwanaye* (so we would spell his Indian title) means "Indian Black Goat."

² The syllable *iz* or *izh* seems superfluous, and was declared so by an intelligent native. Accordingly, when we come to analyze the vocable, we shall take no account of it.

Eidon abwi! Bring the paddle! Oma aton! Put it down here! Anindi koss? Where is your father? Tibidog. I don't know. Aia-na kizhime? Is your younger brother here? Ka; zheba gi-gopi. No; he went into the woods this morning. Nin gabiskab, ikitoban. He said he would return to-day. Noi dash? And Louis? Megwa madabi. He is just coming down to the shore. Pien, awi-nadin makak! Pierre, go and fetch the box! Tiwe, nin bwawinan! Oh, I can't lift it up! Bositon! Put it aboard! Kizhikan, Saswe; bosin! Hurry up, François; get into the canoe! Andabin! Sit elsewhere! Kidebab-ina? Have you room enough to sit? Taya, bidanimad! Ah, the wind is getting up! Ombakobijigen! Put up the mast and hoist the sail! Kigaminwashimin. We shall have a fine sail.

But why multiply by examples? The reader is already aware that something similar to what every one knows to be the case with the English language must hold good of the Algic tongues: words in common and frequent use incline to shortness; those employed in stately and formal language, or for the designation of more abstract, or more complicated ideas of less frequent occurrence generally, require a larger number of syllables. Some points of difference, however, must be adverted to.

In the first place, it cannot be denied that the average length of Algic vocables, including the inflected parts of speech, exceeds not only that of English words in common use, but even of those of the Sanskrit, of the classic idioms of Europe, and of some living tongues of the Indo-European family that have in a higher degree preserved its original synthetic character, such as the Sclavonic dialects. The proper inference to be drawn from this fact must remain reserved for a later paragraph; here we only remark that words exceeding a dozen syllables are at least of extremely rare occurrence. The average length of vocables, in ordinary talk, may range from three to four syllables, the Pottawattamie dialect verging on the lower, the Niinaw and Cree on the upper mark, the Ottawa and Ojibwa holding the middle.¹

Secondly, the very same ideas with which the civilized European has been familiar for ages must not be expected to have fared as well among uncultivated American nomads. No wonder, then, if the Algonquin equivalents of numberless words which in the Indo-European tongues have lost the last vestige of their originally compound character, still appear in the full array of their time-honored polysynthetic trimmings. On the other hand, the Indian mode of life must have favored the working out of many vocables for which we have no corresponding terms of similar shortness. The differ-

¹ The average number of syllables in an English word is, according to Whitney, 1.358. In Ottawa we found it to be about 3.4.

ence, both in degree and kind of culture, between any two nations is strikingly portrayed in the more or less complicated character of terms employed for the expression of the same ideas. The Chinese, for instance, designate "a person who died in jail of hunger and cold" with the 'one radical syllable *du*, a term for which we fortunately have not even a polysyllabic equivalent. Anamite civilization has worked out or naturalized one single term (*ti*) for "one hundred millions," but none for "philosophy," which is but loosely defined as "the trade of loving the perfect virtue of the prudent and gentle" (*su yeu nhon duc khon ngoan*). Thus the English "tablecloth," or the still shorter French "*nappe*," unfolds in Ojibwa to *adopowinigin* ("eat-upon-thing-cloth"), and in Cree spreads out into *michisuwinatikakwanaigan* (eating-wood-covering). In this particular case the length of the vocable corresponds, it would seem, with the frequency the article itself is called for, or with the lapse of time since its first introduction. But when the Ojibwa wishes to tell you that "he rows against the current," he simply says *nin nitaam*; when the enemy's "footsteps are visible," the fact is fully expressed by *okarwi*; and when a hunter "breaks up camp to move to some other ground," all that need be said of him is *gosi*. The plough, when first introduced among the Ojibwas on Lake Superior, some thirty years ago, was termed *bigwakamigibijigan* (ground-break-up-implement), and it is an encouraging fact that three syllables have since been dropped, and *bigobijigan* or *bigobojigan* (break-up-implement) alone answers the purpose. On the other hand, the snowshoe has from immemorial ages been *agim*, the lodge-pole *abash*, the whortleberry *min*, and the burrow of a bear or beaver simply *wash*. Here, again, however, we must make an important concession. A host of long polysyllabic vocables, that must have been in frequent use for ages, are still found wonderfully preserved in the various Algic dialects; and this phenomenon, too, will be explained and appreciated in due time.

In the third place, let it be well understood that the length of Algic vocables, however extreme, causes not the least embarrassment to even the most illiterate native speaker. There is, of course, some difference in the degree of ease and rapidity with which novel or seldom heard combinations will be appropriated by different individuals; but blunders of the Mrs. Partington type are an impossibility, and the fact is of easy explanation. The English language being both a mixed and a highly cultivated one, its measurably perfect management, especially as far as the foreign element is concerned, is the exclusive privilege of the educated, and only indeed of the highly educated; the mass of English-speaking people as a matter of course, moving principally within the range of that host of monosyllables into which most of the Germanic and a part

of the Norman French ingredient have been ground down in the course of ages. Let them go ever so little beyond their familiar ground and they will be bewildered as hearers, and stumble or blunder as speakers. The Algic dialects, on the contrary, containing but slight traces of heterogeneous admixtures, and only a small number of vocables that owe their origin to a higher stage of intellectual culture, have no boundary line which it would not be in the power of any member of the tribe, however devoid of literary training, to overstep. The mother tongue with all its wealth is the property of each individual, in an incomparably higher degree than can be predicated of our cultivated European languages, especially the English. Hence polysyllabic words of apparently abnormal dimensions will be found mixed up with the ordinary discourse of the Indian people, and used by them with perfect propriety and surprising ease; and even new terms of considerable length, necessitated by the progress of civilization, and either formed by intelligent natives or introduced by whites, will be readily understood and accepted, provided they be idiomatically compounded together or derived from the existent roots. Thus, what appears to be a blemish in reality proves a blessing—the introduction of new ideas among an illiterate people, and the instruction of old and young become matters of comparative ease. One or two examples may illustrate this fact. In Father Lacombe's *Dictionary* we find the term *aperceptibilité* rendered by *otisabatteyittamowin*, *i. e.*, "the state of being discernible by the mind." Rarely as the employment of such an abstract term may be called for in addressing "savages," the word will no sooner be pronounced than understood by every intelligent hearer, which would be far from being the case with the corresponding term "intelligibility," or "comprehensibility," if uttered before a mixed English audience. The Ottawa term *Kotagitowini-webinamagewini-zhawendagosiwin*; literally, "penalty-remission-favor;" that is, "indulgence," at once explains itself and effectively excludes the idea of the remission of guilt, which is *batatowini-gassiamagewin*, "the wiping off of sin."¹ In this manner the whole nomenclature of our little catechetical and devotional Algic works, whether original or translated, is transparent and self-explaining. It is so, at least, in a much higher degree than the religious terminology even of those European languages which, in forming compounds and derivatives, to a great extent draw on their

¹ It may be remarked that the above term for "indulgence," was suggested by an educated native in the stead of *Kotagitowini-zhawendagosiwin*, "penalty-favor," as preposterously used by a white man. The Ottawa naturally objected against *punishment* being granted as a *favor*. Our catechisms use the shorter form *webinamagewini-zhawendagosiwin*, "remission-favor," and supply the object of the remission in the course of the instruction as our English catechisms do in regard to the term "indulgence."

own resources. If the Algic terms of that sort are sometimes anything but short, there is something to make up for the blemish; the native hearer or reader has, if not a reflected knowledge, at least an unconscious or instinctive perception of the import of most of the roots, and of every theme and formative syllable or articulation that enters into the new combinations offered to him; and his memory is not uselessly burdened.

After the preceding remarks and illustrations it hardly needs to be mentioned that our Algic vocables in innumerable instances include a bunch of ideas, a cluster of relations, or both combined, to such an extent that the English and most other languages would for their adequate expression frequently require as many, or nearly as many, independent words as the Indian vocable contains syllables. A few examples of such word-conglomerates or crystallizations have been presented at the outset of our inquisition, but left unexplained. We will now take up the task of analyzing them, and begin with the samples selected from the Cree grammar, as exhibiting a simpler kind of formation. The task may be somewhat facilitated by typographically distinguishing their component parts in this manner: *kid-osarwa-soniyawi-wasaskutenigan-ABISK-umisis-inow-ak*.

The nucleus of the formation figures in large capitals. *Abisk* (after a vowel *wabisk*; in Ojibwa, Ottawa, etc., *abik* or *wabik*; probably a compound of two roots) is one of those word-elements, that, without possessing an independent existence, go to make up innumerable compounds. It implies any hard mineral substance, such as stone, glass, metal. Thus it appears in *piwabisk*, "metal," especially "iron." The word *piwABISKokutarwanABISK*, "iron, fireplace, stone," that is "a stove," contains it twice; so does the Ojibwa *kishABIK-isiganABIK*, "heating-stone, iron," or likewise "a stove." In the vocable that forms the subject of our inquisition, *abisk* is qualified by *wasaskutenigan*, "any contrivance for illuminating purposes, a torch, a lamp, a candle." The compound *wasaskuteniganabisk* accordingly signifies "a piece of metal used for illuminating purposes;" that is "a metal candlestick." The history of *wasaskutenigan* is as follows: of the root *was*, which implies "shining, luminosity," and the noun *iskute*, "fire" is formed a verb *wasaskutew*, "it shines like fire, there is a shining fire;" of this another verb is derived; namely, *wasaskutenike*, "he illumines, he uses fire for a light;" and this, by a process which it would lead too far to fully describe, is transformed into the noun *wasaskutenigan*, "a contrivance for making light by the means of fire."¹ But let us return to our metal candlestick, *wasaskuteniganabisk*. This is again quali-

¹ *Wassenamawin*, Ojibwa *wassechigan*, is "a fixture for making light (without fire)", that is "a window."

fied by the compound *osawa-soniya*, "yellow silver," "gold." The syllable *wi* at the end of it, whatever its original signification may have been, now only serves to solder the noun and "ad-noun" together. At this stage of growth the vocable literally signifies "a yellow-silver light-fire-making-thing metal," or "a gold candlestick." The further accretions are principally of a pronominal character. The prefix *Ki*, or *Kit*, before nouns represents the possessive pronoun of the second person singular, provided no pronominal suffix change its value. The letter *m*, affixed to our noun by means of the connective vowel *u*, enhances the idea of possession. Hence, *Kitosawasoniyarwivasaskuteniganabiskum* would be "thy own gold candlestick." By further adding the double diminutive ending *isis*, the meaning of the noun is reduced to a "very little gold candlestick." The suffix *inow* has a twofold effect; it shows that the speaker shares with the person addressed the ownership of the object in question, and makes it optional to understand the pronominal prefix *Ki* as referring to several persons. In consequence, the vocable thus obtained may signify "my and thy," or "my and your," that is, in either case, "our . . . candlestick." Finally, the plural ending *ok* shows that there is question of several objects; and the translation of the vocable, thus trimmed up, will be "our very little gold candlesticks." There is, however, room left for further additions. By inserting between the pronominal prefix and the body of the compound the qualification *ayamic*, "relating to the prayer," or "used in the church," and by changing the termination *nowok* into *warwok*, the form *kitayamicwosawasoniyarwivasaskuteniganabiskumisisiwarwok*—the longest in our series—will be obtained, with the signification "your very little golden church candlesticks." Being so well under way, we may yet run a little farther ahead and complete the score and a half of syllables by adding the ideas of "old" (*gayas*) and of "lost" (*iban*) in this manner: *kigayasayamicwosawasoniyarwivasaskuteniganabiskumisisibanwarwok*, "the old little golden church candlesticks once in your possession." And even this is hardly the *ne plus ultra* of possible Algi polysyllabism. We say *possible*; for the limits of the allowable have already been transgressed in the preceding examples. No Indian will use words of such length. Their value, in grammars, consists merely in the exercise of intellect and tongue they may afford to beginners. Were we to say otherwise, some critical reader could justly call us to task for doing what we criticize in others, that is, drawing a caricature, instead of describing the characteristics of Algi speech.

Of our remaining samples, the next in length is evidently one of those artificial constructions, bordering on the burlesque, which, upon being brought to any Indian's notice will make even him

wonder at the remarkable adhesiveness of his vocables. The Ojibwa word *bonibigwakamigibijiganikewiniwissiwwangoban* includes not only the implement of husbandry our red friends are so slow in appreciating, but also its making; for, freely translated, it means "had we not given up the ploughwright's trade." As for the analysis of this and the following samples we must refer to a note, such readers as are more particularly interested in the matter.¹

¹ The following explanations do not lay claim to the highest degree of analytical accuracy; but they will give the reader a general idea of the character of Algic compounds and derivatives, and an opportunity to catch a glimpse of the Ojibwa conjugational scheme. The interlinear translation of our first sample will become intelligible by reading the English words in the order marked.

I. Bon - i - big - w - akamig - i - bijigan - i - ke - w - inini - wi - ssi - wang - o - ban
 4 9 10 8 7 6 5 3 2 1
 cease(d) (for) breaking ground instrument(s) making man(men) to be not we had
 With the exception of the word *inini*, not one of the elements of the compound, as here divided, has a separate existence; no more, in fact, than the syllables *neigh*, *bor*, *li*, and *ness*, outside of the English vocable, or vocables, formed by them; nay, our interlinear translation does not even as nearly approach the original meaning of the corresponding Algic elements, as "nigh," "dweller," or "farmer;" "like" and "quality" would answer the etymological signification of the component parts in "neighborliness." This will appear from the following analysis: BON (probably allied with BAN, "dropping down," "falling off," "going to loss"), "ceasing;" as in *bonita* "he ceases working." The following vowel (*i*) is merely a euphonic connective. BIG (BOG, PAK), "breaking;" as in *bigoshka*, "it breaks." Another euphonic connective (*w*, originally *o*) follows. AKAMIG, earth-like, relating to the earth; as in *anamakamig*, "beneath the ground." (The root appears to be KA or KI; outside of compounds "earth" is *aki*, Pottawattamie *ke*, Cree *askiy*.) Another connective (*i*). BIJIGAN includes three roots: (1) BID (BIN), which implies "hand," or "using the hand;" as in *bigobidong*, "breaking;" (2) IG, originally a demonstrative pronoun (preserved in *igiv*, "these," and (Cree, *eko*, "this"), now, in the form of IGE, an ending of neuter verbs, as in *bigobijige*, "he is breaking up;" (3) AN, another demonstrative root (preserved in Ottawa *anivi*, "those," and Cree *anah*, "this," "that"), now an ending of verbal nouns, as in *bigobijigan*, "a contrivance for breaking up." (BIJIGE, if used separately, would be "he uses his hand," and BIJIGAN, "a handle" in the sense of "a tool.") Another connective vowel (*i*). KE, the formative ending of "constructive" verbs, as in *zhominabo*, "he makes wine," *chimanike*, "he makes a canoe," or "canoes." (BIJIGANIKE, if in separate use, would be "he makes a tool," or "tools.") The next letter is again the euphonic connective *w*. *Inini* (Ottawa *anini*, Cree *iyiniw*, Indian, Pottawattamie *nenne*, probably allied with ININ "perfect," "the best of its kind," "the thing *kar' êxoxhyn*"), "man," *vir*. WI (from *awi*, "he is," and this from O, *aw* "he," "this"), forms denominative verbs, as *ogimawi*, "he is a chief," from *ogima*, "a chief;" hence *ininiwi* signifies "he is a man;" first person singular *nind-ininiw*, "I am a man." SSI, a formative syllable, implying negation, e. g., *nind-aw*, "I am," *kawin nind-awissi*, "I am not;" *ayawiyaw*, "I who am," *ayawissiwan*, "I who am not." WANG (YANG, ANG) termination of the first person plural in the subjunctive mood. BAN, with a connective vowel, OBAN, IBAN, etc. (perhaps from the root BAN, "dropping down," "falling off"), the imperfect ending of verbs.

Synthesis.—*Inini*, man; *ininiwi*, he is a man; *ininiwiyang*, if we be men; *ininiwissiwwang*, if we be not men; *ininiwissiwwangoban*, if we had not been men; *boniwininiwissiwwangoban*, had we not ceased to be men. *Bigobijigan*, "a breaking-tool;" *bigwakamigibijigan*, a "ground-breaking-tool," a plough; *bigwakamigibijiganike*, he makes ploughs; *bigwakamigibijiganikewinini*, a man that makes ploughs, a plough-

As for our two specimens of the polysynthetic scheme of conjugation in the Ojibwa dialect, it will suffice to remark that participles of the type of *wayabamigossizwangoban* "we who were not seen," though sometimes convenient and withal of easy construction, may generally be dispensed with, not only in common conversation, but also in formal addresses and literary compositions. In a still higher degree is this true of more complicated forms, such as our second example *wayabamissinowangobanenag*, "they who, perhaps, did not see us." No student need burden his memory with almost endless rows of similar forms, which the grammarian himself who strung them together most likely evolved by a somewhat laborious process, or with the assistance of a good native speaker.

There remains one word-specimen to be at least glanced at, the first in our list, and not the least interesting. It forms, together with three other distinct vocables, the translation, rather periphrastic, some will say, of the text *terra autem erat inanis*. The closest possible interlinear translation of the Ojibwa version might run as follows:

Ka dash mashiwawen-akamig-issijigadessinogoban aki not however yet nicely earthlike was made to lie (it is related) the earth; or

wright; *bonibizwakamigibijiganikewininiwissiawangoban*, had we not ceased to be ploughwrights.

2. The following scheme will exemplify the progression of polysynthetic verbal forms. Root: WAB (allied with WAB, "white"), "seeing." *Nin wab*, I see, I have the sense of sight. *Nin wabama*, I see him; *nin wabamig*, he sees me; *nin wabamigo*, I am seen; *wabamigoyan*, if I be seen; *wabamigoyang*, if we be seen; *wayabamigoyang*, we who are seen; *wayabamigoyangoban*, we who were seen; *wayabamigossizwangoban*, we who were not seen. *Nin wabamig*, he sees me; *wabamid*, if he see me; *wabaminang*, if he see us; *wayabaminang*, he who sees us; *wayabaminangoban*, he who saw us; *wayabaminangobanig*, they who saw us; *wayabaminowangobanenag*, they who perhaps saw us; *wayabamissinowangobanenag*, they who perhaps did not see us.

3. *Wawen-akamig-i-ssi-j-ig-ade-ssi-n-o-go-ban*.

Analysis.—WAWEN, reduplication of WEN, ON, "fine," "good." AKAMIG, explained above (No. 1). The connective *i*. SSI, from SSIN, SHIN, "lying," "being in place;" the letter *n* is shifted toward the end of the word. J (CH would be the proper spelling, etymologically) from AT, ASS, "putting," "setting." IG, from IGE, as above (No. 1). ADE, ending of "inanimate" neuter verbs, implying the substantive verb, as *izhijigade*, "it is made," from *izhijige*, "he makes." SSI (explained above) implies negation. N, complement of the mutilated element SSIN, five syllables to the rear. The connective *o*. GO, formative syllable in imperfects, implying uncertainty, doubt, or, as in this case, the circumstance that the fact related is not one of the speaker's personal observation. BAN, explained above (No. 1).

Synthesis.—(*Izh*)-*ijiga*, he does, he acts in such a manner; (*izh*)-*ijigade*, it is done in such a manner; (*izh*)-*issijigade*, it is made to lie, or constructed, in such a manner; *wawenizhissijigade*, it is made to lie, or constructed in a nice manner; *wawenakamigissijigade*, it is made in a proper earthlike manner; *kawin* (not) *wawenakamigissijigadessinon*, it is not made in a proper earthlike manner; *kawin wawenakamigissijigadessinoban*, it was not, etc.; *kawin mashi wawenakamigissijigadessinogoban*, according to tradition (or information received) it was not yet made in a proper earthlike manner.

more intelligibly, "but as yet the earth (so it is related) had not been put in its proper earthlike shape."¹

Readers who may have chanced to examine the historian Bancroft's dissertation on the peculiarities of the Algonquin, Huron, Iroquois, and Cherokee dialects, will be inclined to consider the preceding examples as good evidence of the correctness of that writer's views.² Being ourselves of a different opinion, and, at the same time, taking the essay in question to be but a condensed statement of the opinions entertained on the subject by linguistic authorities of high repute, we think it proper to devote a few paragraphs to the examination of its merits. It would carry us into too much detail to undertake a refutation of every objectionable statement in that little treatise. A few remarks, however, touching the singularly distorted and exaggerated view it gives of the syncretical character of Indian speech will but help to throw light on the very subject of our present inquiry. Need it be remarked that it is not in a fault-finding spirit we take up this task? It will be seen that certain conclusions, drawn by our author himself from the premises we impugn, are too pregnant with consequences bearing on a vital question in the early history of mankind to be too lightly passed over.

Bancroft predicates of the Indian mind "a *total* want of reflection and analysis," and, consequently, also "the absence of all reflective *consciousness*." This is strong language and should be supported by the strongest of proofs. Whether the evidence furnished can be called so, we must let the reader judge, after offering him a résumé of our author's argumentation. The learned historian grounds his assertion exclusively on the character of Indian speech, which he holds to be *originally* and *absolutely* syncretical. According to him, or, as we should always be careful to remember, according to his authorities, "the American does not separate the component parts of the propositions which he utters," "every complex idea is expressed in a group," "the character of each Indian language is one continued, universal, all-pervading synthesis." It is the last of these three propositions that expresses most emphatically, if not most pointedly, the idea which forms the ground note of the whole treatise. Its wording, however, being too vague, and its sense too elastic for a successful attack, we must direct our criticism against the two preceding sentences, of which, in fact, the third is only the summing up and sublimation.

First, then, we learn that "the Indian does not separate the component parts of his sentences." Almost any sentence taken at

¹ A more explicit treatment of this sample may be found in the preceding note.

² See that author's *History of the United States*, vol. iii., ch. xxii., pp. 254-265 of the twenty-third edition.

random from some printed Indian work would be suitable to demonstrate the contrary. We will choose, for our basis of operation, a sort of counterpart, as far as the form is concerned, of the very proposition we deal with. "*The white man should not overrate the confessedly superior endowment of his mind.*" Translated into idiomatic Ojibwa, our sentence assumes this form: *Kawin osam o-da-ishpendansin wayabishkiwed od-incendamowin ayano-niganendâgwadinig*; and this again turned, word for word, into Latin (the English idiom not being pliant enough for the purpose), *ne nimis exaltet albus ingenium suum utcumvis præcellens*. As a matter of course, our point of view or term of comparison, in judging this particular case, can only be the construction of the sentence. How, then, will the three samples compare? As far as the number of words is concerned, and if you will, the corresponding degree of analytical power in the mental constitution of the respective races, the Anglo-Saxon bears off the palm, parcelling out, as he does, among thirteen vocables, the ideas which the Roman distributes among eight, while the Ojibwa puts them on the back of six proportionally broad-shouldered bearers. If we compare the distinctness with which the parts of the sentence, or the subjective, predicative, objective, and attributive relations are expressed or held asunder, the difference between the three idioms is much less striking. Were we to analyze our seven Ojibwa vocables, the synthetical character of Indian speech would certainly appear in a much stronger light; nor would it be difficult to build up Algonic sentences with a less favorable proportion between the number of words and that of ideas, and with strange combinations of subject and predicate, substantive and attributive, adverb and verb, verb and its object, etc. This we freely acknowledge, and at some future opportunity shall more fully discuss the subject. But after all, the verdict of every competent and impartial judge will be that, as far as the analytical character of the sentence is concerned, the difference between the Indo-European and the American idioms is one only of degree. At all events, the one sentence under treatment fully proves that there *can* be in the Indian proposition a subject, a predicate, an object, an attribute, a verb, an adverb, etc., all plainly discernible and properly distinguished from each other; and the sweeping assertion that the Indian does not separate the component parts of his sentences falls to the ground. It evidently rests on a most superficial examination of American speech and on a palpable pseudo-syllogism. We might as well assert that the Indo-European languages are incapable of combining words, on the ground that in very many instances where the American employs compounds, the Indo-European expresses his ideas by a series of separate terms.

Secondly, we are assured that in the Indian languages "every

complex idea is expressed in a group." How are we to understand the terms of this proposition? Ideas, logicians say, are complex when the object is qualified. But how about the outward expression of the qualifying idea? Will "a scholar" pass for a simple idea and "a learned man" for a complex one? Is "man" simple, and "rational animal" complex? And, taking for granted that our author speaks only of those ideas whose complex character is manifested by their expression in language, is it not obvious that in this respect men's judgments are liable to be swayed by the idiosyncrasies of their accustomed form of speech? Thus "smiling" would be looked upon as a simple idea by an English-speaking person, while those who say "*sourire*" or "*subridere*," might be inclined to call it complex; and the Ojibwa *bapingwening* "laughing with the face" would naturally suggest the like judgment. The same will be the case with the ideas "brown," "green," "olive," etc., which our Indians express by several independent vocables, or by compounds, signifying respectively, "black, but rather a little red," "grassy-yellow," "yellow inclining to red," etc.

On the other hand, groups of words, like "a younger brother," "an old man," "a beaver less than two years old," etc., leave no doubt as to the complexity of the ideas expressed by them, while the corresponding Algonquian vocables *weshimeimind akiwesi*, *aboyawee*, etc., present the same objects in the garb of simple ideas. Where, then, does the complexity begin that placed our Indian language-makers under the obligation of forming groups? And again, what are we to understand by "groups?" Will two vocables suffice, or is a larger number required? Are those vocables to stand separated from each other, as in our English examples, or loosely connected, like "dark-blue," "candlestick," etc., or must they form a well-cemented and undissolvable whole, such as the samples of polysynthetic word-formation already presented and analyzed? A little more of Anglo-Saxon analytical power brought to bear by our author on his sweeping assertion as to complex ideas being always expressed in groups, would have prevented the possibility of a misunderstanding. However, from certain indications which it would be tedious to point out, we should surmise that by "group" he understands what has been called "a cluster-word," "a bunch-word," *i. e.*, a compound vocable of such transparency that its ingredients become visible even to a superficial observer; and by "complex ideas" he seems to mean those for whose enunciation through the medium of the English tongue several vocables are needed, such as "a wise man," "speaking slowly," etc. Now let us see how the Ojibwa language expresses these ideas. "Man" *inini*, "wise" *nebwakad*, "speaking" *gigitong*, "slowly" *beka*; or combined into a proposition: *nebwakad inini beka gigitong*, "a wise

man speaks slowly," or "is slow to speak." In all this we fail to discover a single group. In the following sentence the verbs are qualified by several accessory ideas: *pangi nawach besho enabing'in apichi go bakan naningotinong gego ishinagwad*, "a little more near if one look very much indeed otherwise sometimes something appears" (if you look a little closer at things, they sometimes present a very different appearance). The English parenthetical translation of our Ojibwa text plainly shows that the difference between the two idioms, as far as group-forming is concerned, may occasionally be extremely slight. That this is always the case we will not by any means say. Thus, in the first example, "a wise man," might as well have been translated *nibwakawinini*, "a wise-man;" and though there happens to be no single term in Ojibwa for "speaking slowly," we have *bekadoweng*, "speaking low;" *kizhiweng*, "speaking loud;" *babekikadanjigeng*, "eating slowly;" also, more multiple compounds, like *kashkabiginamasong*, "cutting off one's own breath by means of a rope," *madweganeninjibinid:song*, "making the bones of one's (own) fingers crack."¹ It is perfectly true, moreover, that very many complex ideas which the English tongue dresses in the garb of short vocables, seemingly non-compound, reveal in the more transparent Indian idioms their complex character by their very wording; thus, the analytical counterpart of the Ojibwa compound *debweyendamowin*, "faith," would be in English "the act of considering that which is spoken to be in accordance with reality;" the simple word "rowing" is translated or defined by *azhebwoyeng*, "paddling (while sitting) backwards;" and what is only a "kite" to our boys, becomes in the mouth of the young redskin *babamassichigan*, "a contrivance driven about by the wind." But what does all this signify? That some complex ideas—or let there be a host of them—for whose enunciation we employ either a simple word or a series of distinct vocables, are, in some Indian tongues, expressed by binary, triple, quadruple, and, still more, multiple compounds. But hence to conclude that in each Indian language "every complex idea is expressed in a group," is as unwarranted a proceeding as if we asserted of the English language that it possesses not a single compound, on the plea of its capacity to express even highly complex ideas by means of simple monosyllabic terms. What could not be proved by such logic! Suppose an Ojibwa Indian to turn over the leaves of a dictionary of his dialect, explained in English, and discover that the proper interpretation of the verb *ana* requires seven or eight words ("he

¹ It should be observed that every one of these complex ideas could also be expressed—though more or less clumsily—in the analytical style, for instance:

o-madwewetonan okanan (ima) o-binakwanininjing etenigin,
he makes sound his bones (there) in his fingers which are.

has something sticky in his throat"), or that *geget*, *sesika*, and *kisha* are, in a manner, the equivalents of vocables made up of a dozen and more articulations ("unequivocally," "instantaneously," and "preliminarily"); all he could reasonably assert would be that his English-speaking friends occasionally give themselves more trouble than absolute necessity would require. But let him conclude from those few instances that the white man's language moves on very slowly, at the rate of about one-third or one-fourth of the rapidity of his own: will not this red-skinned linguist's logic be on a par with that of our misled historian, or rather of the authorities that misled him? So much about propositions and "groups." Now, what has our author to say, more particularly, about words?

On page 261 we read: "An Algonquin cannot say *I love*, or *I hate*; he must also, and simultaneously, express the object of the love or hatred." The fact is, that, like every other verb that is capable of being used both transitively and intransitively, "*I love*" has a double form: *nin sagia* (or *nin sagiton*) and *nin sagiïwe*. Hence, whenever the Ojibwa wishes to express the object of his love, or when that object is understood, he employs the active form *nin sagia* (or *nin sagiton*), and when the object is only implied, the simple verb means "*I love him (her, it)*," very much in the same manner as *amo* does when it answers a question like "*amasne Deum?*" "*amasne illam?*" etc. If no particular object be mentioned or understood, the neuter form *nin sagiïwe*, "*I love*," "*I feel the affection of love*," must be used. In like manner, "*I hate lying*" is *nin zhingendan gagingawishkiwin*, "*I hate it*," *nin zhingendan*; but "*I hate*," simply will be *nin zhingenjige*, or, if a habit or disposition be implied, "*nin zhingenjigeshk*." The same difference obtains in Cree: *sakiw Kizhe-Manitowa*, "*he loves God*," *sakiïwe*, "*he loves*;" *pakwatow iyiniwa*, "*he hates an Indian*," *pakwatam* "*he hates*." This distinction is likewise made in Pottawattamie, Menominee, Niinaw, and probably in every other Algon dialect. In some cases the neuter form is even the simpler of the two, the mere root, for instance, *nin gagibingwenaban*, *nongom dash nin wab*; *Kakinagego nin wabandan*, "*I was blind, but now I see*; *I see everything*."¹

¹ The ending *a* in *nin sagia* is undoubtedly the remnant of an original demonstrative pronoun *aw* "*this*," "*this living being*;" and even in the neuter *nin sagiïwe* the ending must probably be traced to the pronoun *iw* "*that*." But of this circumstance the Indian speaker is as unconscious as Cicero was of the presence of an original pronominal affix in such words of his native tongue as *lex* (*leg-s*) and *rex* (*reg-s*), or in conjugational forms like *amas* (*ama-si*) and *amat* (*ama-ti*). Hence, we do an injustice to the Indian when we take him to task for saying *nin sagia Kizhe-Manito*, "*I love 'm God*," while no one finds fault with the Roman orator for saying *ille reg-s* "*this king-he*," or *iste amat* "*he love-he*." Are we not ourselves guilty of the same linguistic misdemeanor whenever we say "*he loves*," or "*he loveth?*" The power of habit is great! Were we but accustomed to say *amom Deum* in the stead of *amo Deum*, we

Our author continues: "As each noun is blended with a pronominal prefix; as each adjective amalgamates with the subject it qualifies; so each active verb includes in one and the same word one pronoun representing its subject, and another its object also." It is more especially with the first section of this sentence we find fault.¹ Each noun blended with a pronominal prefix! We could wish it were so. But this would bring the American idioms a step nearer the mother tongue of our own family of speech, in which, if we may trust the results of modern linguistic research, nouns were formed by blending pronominal with verbal roots. There are, indeed, traces of the prevalence of a similar law in the oldest strata of Algonic speech. Thus, by prefixing the demonstrative *mi*, the noun *mitig*, Cree *mistik*, "a tree," was formed from a root *tig* or *tik* (probably "rising," "sticking up"), and *migoss* "an awl," from *gwass* or *goss*, "sewing;" and in the Cree dialect the same demonstrative root is still regularly prefixed to a large class of nouns, whenever they happen to be used unconnected with personal pronouns, as *mistikwan*, "head," *mipit*, "tooth;" a process akin to the well-known rule in the Aztec tongue, according to which isolated nouns take the termination *tl*, as *teotl*, "God," *tepetl*, "mountain," from the themes *teo*, *tepe*. But this can hardly be what Bancroft, or his authorities, had in view when denying to the Indian speech the capacity of employing nouns without their pronominal companions. If we are not mistaken, they had simply remarked that in the case of composites like *noss*, "my father," *kishtigwan*, "thy head," *onik*, "his arm," the prefixes *n* (*ni*), *ki*, and *o* (*wi*) being dropped, the remnant of the vocable would not, as expected, yield the simple noun, as "fathers," or "heads," and "arms," do in English, upon being shorn of their case or plural endings. They found *oss*, *shitigwan*, and *nik* to be as unfit for use as *patr*, *capit*, and *brachi* would be in Latin; and from this discovery those scholars not only concluded that the Indian nouns in question could not be employed

would not be in the least surprised to hear the Indian say, "I love'm God" (if we may thus imitate his *nin sagia Kishe-Manito*). At all events, the want of analytical power cannot be proved by these grammatical characteristics, or, if it can, the Indo-European stands not a whit higher than the American. As for the conclusions to be drawn from the fact that the Algonquin form of speech accomplishes by conjugational endings what the Indo-European arrives at by means of declension, we purpose to examine this matter on some other occasion.

¹ As for active verbs, said to include two pronouns, we refer to the preceding note, where the import of the *objective affix* is explained. A *subjective prefix* is met with, in some dialects, in the form of the personal pronoun, somewhat mutilated, or more rapidly pronounced; but even this is dropped in the subjunctive and imperative mood, in participles, etc. Or should the personal *endings* be meant? If so, we need not remark that in this respect the Indo-European tongues were, and to a great extent still are, as synthetical as the Algonic dialects; even *objective* affixes are not wanting in some of them. And what about the Semitic idioms?

without a personal pronoun, but also surmised a general law, or peculiarity, according to which each noun must be blended with a pronominal prefix. We should copy a considerable part of the dictionary, were we to get up a list of exceptions to that remarkable rule! Other circumstances may have helped to strengthen the preconceived idea. The following is a case in point. Bancroft (on page 258) assures us that "the savage could not say *tree*, or *house*; the word must always be accompanied by prefixes defining its application." We simply open our Ojibwa dictionary, and there, *sub voce*, "tree," we find *mitig*, while "house" is interpreted by *wakaigan* (Ojibwa) and *wigiwam* (Ottawa). Neither in these vocables, nor in their equivalents in other Algonic dialects, a trace is discoverable of prefixes "defining their application." How could our author's guides be led so far astray? In the simplest way in the world. Ask an Ojibwa child, pointing at the same time to his father's house (for many of them *have houses*), "what is this?" In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the answer will be: *mi sa* ENDAYANG, "this is where we *dwell*," or, as our children would say, "where we *live*." Repeat the question, pointing to the nearest habitation: *mi sa Maingan* ENDAWAD "this is where Wolves are *living*," may happen to be the reply. A third question will be answered with *Wakosh sa* ENDAPANIG, "where Foxes *lived*," and so forth. If a Frenchman, upon his return from a short excursion into the realms of Her Majesty of England, seriously informed his countrymen that across the Channel they have no word for *maison*, a habitation with them being either "a live," or "a living," or a "lived," according to its being or having been, occupied by such or such parties, that foreigner would not go farther astray than the American linguist on whose authority Bancroft assures us that the word "house" must always be accompanied by a prefix defining its application.

This particular error, however, concerning "prefixes of application" seems to be traceable to another source. Edwards, to whom our historian refers in a marginal note, undoubtedly observed that the element *gamig*, or its equivalent in the particular New England dialect he was acquainted with, evidently signified "house" in a number of compounds, such as *ishkwegamig* "the last house," *atassowigamig*, "a storehouse," *anamiwigamig* "a house of prayer," etc. Failing, nevertheless, to hear or to discover in the written documents of the dialect, the simple vocable *gamig*, he very reasonably surmised that it could have no separate existence. When he, however, concluded from this that those savages could not say "house," he shot as far beside the mark as a young Latinist would do who, after searching his authors in vain for such terms as *fex*, *fices*, or *cen*, *cines*, though there is no lack of *pontifices*, *tibicines*,

etc., would come to the conclusion that Cicero's countrymen could not say "maker" or "player."¹

Does each adjective "amalgamate with the subject it qualifies?" If compounds like "vice-president," "arch-bishop," "six-pence," etc., are amalgams, then the assertion is true of the very limited number of adjectives apparently radical, or adjectives proper, which the Algic dialects possess. But besides these, there is a great number of attributives in daily use which we see no reason why not to call adjectives merely on account of their participial dress; and these adjectives hold their own place in the sentence, so much so as to be sometimes separated from the substantives they qualify, by one or more intervening vocables. The same is generally the case with numerals. Examples will be found in the following lines:

Kichi-ogima pishikiwan gi-bawamad nishwasswi o-gi-wabaman
 The great chief, of cattle when he dreamed, seven he saw
ikwe-pishikiwan waninonijin; minawa dash gi-inabandang
 cows fat ones; again ðè when he dreamed,
nishwasswi pishikiwan o-gi-wabaman kechi-pakakodosonijin.
 seven cattle he saw very lean ones.

Passing over several other statements in Bancroft's essay, either similarly erroneous or greatly exaggerated, we now come to some conclusions the historian draws from them. The first is that language, so far as its organization or its grammatical forms are concerned, is not the work of civilization but of nature. On this question, as lying outside of our present scope, nothing need be said. Another "momentous" and "more certain" conclusion is this, "that the ancestors of our tribes were rude like themselves." Over this assertion we have no disposition to quarrel, provided we be allowed to determine the degree of rudeness and the point where the ancestral line of our tribes must be conceived to begin. But our author continues: "It has been asked if our Indians were not the wrecks of more civilized nations. Their language refutes the hypothesis; every one of its forms is a witness that their ancestors were, like themselves, *not yet disenthralled from nature*. The character of each Indian language is one continued, universal, all-pervading synthesis. They to whom these languages were the mother tongue,²

¹ With regard to "tree," the mistake must have occurred in a similar manner. The Algic dialects designate most trees by compounds whose second term consists of the elements *ak*, *atig*, or *agawanzh*. Some Anglo-Saxon linguist, misled by the analogy of his "apple trees," "pear trees," etc., expected to meet, at least once in awhile, with some solitary *ak*, *atig*, or *agawanzh*, and being disappointed in this, concluded that the simple term for "tree" is wanting in those dialects.

² From the context we must understand this phrase to mean: "they who first used these languages." Bancroft inclines to the hypothesis according to which language was *given* to the several families of mankind together, and in proportion with their other endowments.

were still in that earliest stage of intellectual culture *where reflection has not begun.*" (Page 265.)

We have again to complain of a certain want of definiteness in the use of terms. What does our author mean by "reflection?" Reflection on the parts of speech and the rules of grammar and syntax? Then we fully agree with him as to its total absence among our untutored Indians, at least among those who never had their attention turned to those rules by a white man blundering in the use of their difficult dialects. We have no objection against placing the ancestors of the red man on the same stage, so far as grammatical knowledge is concerned, with our own sires, or their cousins who composed the Vedic hymns and the great epics of the world. None of the latter, if we are rightly informed, were able to parse a sentence or even to distinguish, by name, a noun from a verb. Would our historian, on that account, call them "rude," and assign them "to that earliest stage of intellectual culture where reflection has not begun?" He knows too well that quite a respectable height of civilization can coexist with a total want of reflection on the parts of speech and the rules of grammar. We must, then, presume him to have had in view what is ordinarily understood by reflection: the reverting of the mind to its own inward operations, the attentive and continued consideration of one's own thoughts or feelings, or the like. Here we must distinguish. If men should study psychology and logic ere they can be looked upon as disenthralled from nature, then again we shake hands with the historian, and even give up all hope of ever seeing our Indian friends throw off the shackles of intellectual bondage. But if reflection on thought, as distinguished from sensation or volition, be understood, or reflection on thoughts as different from, and opposed to, one another, as standing in various relations to the idea of truth, and so forth, then we claim for the Red Indian and his ancestors, back to the very beginning of their particular form of speech, a moderate share of that self-consciousness and that capacity of reflected self-determination which prove the white man to be something more than the bondsman of nature, and that very speech, fairly presented and competently tested, will bear out our assertion. Our next step, to this end, would be a comparison of the Algonic tongues with the principal types of human speech. We must not, however, presume too much on the patience of our readers, and hence, conclude here, with the hope of taking up the subject at some future time.

SCHULTE'S ROMAN CATHOLICISM: THE PLEA OF AN APOSTATE.

Roman Catholicism, Old and New, from the Standpoint of the Infallibility Doctrine. By John Schulte, D.D., Ph.D., Rector of Port Burwell, Ont., Canada. Toronto (Belford Brothers, publishers): 1876, 12mo., pp. 350.

WHEN a man comes before the Christian world to give evidence which he considers of great importance to its religious interests, there are two questions that should naturally occur to the public mind: Who is this witness, and what has he to say? In other words the character of the witness and the nature of his evidence offer reasonable ground for preliminary investigation.

Even if we knew nothing of Dr. Schulte personally, we know enough of the class to which he belongs; and it is proverbially an unsafe one. For the last three hundred years or more they have been constantly coming before us with their "testimony" from the vagabond monks who flocked to Wittenberg clamoring (as Luther complains) for a crust of bread and a wife to share it, down to the Gavazzis and Schultes of our day. They come upon the public stage and claim as a right that the world should see and hear them. This is, generally speaking, their formula of self-introduction: "Look well at me, O religious public! and behold in me a genuine convert from the errors and wickedness of popery. I have managed by stealth to read the Bible, which the Church of Rome fears and proscribes, and in it I have found Protestantism. I was a priest, but I have renounced my ministry and its obligations. I have done forever with celibacy and confession; with penances, fasting, and irksome daily task of vocal prayer. They were galling fetters of the Man of Sin, and I have cast them off to enjoy Gospel liberty. Listen then with open ears while I unfold the horrors of the prison-house whence I have escaped. Listen, for I have anecdotes to amuse you, choice bits of scandal to tickle the palate of the curious, and tales of terror to thrill your inmost hearts." Such substantially, *mutatis mutandis*, has been the programme of all the "brands plucked from the burning" when about to entertain evangelical audiences with lectures or the reading public with books, purporting to give the history and motives of their change. It is not perhaps to the credit of human nature that such charlatans should be seldom at a loss for gaping mouths and willing

ears; but the maw of anti-Catholic prejudice is insatiable, and besides, as the poet tells us,

Infinita è la schiera degli sciocchi.¹

But of late years, whether the charm of novelty has vanished, or the intelligent portion of the Protestant world has had its eyes opened by experience to the worthless character of these men, or from both causes combined, it is certain that converts from popery and their spoken or written "testimony" have ceased to be the attraction that they once were. The converts, too, have become more cautious.

There is also another reason which has not been without its weight. Side by side with these self-styled proselytes the world has beheld with astonishment a host of other converts moving in an opposite direction. It has seen them issuing in crowds from the walls of the great city, that incloses many different religions whose only bond of unity is a common name, and knocking quietly and humbly for admission at the gates of the Catholic Church. The conduct and demeanor of these men, and indeed their whole history, if it excited the wonder, has also claimed and compelled the respect and admiration of the intellectual and better-disposed class of Protestants. These converts were men of polished understanding, and many of them had made for themselves a great name in the literature of the period. They were men of moral excellence, esteemed and beloved by all who knew them. Many of them left their churches amid the tears and blessings of the congregations with whom they were parting. There were among them none tainted by suspicion of crime, none seeking pelf or preferment, none clamoring for carnal liberty under color of the Gospel. They left behind them no dark whisperings of mortified pride or disappointed ambition that had revenged itself by apostasy, of ecclesiastical censure avoided by timely flight. They threw away wealth and honored position in the Church of their birth. In some cases they had to renounce the most sacred ties of friendship and even of kindred. They attested the truth of their convictions by facing poverty and not unfrequently the frown of the world and obloquy. All this they counted as nothing compared to the happiness of being restored to Catholic unity. When they entered the Catholic

¹ Petrarch. This is nothing more than a literal version of Eccl. i. 15. *Stultorum infinitus est numerus*. Petrarch, like all scholars of the "dark ages," was wonderfully conversant with the Bible, far more so than Protestants or Catholics of our day. One proof of it is, that in his exquisite ode (Canzone 49) which abounds in most happy scriptural allusions, one of the choicest of them has been utterly ignored or misconstrued by the commentators (including the erudite Liberal Catholic or infidel, Leopardi), because they were ignorant of the source whence he derived it.

Church some of them saw fit to give to the world the motives of their change; others said nothing, as if unconcerned about the judgments of men, and content with the testimony of their own conscience. But whether they wrote or kept silent, none of them had either publicly or privately any word of reviling for those they had left; they had no idle gossip to retail, no tales of scandal or of imaginary horrors to awaken mockery or indignation against their former co-religionists. They lived, and some of them have since died, loved and respected in the Church of their choice as they once had been in that from which they departed.

The intelligent Protestant world could not help observing and reflecting on all this; nor could it fail to be deeply impressed by the marked contrast between those honest, conscientious men (mistaken, if you choose) who return to the Church of their fathers, and those unhappy waifs who from time to time are swept by some wind or other into the open sea of Protestantism. The comparison cannot have been very favorable to the latter. The Church has no reason to fear, but every reason to desire, that the non-Catholic world should carefully examine and compare those who return to her bosom and those who abandon her fold, and from the comparison draw whatever inference candor and logic may suggest. But for the Catholic it is quite unnecessary, and even incompatible with his habitual mode of thought, to institute any such comparison. He does not regard the difference, striking as it may be, between the conduct and the history of the Newmans, Fabers, Wilberforces, Mannings, etc., on one side, and of the Hogans, Leahys, Gavazzis, Achillis, etc., on the other, as a mere phenomenon in the moral or religious world, offering to the curious observer a fine field for thought and deduction.¹ Taught by his religion, he judges men and things from a higher point of view and sees in the light of faith what escapes the vision of the children of men.

He knows that conversion from heresy to the Church of Christ is one of the greatest triumphs of God's grace; and that, without this conquering grace, no amount of human certainty, no fulness of conviction can accomplish it. He knows, too, as none but a

¹ Even Dr. Schulte is compelled to acknowledge this "puzzling phenomenon," as he calls it, "that talented men, men of standing in other denominations and in society, should leave their own Church and enter the Roman communion" (p. 37). There is nothing "puzzling" in it that a Catholic child might not easily unravel, to say nothing of the Doctor himself, had he not put off his candor with his cassock. The real "puzzle" is his attempted explanation. Besides Rome's "imposing exterior," converts hope to find in her the old Catholicism of the Apostles. They are also attracted by "a certain amount of *rationalism* in Roman theology" (Ibid.). This is playing rather too boldly with anti-Catholic credulity, and we scarcely think any one can be found, orthodox Protestant or Rationalist, to swallow this explanation.

Catholic can know and understand, the dreadful meaning of apostasy with all that it implies. It is not for him a mere exchange of one form of Christian opinion for another, as the blind unchristian world is pleased to regard it. It is in his case the deliberate renouncing of salvation, the casting away of all hope, the voluntary surrender of one's self to final reprobation. It is to renew the denial and betrayal of Peter and of Judas, for Christ our Lord is one with His Church. Apostasy, however, may possibly be preceded by loss of faith; but even this is sad and horrible to contemplate. For the Catholic does not believe as other men do, because he has argued himself into the persuasion that the doctrine is true. There can be amongst us but one ground of faith for all, for the peasant and the philosopher, for the beggar woman and the one who sits and teaches in the Apostolic chair. All must believe on the authority of the Church bearing witness to what God has revealed. And even thus we cannot believe without the grace of faith, which is a special gift of God. Being God's gratuitous gift, it may be forfeited; but this can happen only through our own fault, through some prevarication, actual or habitual, which renders us unworthy depositaries, and forces an angry God to take back his gift. The loss of faith, therefore, reveals the moral ruin of the soul, and that apostasy should ensue can cause no wonder.

But sometimes faith continues to live in the soul not only up to the hour of apostasy, but who may say how long after it? None can set a limit; for, as it is God's gift, whether He may choose to recall it, or when, depends solely on His own good pleasure. But where sanctifying grace is wanting faith is virtually dead. It is the faith of the devils, who, as St. James says, believe with trembling, not with hope and joy (James ii. 17, 19, 26). And even the purpose of apostasy presupposes the loss of sanctifying grace. Yet as long as faith of any kind remains, who can imagine or describe the agony and remorse that must accompany the deliberate contemplation of the sacrifice of one's soul, heavenly birthright and God himself for some dross of earthly advantage? And how fearfully evil must be the energy of bad will that forces this sacrifice upon the reluctant soul! It can only coexist with moral desolation of frightful degree, and usually of long standing. Whence came this moral waste and ruin, and what may be its special character, we may not always be able to determine or even to guess, nor is it necessary. There is no doubt, however, that it may ultimately be traced to some one of those three sources in which, as the Apostle tells us, all the moral evil of the world has its origin. Perhaps it is pride, perhaps it is inordinate desire of the goods of this life, perhaps it is sensuality in some disguise

or other. That a Protestant should exchange one form of religion for another outside of the Church, may involve no moral guilt of any kind whatsoever; in some cases he may be acting laudably by following conscience, which is unable to guide him any higher. But in the case of a Catholic this is impossible, and no one knows or once knew it better than the doctor of theology whose book lies before us. Outside of the Church they have no *faith*, in the true sense of the term, but only *opinion*, which being purely human may be readily and in some cases commendably altered and amended. But we have divine faith, which cannot be taken from us save on account of our sin, like the Gospel talent from the faithless servant.

The Catholic cannot be good, cannot be acting conscientiously, who deliberately abandons the Church. This is no hasty, uncharitable statement prompted by anger or resentment. It is the direct consequence of Catholic theology, and has been the doctrine of the Church in all ages. St. Cyprian cries out with loud, indignant voice, "Let no one imagine it POSSIBLE for those who are GOOD to depart from the Church."¹ It is not the good grain (to use the same Father's illustration) but the empty chaff that is carried away by the wind; not the firmly-rooted tree, but the one which has lost its sap and vigor, that is overthrown by the storm; and one greater than St. Cyprian had long before given utterance to the same truth. *Prodierunt ex nobis*, says St. John, *sed non erant ex nobis*.²

And this furnishes a general answer to the first question: Who is the witness that offers himself to testify against the Catholic Church? He is a priest who exercised his ministry for years in the care of souls, and as professor of divinity. It is only fair then (unless one would needlessly charge him with dishonest dealing) to assume that during that time he held the Catholic faith, and that amongst other things he held and taught that the gift of faith can only be lost by unworthiness. He would have us believe that he has lost that faith, but he takes care not to tell us how he came by the loss. If he had a plausible reason to assign he would have done so; but even then we should be under no obligation of taking his mere word for it. We measure him not by what he may say of himself, or may be said by his new patrons, but by what we know of him. Judging him, therefore, by the Catholic standard, by the faith which he himself professed and taught for so many

¹ "Nemo existimet BONOS de ecclesia POSSE discedere. Triticum non rapit ventus, nec arborem solida radice fundatam procella subvertit. Inanes palææ tempestate jactantur, invalidæ arbores turbinis incursione evertuntur." *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, opp. S. Cypriani, ed. Ven., 1758, col. 470.

² They went out from us; but they were not of us. For if they had been of us, they would *no doubt* have continued with us. 1 John ii. 19.

years, in what other light can we regard him than as one who, having tasted of the heavenly gift (Heb. vi. 4), has with perverted will flung it away in exchange for the flesh-pots of Egypt? Who can discover or follow the course of a perverted will, the working or suffering of a heart that has swerved from the allegiance sworn at the awful imposition of hands in ordination? It is the province not of man but of the all-seeing eye to detect the root and trace the ravages of moral decay in such a soul. They may and will elude the keenest scrutiny of hostile criticism or of friendly censure. But there are cases in which to affirm that the moral taint, however invisible, certainly exists, is no violation of truth or charity. This may sound harsh in the ears of some, and others will insist that it is uncharitable. It is neither; it is not even discourteous, though it may not be the way precisely in which Catholic writers usually state the case against our apostates. What can there be, we may ask, either honest or profitable in the mock courtesy, which fosters the delusion that our apostates may be in good faith when they leave the Catholic Church?¹ Besides, the *Review* addresses both Catholic and Protestant readers. It is but right that the latter should be correctly informed as to the theory and doctrine of the Church in regard to wilful apostasy. As far as Catholics are concerned, what harm can it be to remind them of a truth which they have known from infancy, viz., that it is not the good, but the bad, unworthy son, who turns his back upon his mother? And surely we owe none any apology for taking to heart and repeating, for our own benefit and that of others, the wholesome teaching of those great saints who lived, and suffered, and shed their blood for the true faith. We say, therefore, again, and cannot say it too often, in the language of the holy African doctor and martyr, "Nemo existimet BONOS de ecclesia posse discedere." That they CANNOT possibly be good men who depart from the Church, is as true in the New World as in the Old; as correct a standard of practical judgment in this nineteenth century, as when it was first uttered by St. Cyprian more than sixteen hundred years ago. Some Catholics, we are told, have been scandalized by the fall of this unhappy man and still more by the appearance of his wicked book; but let them remember that our Lord, while denouncing woe upon the bringers of scandal, warned us at the same time that scandals

¹ There are not a few Protestants whose good sense has preserved them from this delusion, or who have been weaned from it by a sad experience. We know on the best authority that a distinguished Presbyterian minister, whose name is still remembered and revered by his New England brethren, used to repel persistently two classes of men, pretended converts from Judaism and apostate priests, no matter what credentials they might bring with them from other ministers, and never allowed them to "give their testimony" in his pulpit. Nor did he make any secret of his reason. They were as a class, he would say, rank impostors.

must come. It is better that the author of this scandal should be outside of the Church than hurting his own soul, and possibly the souls of others, in her bosom and in her ministry.

As to who the Rev. Dr. Schulte may be individually, we have no need nor do we care further to inquire, though we have heard him spoken of once or twice by his former classmates. His title-page tells enough of his story. He was once a weed in the Pope's garden, as the witty Dean Swift used to express himself, was plucked up, thrown over the Anglican side of the fence, and had the luck to tumble into the snug little rectory of Port Burwell. What concerns us more is the next question: What has the witness to say for himself? What is the nature of his testimony?

Dr. Schulte's book has been hailed in some quarters as a work of great power and originality, and a "deathblow to popery." But the latter clause can only be a publisher's stereotyped flourish, as we remember having heard it repeated in the case of a thousand and one books of the sort, from Maria Monk's *Awful Disclosures* to the late stupid, mendacious book of R. W. Thompson, who sits by the side of John Sherman in the new cabinet, and is the representative, we suppose, of its Christian statesmanship. Power or originality it has none; of the latter not even the shadow. On the contrary we have been pained and to some extent ashamed to see that the author cannot rise above the twaddle and common place of every-day scribblers in the no-popery line of the most vulgar, offensive sort. There is nothing in him that may not be found in the most ordinary manuals of Anti-Catholic theology for the people; and if there be anything that looks like an exception, he has borrowed it to all appearance from his namesake of Bonn,¹ or Dollinger, who in turn stands indebted to Richer, Febronius, etc., to say nothing of Protestant writers. No doubt the author has some ability; his education and academical degrees would lead one to suppose so. And had he exercised it in the cause of Truth, some undeniable trace of it would be stamped upon his pages. But no man can defend error in such way as to give a respectable showing to those talents that he may possess. And logic, above all, is not the weapon which any one can wield with credit against the Catholic Church. His bad logic shows itself from the very start, when giving an account of his religious change. He tells us, with somewhat of mixed metaphor, that when he made the final plunge out of Rome, without knowing where to land, he found himself in the atmosphere of Protestantism. But as the Church of Rome possesses the whole body of revelation, though incrustated

¹ Dr. Schulte, a layman, who is suspected of having had a hand in the compilation of that vile book of the masked Janus, "The Pope and the Council." His apostasy has been rewarded by Bismarck with a professorship in the University of Bonn.

with error, he felt it his duty to separate revealed doctrine from its Roman excrescence. And as the Church of England told him that she possessed de-Romanized Catholicity, he took her at her word and blindly entered her communion. To avoid all suspicion of exaggeration we give his own words :

"I had made the final plunge out of Rome, without knowing where to land, and I found myself in the atmosphere of Protestantism. . . . I had to distinguish and separate the purely *Roman* from the purely *Catholic*, rejecting the former and adhering to the latter. And in looking around me among the different churches, I found that the Church of England professed to have followed the same process. This was the reason which at that time determined me to join her communion."

Let any one imagine, if he can, a Catholic doctor of theology so ignorant as not to know what the Anglican Church professes to believe, and only finding it out after he "had made the plunge into Protestantism!" *Credat Judæus Apella*. But let this improbable, impossible story pass, and let us admire the Doctor's process of reasoning. He rejected the Catholic Church and rushed into the embraces of the Anglican, because she *professed* to separate truth from error. This and this only was the reason that determined him. How logical and consistent! If we are to believe himself, it cost him a long mental struggle to get out of the Church of all ages, and which claims infallibility; yet without serious study, without even an hour's investigation, he unites himself with the church begotten of the monster, Henry VIII., *because*, while boasting of its fallibility, it *professes* to hold the truth unmixed with error. Do not the Presbyterians and Baptists of British America profess the same? Is there any church at all, calling itself by whatever name, there or elsewhere, that does not make the same profession? But we are sure Dr. Schulte has been unjust to himself. It was not this solitary, flimsy reason, but others of more strength and substance, if not logic, that drew him into the Church of England, and gave its peculiar tinge to his Anglicanism, which is of the lowest grade. Baptists and Presbyterians in that region have no rectories to bestow on every hungry newcomer, and the patronage of the establishment is not in the hands of high churchmen, who are oftener heard of than seen in the Dominion.

Dr. Schulte devotes his book to the examination of Church infallibility "not only because it is the root of Papal infallibility, but also because it is held by the liberal Catholics of all countries, the old Catholics of Germany, and in a modified form, though unconsciously, by some Protestants" (p. 11). The first part of his work reviews the arguments used by Catholics to prove infallibility, the second discusses the practical workings of infallibility in the Church, the third finally treats of the Papacy and its infallibility. He looks on Church infallibility as the very "essence of Roman-

ism," and says that therefore this doctrine must be refuted in the first place in order "to demolish the very bulwark of the Church of Rome" (p. 44). Who will not be surprised after this to hear him, a few pages farther on, disguising the commonest every-day Protestantism under such high-sounding language as the following :

"We agree with the Roman Catholic that the Church is infallible, but we differ from him as to the seat of that infallibility. We maintain that it resides in the inner element of the Church, namely, in the Word of God contained in the Bible and deposited within the Church. We believe that the Bible is the infallible element of the Church, and that on this account only and no other she is said to be infallible, etc." (p. 47).

Now what does this verbiage amount to after all, but to what is held by the most rabid advocate of private judgment, viz., that the Bible is infallible but the Church is not? The distinction that he makes (p. 46) between the two elements of the Church, of which the outward is formed by its members, preaching, rites, and ceremonies, the inward by the Word of God or Bible, has no foundation in reason or in fact. We can understand how the Church may have an inward and an outward life. The former is a life of faith, hope, charity, and sanctifying grace, which she imparts to her children by her outward ministry and chiefly by the administration of the sacraments. Or, since she is a moral individual, we can understand that she may have by analogy what is called a body and a soul. But that a volume, however holy, should form the inner one of the two elements that constitute her being, as the author intimates (*ibid.*), is absolutely unintelligible.

Besides, this hypothesis is hopelessly destroyed by the undeniable fact that the Church existed before a syllable of the New Testament was written. The first book, St. Matthew's Gospel, only came to light according to some eight, according to others thirty, but most probably fifteen or twenty years after the death of our Lord. The other Apostles had been gathered to their rest, and the Church by their labors had been spread over a great part of the world, before the last of its books came from the pen of the Beloved Disciple. Moreover, the genuine writings of the New Testament were only separated by degrees from their apocryphal counterfeits and gathered into one body. The first attempt of the kind was not made until the latter half of the second century (A.D. 160). Still several of the books remained doubtful, accepted in one place, rejected in another, till at last after the lapse of almost four hundred years the Canon, or body of Scripture books, as we now have it, was definitely fixed by authority. Was the Church of Christ, during the whole or any part of that time, wanting in one, and the more important one, of her two constituent elements? God's work, and surely His Church deserves that name, is never imperfect. The Church of God was as full and complete

a masterpiece of His wisdom on the day when she was first proclaimed to the world, as she has been at any time since that great Pentecostal feast. But this fact does not suit Dr. Schulte. Let us see how he tries to get rid of it, and to prove that the Church is behind the Bible in point of time as well as in authority.

"All will agree that the Scriptures of the Old Testament existed before the Church; nay, Christ and His Apostles built their divine mission on them by constant appeals to them. Moreover, none will deny that the Gospel is contained in the Old Testament, and that the constitution of the Church is clearly foreshadowed therein. The Christian Church, therefore, depended greatly as to her rule of faith on the Old Testament Scriptures, especially as the first Christians were mostly converts from Judaism, who needed constant reference to their sacred writings as a rule of faith. Further, as the Church of Christ was to be 'built on the foundation of the Apostles, Christ himself being the chief corner-stone,' she cannot be said to have fully existed before their death. The building of the Church on this foundation, and the writing of the New Testament Scriptures commenced and proceeded concurrently until both were completed by the same workmen, so that at their death the Church stood forth with a complete constitution and a rule of faith given by God's Spirit to lead men into all truth 'even to the end of the world.' We are justified therefore in concluding that the Bible existed prior to the Church" (p. 53).

The Scriptures of the Old Testament existed indeed before the Church of the Christian dispensation, but a church, foreshadowing that of the New Law, had already existed in the Old. And the same had existed for a long time before the Law was written, living meanwhile on tradition or the Unwritten Word. The Patriarchs had revelation, but no volume that contained it, a case analogous to that of the Christian Church in her early days. And when the Law was written, it was not so much a doctrinal code as a body of laws, by which Jehovah sought to bind more closely to Himself and to His allegiance the people whom He had deigned to adopt as His own peculiar people and the depository of His gracious promises to the human race. The Law of Sinai, save wherein it re-enacted the precepts of the natural law, contained, it may be said without irreverence, a mite of doctrine under a mountain of ritual and ceremonial observance. The Law included, it is true, the promise of a new prophet and lawgiver (Deut. xviii. 15, 18); but it was only in the subsequent prophecies that this promise began to grow in fulness and distinctness, till at last his glory, sufferings, family, birthplace, and even the time of his coming were clearly announced. Now it was a belief in these *promises*, coupled with faithful adherence to the precepts of the Law, that constituted the Jewish rule of faith, such as it was, and not a body of dogmatic doctrine, properly so called, to be found in their sacred books. Otherwise it is hard to explain how the Sadducees could have any standing in the Synagogue and even creep into the high priesthood. Though denying doctrines contained in tradition and the sacred books themselves, their observance of the Law and profession of

a belief in the promises gave them some color of orthodoxy or outward title to it.

If our Lord and His Apostles appealed to the writings of the Old Testament, it is scarcely correct to say that they "built on them their divine mission." Our Lord appealed constantly to His own miracles, and but seldom to the sacred writings. And when He did, it was only to the prophetic *promises* that were receiving their fulfilment in His person. He used them against the obdurate Scribes and Pharisees, but we nowhere find Him proposing them as a standard by which believers of good will, the *docibiles Dei* (Jno. vi. 45), were to test His claims to their obedience. That the first Christians, being mostly converts from Judaism, "needed constant reference to their sacred writings as a rule of faith" is not only false but absurd. Where was the rule of faith any longer in the Old Testament for men, who in becoming Christians had learned that its *Law* was abolished, its *promises* fulfilled, its *moral teaching* supplemented and perfected by the teaching of Christ and His Apostles? Had they not the Apostles or their successors, the CHURCH, in a word, which Christ Himself had commanded them to hear under penalty of being cast out with the heathen and the publican (Matt. xviii. 17)? Had they not the traditions, which they had received from the Apostles either by letter or by word of mouth (2 Thess. ii. 14), or from those "faithful men" who had been commissioned to teach by the Apostles or by their representatives and successors (2 Tim. ii. 2)? There does not occur in the whole New Testament history an instance in which our Lord or His Apostles referred their hearers to the Old Testament as a rule of faith.¹

¹ The hackneyed quotation "search the Scriptures" (Jno. v. 39), the well-known praise of the Bereans (Acts xvii. 11), and the general commendation of Scripture (2 Tim. iii. 16) are not to the point. We are glad to see that Dr. Schulte has cautiously avoided them, except the last, to which he returns once and again (pp. 62, 83, 89). The words "search the Scriptures," which as Selden says (he means the Protestant gloss put upon them) have undone the world, are merely an argument *ad hominem*. It is probably, as St. Cyril, a Greek father, explains it, not in the imperative but in the indicative mood. The context seems to require it, and scores of Protestant commentators have thought so from Beza, Œcolampadius, and Causabon down to Doddridge, Campbell, Bloomfield, Ernesti, and Rosenmüller in our day. Whatever it be, it is evidently not a command, but a rebuke for reading the Scriptures, and not finding in them Him to whom they bear witness. The passage of Acts xvii. 11, is very adroitly translated in King James's Bible, "*who* received the word" . . . *searching* (ἑρῶντες ἐδὲξαντο . . . ἀνακρίνοντες) being rendered by "*in that they* received the word . . . *and searched.*" Yet nothing more results from it than that the Bereans are praised, *because* they differed from those of Thessalonica in preferring the way of rational investigation to that of blind hostility and persecution. Both of these passages regard not Christians, but Jews who have not yet believed. And the Catholic Church of to-day would most cheerfully address the same words of encouragement and praise to Jews and unbelievers.

That the reading of the Old Testament is profitable, instructive, etc., we freely ac-

Dr. Schulte in support of his theory, that the Church had no complete existence up to the death of the Apostles, refers us to the words of St. Paul (Eph. ii. 19). The reference is as artful as it is dishonest. The words "*was to be built*" are skilfully chosen, leading the reader (without saying it) to infer that the Apostle spoke of something in the future, but they betray an unscrupulous controversialist. St. Paul does not speak of a church *to be built*, nor of a church at all, but addressing the Ephesians, he tells them that by their admission into the Church *they* have been built¹ upon the foundation of the Apostles. The Church had been already built upon their foundation, and especially upon St. Peter their chief and prince. The Divine Founder had made the promise when He said: Thou art Peter and on this Rock I will build my Church (Matt. xvi. 18). He fulfilled the promise when He gave him his commission "Confirm thy brethren," "Feed my lambs; feed my sheep" (Luke xxii. 32; Jno. xxi. 15-17). The kingdom of Heaven had not the fanciful growth imagined by Dr. Schulte, and which argues imperfection. It could grow in no way but one; in the accession of new subjects, in the number of new lands over which it extended its sway. From the first day on which it was solemnly proposed to the homage of mankind, it was perfect in its constitution, its governing power, its mode of teaching and guiding the souls of men. It had its rule of faith not in the dead letter of the Old Testament—which Christians left to themselves might disfigure and pervert by false glosses, as the Jews had done—but in the living voice of the Apostles or their representatives and successors. These were the Prelates of the Church, who were charged not with the bodies but with the souls of the flock, that they might feed them with sound doctrine and govern them with wholesome counsel, and who therefore were to be HEARD and OBEYED (Heb. xiii. 17).

But when we say that the Apostles left their infallibility to their successors, Dr. Schulte will not hear of it. He hates the idea of Apostolic succession as fiercely as any bigot of Exeter Hall, and will have it that their only successors were their inspired writings. But beforehand he talks very confusedly of the inspiration of the

knowledge after the Apostle (2 Tim. iii. 15-17), but that it is, or ever was, *necessary*, or that they had to consult it as a rule of faith, is quite another thing. The Apostle has not said it, and we may deny it without slighting his authority. And the reading of the Old Testament is only profitable "through the faith which is in Christ Jesus," as St. Paul himself explains (*ibid.* v. 15), that is, when it is read with due subordination to the Gospel teaching of Christ and His Apostles. Any other reading of it is injurious. The Puritans, who had very little in them of the spirit of the Gospel and a great deal of the spirit of the Jew and the Pharisee, were very fond of reading the Old Testament. But with what result? They learned from it to be iconoclasts, vandals, robbers, and murderers.

¹ The past participle ἐποικοδομηθέντες.

Apostles, and even sets about proving it against Catholics, as if we denied it from interested motives.

"The Apostles," he says, "were individually inspired, or they would not have been qualified for their office as founders of the Church. They were inspired, or the promises of Christ to them would have failed of accomplishment; they were inspired, or they would not have given so many miraculous proofs of the special presence of the Holy Ghost, nor would they in their writings have, either directly or indirectly, so repeatedly laid claim to inspiration. . . . When they departed this life, their *writings* were looked upon as the Apostolical foundation on which the Church was built. And what better substitute could we have for the living voice of the Apostles than their inspired writings? But here Roman Catholics step forward, and endeavor to prove that the infallibility of the Apostles did not die with them, but is shared by their successors" (pp. 53, 54).

This is not quite correct and it lacks clearness. But the last sentence gives us the clue to the author's intention. We do not think there is any confusion on this matter in his mind, but it would seem his set purpose to confuse his readers' notions, so that they may no longer be able to distinguish between the inspiration and the infallibility of the Apostles.

The Apostles, no doubt, were all *infallible*, because of the presence of the Holy Ghost that came down upon them at Pentecost, to recall to their minds and render clear and perfect the teaching they had received from Christ, full and complete indeed, but poured into the ears of imperfect hearers. It had lain sluggish and dormant in their carnal hearts, but by the descent of the Holy Ghost it was to be quickened into new life, and invested with the brightness of heavenly light. This gift of the indwelling spirit was common to all. But none of them were inspired, in the true technical sense of the term, save those five who were moved by the Holy Ghost to write; and their inspiration ceased when they ceased writing. Inspiration was *not* necessary, as Dr. Schulte pretends, to found the Church. They could bear their part in doing this without any such gift. St. Peter was pre-eminently the foundation of the Church, but he was inspired only when he wrote his two Epistles. There is no question of the promises of Christ being made void, unless the Apostles were inspired, for He never made any such promise. Yet we will not deny that on some extraordinary occasion, as for example when they were in the presence of persecuting tribunals, He may have put words into their mouth, as He did with others of His servants in their hour of trial. But this is not necessarily inspiration, nor is the inspiration of the Twelve proved by their "miraculous powers." What had St. Peter's miracles to do with his inspiration, when his shadow healed the sick, as he passed through the market-place unconscious of their presence? All were infallible, we repeat, but not all inspired. Those who were inspired wrote, and their inspiration died, not with their leaving the world,

but as soon as they laid down the pen which they had been moved by the Spirit to take up. All were infallible, as long as they lived. Did their infallibility die with them? We shall see presently, and if it did, in what sense.

Dr. Schulte maintains that infallibility died with the Apostles or survives only in their writings, and contends (pp. 58, 59) that the texts (Matt. xvi. 18 and xxviii. 20) usually adduced by Catholics¹ to prove the perpetual infallibility of the Church amount to very little or nothing. However, he carefully avoids all direct discussion of these texts, but spends pages of loose declamation in reply. He tells us how the Apostles were infallible as founders of the Church and as witnesses; how they left behind them an infallible deposit of truth in the Bible; how reasonable Protestants are in being content with certainty in getting at the meaning of this infallible truth; how unreasonable are Catholics in aiming higher and trying to get an infallible knowledge of that meaning; with a hundred other things which, true or false, are nothing to the purpose (pp. 59-64). Instead of following his devious route *per ambages et longa exorsa*, let us examine the passage of St. Matthew (xxviii. 20) and see if it proves nothing for Catholics. It is no wonder that Dr. Schulte runs away from it, for he cannot afford to see or acknowledge its true meaning. It is a glorious text; it contains the high, heavenly commission of the Catholic Church, and the death-warrant of all human systems of Christian theology framed in opposition to her authority.

When our Lord was about to return to His Father, after fulfilling His mission on earth, He gathered His Apostles and addressed to them a few parting words. They listened with breathless, eager attention, treasuring up every syllable, and guarding them with such anxious memory that St. Matthew years after could have put them on record even without the aid of inspiration. And well they might; for they were the last words He was to utter amongst them on earth. The words themselves were of the highest importance and worthy of that solemn hour. "Jesus spoke to them saying: All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore and teach all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you. And

¹ To bewilder his reader and to belittle our case, he gratuitously adds two other passages, Luke xxiv. 47-49 and Jno. xvi. 13, which have reference only to the Apostles personally, and which Catholics never use for the purpose mentioned in the text. This fabricating men of straw and then knocking them down triumphantly has no part in fair and candid discussion. But Dr. Schulte perhaps cannot help it. Dishonesty and trickery in dealing with Catholic doctrine are the hereditary portion and distinctive badge of all his tribe.

behold! I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world" (verses 18, 19, 20). Here we have Christ commissioning the Apostles as authorized teachers of the whole world. They are to teach whatsoever they have received from Christ. They are commanded, not to write books but to preach the Gospel. They are not told to argue with men, nor to allow any investigation of the reasonableness of what they propose for belief; they are simply to present their credentials, prove them, if necessary, by miracles or otherwise, and then demand unqualified submission and obedience. All who receive their teaching will be saved; all who reject it will be condemned.¹ He declares that He will be present with them down to the end of the world. This last promise evidently regards their teaching, and is tantamount to saying: Teach with confidence, without fear or hesitation; for you can teach no error, as I shall be with you while you teach to the end of time. It was a promise of infallibility for the teachers; indeed, nothing short of this high privilege would justify the accompanying threat, that whosoever refused to listen to those teachers should incur no less a penalty than the everlasting death of his soul.

Now, to whom was this gift of infallibility promised? Was it to the Apostles personally? No; and this for two very good reasons. In the first place the Apostles had already received the assurance of such gift personally, through the presence of the Holy Ghost, who was to take possession of their souls as His dwelling-place on the tenth day after Christ's departure from the world, and was to remain with them to the day of their death. That they might clearly understand how distinct from this was the second gift, He lets them know that it will be caused by His own abiding with them forever. The other was to be brought about by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in their souls; this was to be the fruit of His own perpetual presence with their body corporate. If the former then was a personal favor, the latter must have been granted to them in virtue of their office. And that the Saviour spoke to them on this occasion not in their *personal* but in their *official* character, is manifest from the whole tenor of his words. In God's Church the person dies, the office never. Fifty or sixty years after these words were spoken, all of the Apostles, save one, had slept in death; and their hallowed dust now reposes in Ephesus, Rome, Salerno, Compostella, or wheresoever it has been deposited by the pious reverence of their children in Christ. And yet those men who stood face to face with our Saviour, when He addressed them His parting in-

¹ St. Mark (xvi. 16) adds, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned," or "shall be damned," as King James's Bible forcibly expresses it.

structions, if His words have any meaning, were to live down to the consummation of the world, were to preach to *all* nations. In the course of nature and her laws, the Apostles personally could not expect such immunity from physical decay, could not possibly fulfil such commandment. It was, therefore, in the Apostles in their official character that His words were to be verified. It was the Apostles living and enduring in their successors whom He promised to be with forever, whom He commanded to teach all nations down to the end of time. Divine wisdom could not have used more appropriate and convincing words to let us know that the Apostles and their successors are ONE in authority, ONE in possessing the privilege of infallibility, as long as the Church shall last, which will be until time is swallowed up in eternity. The personal infallibility that came to the Apostles from the descent of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost, died with them. The infallibility that comes of Christ's abiding with them in their office endures forever, because in the Church the Apostolic office and character are to last even unto the consummation of the world.

No one knows better than Dr. Schulte how eagerly the great Anti-Catholic public will swallow any statement, however absurd and monstrous, provided it militate against Catholic doctrine and history. Hence it is with no feeling of surprise but rather of amusement, perhaps of grim satisfaction, that we behold him manifesting by his reckless assertions the utter contempt that he entertains for their ignorance and their credulity. He boldly affirms that none of the early fathers, especially of the Apostolic times, ever claimed infallibility for the teaching body of the Church, that in those early days all controversies about doctrine were settled by simply appealing to the Scriptures, and that it was only when the Episcopal body became corrupt and a political power, that it began to claim infallibility.

"If we read the writings of the early fathers, especially those who lived in the Apostolic age, we find that they looked upon the Scriptures of the New Testament as the inspired word of God, and quoted copiously from their pages.¹ However carefully we may examine these patristic writings, we cannot find any organized body of churchmen in those early times claiming the gift of infallibility. On the contrary, all controversies of faith were settled by appealing to the Scriptures. . . . What we have here briefly stated may be easily verified by any impartial inquirer who will take the trouble of reading the works of the early Christian writers. . . . It was only when the

¹ How striking and original this idea! Later Fathers, Popes, Councils, and divines, we must suppose, entertained quite a different idea of the New Testament, and studiously avoided all reference to its pages. Seriously speaking, we say without fear of contradiction, that on an average there is more Scripture quotation in the pages of one mediæval writer, than in all the Apostolic Fathers, more than in the books taken together of any half-dozen Protestant controversialist writers of our day. But we will not pursue this tempting train of thought. Our only purpose is to call attention to the platitudes with which Dr. Schulte has contrived to eke out his worthless book.

Episcopate obtained high political influence that it lost the primitive Apostolic spirit, becoming haughty and despotic, and arrogating to itself the attribute of infallibility" (pp. 63, 64).

Had any fifth-rate Methodist ranter discoursed in this style, we might excuse his boldness on the score of ignorance. But Dr. Schulte cannot be excused on this poor plea. *He* cannot have forgotten the text-book that he conned daily in college during his theological studies, nor the names and passages that he found there, of the many Fathers who bear witness to the Catholic doctrine. We must rather say of him, what St. Jerome said of a similar brazen apostate of his day: "*Ignoscere nescienti, nisi viderem consulto reticentem.*"¹ The Apostolic Fathers and those who lived before Constantine were not many in number, and all their works have not survived. But enough remain to show that on this point they were one in belief with the Catholic Church. Tertullian, one of the earliest Latin Fathers, plainly intimates that truth can only be found where the Apostles left it in the Church, and that individuals who presume to teach differently become by the very fact trespassers, intruders, outsiders, and enemies, in a word *heretics*. He puts into the mouth of the Church the following complaint against Marcion, Valentinus, Apelles, and other heretics of his time, which she may with equal reason address to Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Henry VIII, Elizabeth, and all other founders of Protestant Churches:

"Who are you? When and whence did you come? Since you belong not to me, what are you doing in my domain? The property is mine. I am long since in possession, I am first in possession. I am the heir of the Apostles, and hold in virtue of their duly attested last will and testament. You, as outsiders and enemies, they have ever disinherited and repudiated. And why are heretics outsiders and enemies of the Apostles, save because of their holding different doctrine, which each one either invents of himself, or receives from others in opposition to the Apostles?"²

¹ I would forgive him, were he in ignorance, but I find him deliberately suppressing the truth. S. Hieronymi, Lib. adv., Helvidium, cap. xv.

² "Qui estis? quando et unde venistis? quid in meo agitis, non mei? . . . Mea est possessio. Olim possideo; prior possideo. Habeo origines firmas ab ipsis auctoribus quorum fuit res. EGO SUM HÆRES APOSTOLORUM; sicut caverunt testamento suo, sicut fidei commiserunt, sicut adjuraverunt, ita teneo. Vos certe exhaeredaverunt semper et abdicaverunt ut extraneos, ut inimicos. Unde autem extranei et inimici Apostolis hæretici, nisi ex diversitate doctrinæ, quam unusquisque de suo arbitrio adversus Apostolos aut protulit aut recepit." Tertul., De Præscript., cap. xxxvii. To understand fully this passage, we must remember that according to Tertullian's idea, which he lays down repeatedly in this book, heretics have no claim to any portion of revealed religion or of the Scriptures. They are the exclusive possession of the Catholic Church. If heretics happen to have them in their hands at all, it is by chance. They came by them fraudulently and illegally. If they presume to set up their opinions against the teaching of the Church they are not to be listened to, much less allowed to dispute on an equal footing with the Church or to quote Scripture against her. They are to be met at the very outset with the peremptory question: Quibus competit fides? Cujus sunt Scripturæ? Who is the true judge of faith? To whom do the Scriptures belong?

Tertullian, who was born about the year 160, and was a convert from paganism, never

This language of an African priest who lived and wrote nearly a century and a half before any of Constantine's courtly prelates, is just as forcible (as arrogant Dr. Schulte would probably say) as anything they ever uttered.

St. Irenæus may be considered a quasi-Apostolic Father, for he was the disciple of St. Polycarp and of Papias, who were the immediate disciples of the Apostles. To explain how fully he is in accord with the Catholic belief of our day, we should have to quote the greater part of his magnificent work, *Adversus Hæreses*. We have only room for an extract or two. In the fourth book of that work he says: "*There* must the truth be learned, where the Apostolic succession of the Church is found."¹ And elsewhere he affirms that "to confound and silence the presumption, blindness, and wickedness of all heretics, it is quite sufficient to appeal to the teaching of the Roman See," by which² "the true doctrine of the Apostles has been preserved, and with which, on account of its primacy (*potiorem principalitatem*), all the churches and all the faithful must agree in belief."³

St. Cyprian wrote a whole book on the Unity of the Church, in which he illustrates at great length his own maxim that "no one can have God for his Father, who has not the Church for his mother," and in which he proves that even schismatical opposition to church authority, on the part of orthodox believers, is a matter

ascended higher than the priesthood. In spite of what some critics may think, his work *De Præscriptionibus* was written before he fell into Montanism. Intrinsic evidence bids defiance to all critical quibbling. Let the student, who has an opportunity, read the work with the long, elaborate, erudite, and nervous commentary of F. Christianus Lupus (*Inter Chr. Lupi, Opera*, tom. ix.). If this learned Augustinian has any fault it is his prolixity.

¹ "*Tibi discere oportet veritatem, apud quos est ea quæ est ab Apostolis Ecclesiæ successio.*" *Adv. Hær.*, iv., cap. 45. By *quos* he means the official teachers of the Church, the bishops, and a few lines after says of them, that from them we get the true sense of Scripture without any danger of being led astray. "*Hi Scripturas SINE PERICULO nobis exponunt.*" St. Irenæus was born in the East about A.D. 120; but devoted his life to preaching the Gospel in Gaul, where he sealed his testimony with his blood in extreme old age. His relics were preserved for nearly fourteen centuries with great reverence in his episcopal city of Lyons, until the Calvinists in 1562 broke into the church, seized and ill-treated the saint's body, kicked his head in impious sport through the streets of Lyons, and finally threw it into the river. These were the men who fully realized Dr. Schulte's mythical pattern of early Christianity. They devoutly read the Old Testament, and made of it their rule of faith, caring little for the Gospel. One of the choicest and most welcome lessons they learned from it was that Catholics were Canaanites, Amorites, Hittites, etc., whom it was their duty to exterminate.

² *IN QUA*. The Lutheran scholar, Thiersch (we quote from memory), in his commentary on this passage of the Holy Doctor suggests that *IN* is here used in the Scriptural or Semitic sense of Beth *instrumentale*, "by means of which."

³ "*Ad HANC enim Ecclesiam propter potiorem principalitatem necesse est omnem convenire Ecclesiam, hoc est eos qui sunt undique fideles, IN QUA semper ab his qui sunt undique conservata est ea quæ ab Apostolis est traditio.*" *Adv. Hær.*, lib. iii., cap. 3.

of deadly sin, which shuts a man out of the Church and excludes him from the kingdom of Heaven. What must he have thought of those who contradict her in doctrine, and presume to set up their private opinion in opposition to her decisions? Have we not already heard his terrible intimation, that NO GOOD MAN, but only the depraved and morally rotten, can voluntarily separate himself from the Catholic Church.¹ We have room only for a short extract, in which he clearly identifies the infallibility of the post-Apostolic Church with that of the Apostles themselves.

"Christ says to His Apostles (Luke x. 16), and in them to all prelates who legitimately succeed them: He who heareth you heareth me."²

To these might be added St. Jerome who, at a time when religious controversies disturbed the Church of Antioch, wrote to Pope St. Damasus, beseeching him to send an exact formula of Roman faith that would guide his course amidst these contending factions, and adding as a reason that he knew full well that whosoever was not in full communion of belief with the Holy See would surely perish, as did those who were outside of the ark during the deluge.³ But though St. Jerome was no bishop, and even a "supporter of Calvinistic or Low-church views" of the Episcopate, as some Protestants fondly imagine, we will waive his testimony, since he did not live before the days of Constantine, when bishops first "arrogated to themselves the prerogative of infallibility."

From these few but unanswerable testimonies it may be seen how utterly false is the barefaced assertion of Dr. Schulte, that the infallibility of the teaching body of the Church was unknown until the bishops became a political power in the state under the Emperor Constantine. Saints Irenæus and Cyprian were bishops, it is true; but they lived under a persecuting pagan government, which recognized bishops only as the most fitting subjects for legal condemnation. In fact both suffered martyrdom, the one under Severus in the year 202, the latter under Valerian in 258.

Before closing these remarks we would give the reader a specimen of the style of reasoning which Dr. Schulte is compelled by his unhappy position to adopt in defence of his new creed. His aim is to show how *reasonably* the non-Catholic receives the Bible as God's Word and an infallible rule of faith, without any reasoning at all.

* "But they retort against us that we, too, must suppose a certain amount of reasoning before we can admit the Bible as the infallible element of the Church. We answer that our position is entirely different from theirs. We base the authority of the Bible on no

¹ "Nemo existimet BONOS ab Ecclesia posse discedere." De Unit. Eccles.

² "Christus dicit ad Apostolos, ac per hoc ad omnes præpositos, qui Apostolis vicaria ordinatione succedunt: Qui audit vos, me audit." Ep. 69 ad Florent. Pup.

³ Ep. ad Damas.

human arguments, as they establish the doctrine of infallibility; but we take it on its own merits. Without any argumentation we find that the Bible is the great book, the only book of an *historical* and *providential* importance, admirable in its origin and relation to all mankind. It excites, therefore, our attention, and stimulates in us an almost irresistible interest. We find, without any logical process, that it is and has always been the book of the Church, and that whatever truth and life there is in the Church has been drawn from its pages. We open it, read it attentively and with a prayerful disposition, and we find that all the praises we have heard of this wonderful book are fully justified. As we read on the truth contained in it strikes our mind, touches our conscience, deeply impresses our whole being. I cannot enter here into details, but this much I unhesitatingly say, that the book has in itself the internal evidence of truth, and bears witness of its divine origin. There may be obscure passages, and surely there are, but who can all at once understand the wonderful works of God? The more we read it with a fitting disposition of mind and heart, the more we understand of it; and that which we understand we cannot help but acknowledge to be divine truth; by virtue of this we are compelled to believe that those parts which we do not as yet understand are also divine. We need no external proofs, however profound and learned, to establish the authority of this book. We simply say, come and see; here is a book that bears unmistakable evidence on its face of being the truth of God; and if you read it guided by the Spirit of God, you will see as we see, and be fully satisfied" (pp. 51, 52).

And again. "The sacred writers address themselves . . . to men of sound common sense who will use their judgment in a normal way. . . . We clearly see that men of common sense, and they are generally in the majority, will by the aid of God's spirit find it no impossible task to find in the Bible as much saving truth as is necessary for them. So long as sober common sense exists in the Church, the Bible will be understood without recourse being had to the interpretations of a hierarchy. . . . And does not history prove that wherever the Bible is read and studied with befitting earnestness, there true Christianity prevails, pure and intelligent?" (pp. 94, 95).

All this would be unpleasant enough to listen to, if it were the extemporaneous effusion of some half-crazed ranter in a Methodist conventicle; but from one who was once a "doctor in sacred theology," it is simply intolerable, and we can only exclaim, "*Quantum mutatus ab illo.*" We take up the Bible, and *before opening it, we find* that it is the great book, the only book of historical and providential importance. We know all about its *origin* and relation to mankind. We find that it is and *always has been* the book of the Church (the Church that was hopelessly sunk in Romanism and idolatry for over a thousand years, as his sect believes and professes!). Having discovered all this without argumentation, without logical process, and therefore without investigation of any kind, we *open the book*, read it, and the more we read the better we understand. Any refutation of this silly stuff would be labor lost. Yet it is substantially the doctrine of the early Anglican Church, of the Westminster Confession, and of the Synod of Dort, in which by order of King James there sat representatives of Anglicanism. That common sense, even of the *sound* and *sober* sort, can enable men to understand rightly the Scriptures might pass for a mere rhetorical flourish. But practically considered it is a bold, reckless assertion to which all experience gives the lie. We need not quote Germany, where the Bible is more earnestly read and studied than

elsewhere. Yet in that land of Scripture investigation, not one student in twenty (perhaps not in fifty or a hundred) believes in the divinity or inspiration of Scripture. There is not a single book of the New Testament that has not been rejected in its turn by German theologians from Luther¹ down to the Bauers, De Wettes, and Bretschneiders of our day.² We need only confine ourselves to the Protestant Church of England, into which Dr. Schulte has made his "plunge," as he calls it out of Popery. In that Church every form of religious error from Calvinism to Puseyism finds itself at home. Amongst her bishops she counts Socinians and Rationalists like Colenso, Hoadley, and Chandler,³ with a host of others. Her representative man at this day is perhaps Dean Stanley.⁴ And in what does he differ from the Bretschneiders, Ewalds, and Wegscheiders of Germany, save that he lacks their honesty and truth-

¹ Luther, and Calvin with him, scouts the idea of allowing the Apocalypse a place in the Canon. He further rejects the Epistle of St. James, which he calls an epistle of straw, "eine strohern Epistel," and pronounces its teaching to be in direct contradiction with that of St. Paul. "Many have taken trouble," he says, "and labored and sweat to reconcile them, but to no purpose; 'Faith justifies' and 'Faith does not justify' are two things that will not chime together. If any one can make them agree, I will put my doctor's cap on his head and allow him to call me a fool." "Viel haben gearbeitet, sich bemühet und darüber geschwitzet über der Epistel S. Jacobi, das sie dieselbige mit S. Paulo verglichen. Es ist stracks wider ein ander, Glaube macht Gerecht und Glaube macht nit Gerecht. Wer die zusammen reimen kan, dem will ich mein Bareth aufsetzen und will mich einen Narren schelten lassen." Tischreden, Franckfurt am Mayn, 1567, fol. 494. In other words, either St. James is a heretic or I am a fool. But these were not the only books Luther attacked. He would talk over his cups at home or in the Wittemberg tavern, which he frequented, in the most contemptuous style of other books of Scripture, Esther, Ecclesiastes, Jonas, St. Paul to the Hebrews, etc., as it suited his humor. The Preface to the New Testament, in which he spoke ill of St. James and the Apocalypse, appeared first in 1522, but after that was carefully suppressed and hidden by "orthodox" Lutheranism for over two hundred years. Had this happened in the Catholic Church, it would no doubt be quoted, *usque ad nauseam*, as an apt illustration of what Protestants love to call *Jesuitism*. But though Luther treated the single books of Holy Writ with contempt whenever it suited his fancy, for all that, as Rev. Mr. Dewar says, "he laid great stress upon the Bible, and would allow of no appeal to any other authority; but it was the Bible *as revised and interpreted by himself*." German Protestantism, by Rev. Mr. Dewar, of Exeter College, Oxford, British Chaplain at Hamburg. Oxford, 1844, p. 29.

² See them enumerated one by one in Rev. Mr. Dewar's German Protestantism, p. 130, et seq.

³ It was the example of this rationalistic Bishop of Coventry and Litchfield, that induced and encouraged the free-thinker, Dr. Anthony Collins (as he himself tells us), to give out his wicked book, *The Scheme of Literal Prophecy Considered*. London, 1727.

⁴ In a recent sermon delivered at Battersea (see New York Catholic World, April, 1877, p. 135), Dean Stanley says, "The Church of England is what she is by the goodness of Almighty God and of His servant, Queen Elizabeth." For Almighty God substitute Henry VIII., and instead of *servant* read *daughter*, and the Dean would tell the literal truth. For just as truly as that Jezabel was the daughter of his adulterous lust, so was the Anglican Church the daughter of his avarice, pride, and bloodthirstiness.

fulness of speech? His churchmanship is so *Low* that it rises very little above infidelity or refined Deism. He believes in the Eternal Son of God no more than any Mussulman or Brahmin. Yet he prates often, and elegantly, too, we must admit, of the Bible and its beauties. Not one out of every ten English-speaking Protestants who enjoy the free, untrammelled use of King James's Bible, holds the real, true divinity of Him who bought us, our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ. And of the few who really fancy that they believe it, if closely questioned, it would turn out upon examination that their belief resolves itself into the abominable heresy of Nestorius. The readers of King James's Bible in England and our own country laugh and sneer at miracles, vows, fasting, ceremonial worship, the evangelical counsels, the honor given to God's chosen servants and heavenly courtiers, and other scriptural doctrines, as heartily as could any infidel or Deist. They commit daily, with deliberation, without any scruple, almost without consciousness of evil-doing, horrible sins, which are forbidden or denounced in Scripture, and the very mention of which would blanch the cheek, and paralyze with terror the heart, of any ignorant, superstitious, priest-ridden simpleton that dwells in Ireland or the Tyrol, where the Bible is of course a prohibited book. So much for the *pure, intelligent* faith that the Anglican Church has bestowed on the English-speaking world.

It has been sufficiently shown, we think, that Dr. Schulte has failed to establish his main assertion, that Church infallibility is a system unsupported by Scripture and the early records of the Church. The more we read of his book, the more we feel that he has written not of his own free will, but under moral pressure. Had he been left to himself, he would have preferred to keep quiet, to enjoy his rectory and domestic bliss in peace and silence. But the busy, restless ones, men and women, of his congregation, his new patrons, would not have it so. They have driven him at last to open his reluctant mouth and give his testimony, as they call it. He has done it, sorely and against his will it may be, and he must take the consequences. Eager partisans may compel a man to say something, but they cannot infuse into him logical argument.

Having proved that Church infallibility is not the flimsy error that Dr. Schulte pretends, but has its foundation in Scripture and the testimony of the early Church, we see no reason why we should follow Dr. Schulte in his discussion of Papal infallibility. For, by proving the one, as he himself admits, we prove the other. "Papal infallibility and Church infallibility are intimately interwoven; on admitting the latter, the former must be conceded" (p. 43). Nevertheless, in a future number, we shall examine some of his false statements and perversions of historical facts in regard to the infallibility of the Holy See and its dogmatical decisions.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

IN ANSWER TO A CORRESPONDENT.

THE *American Catholic Quarterly* has no reason to complain of the welcome extended to it by the press of the country, both inside and outside of the Church. If there could be any room for complaint, it might be found in the exaggerated praises of some too kindly disposed critics, which to interpret in their literal sense, would argue senseless vanity on our part. We have not so understood them; we have construed them rather as words of encouragement, as merely a loose, somewhat ornamental translation of the good advice contained in the maxim "*œmulamini meliora.*" But it was not in the nature of things that our *Review* should escape the common fate of all periodicals, and should be so privileged as never to hear any other words than those of kindness, praise, and encouragement. And as we never expected any such wonderful good luck, to have missed it is no disappointment. Whether with the view of holding a salutary check over us, while yet in swaddling-clothes, lest we should be tempted to become "wise in our own conceits," and "more wise than it behooveth to be," or with some less charitable intent, the press, Catholic and non-Catholic, takes care to mortify our vanity now and then by misunderstanding or misrepresenting, as the case may be, the meaning and purpose of some of our articles. We say nothing of the anti-Catholic press, which, styling itself religious, has for its almost avowed aim to decry and distort everything belonging to the Church of all ages, and which seeks in our pages only matter for misrepresentation of Catholic doctrine or history. Private correspondents, too, both Catholic and non-Catholic, give us occasionally the benefit of their advice and criticism. One finds a flaw in the logic of certain arguments. Another detects heterodoxy lurking under a seemingly quite innocent proposition. A third drags to light what he considers disguised attempts to exalt certain nationalities at the expense of others. Some one else complains that the tone of some articles is too sanctimonious, good for a preaching-desk, but not for the pages of a review, and so on to the end of the chapter.

It is unnecessary to say that neither usage nor propriety requires of us to make any reply to these attacks, reproaches, or complaints, whether public or private. They must pass unnoticed and unanswered. The writers have vented their spleen or put on record their dissatisfaction. They, perhaps, think they have annoyed us, and feel the better of it. And if they are satisfied we have no objection.

But like all general rules this may admit of some exceptions. Not every criticism is hostile, nor every objection captious. Hence, whenever the statements of the *Review* are questioned, or objection is made to them honestly and in good faith, we are not only willing, but anxious either to be corrected ourselves, or to set the doubter or objector right by explaining what he may have happened to misapprehend. One such letter from a clergyman in a neighboring State is now before us; and, as the writer is moved only by the love of truth, and proposes his diffi-

culties candidly and honestly, we will devote to it a few pages, not only out of consideration for his good faith and candor, but also because it offers an opportunity to say something on a subject less generally understood than it should be by educated Catholics and even by clergymen.

The letter has reference to Prof. Paley's article in the January number of the current year. The portions of the letter that bear immediately on the subject are as follows :

"I was much surprised and not a little pained to find in the *Review* for January such an article as the one by Prof. Paley. . . . It is well known that the Holy See has put forth a decree, stating that the spirituality of the soul amongst other truths may be proved with certainty by reasoning ; and although the immortality of the soul is not exactly the same thing, yet it is closely united to it, and may be regarded as its consequence. Father Hill has shown it in this number of the *Review*.

"Besides combating, in no measured terms, the immortality of the soul as a truth accessible to reason, Prof. Paley speaks very unbecomingly of certain preachers, and of the 'devout and intelligent' people of the Middle Ages."

If the decree of the Holy See, declaring the spirituality of the soul provable by reason be "well known," it is fair to suppose that Prof. Paley and the editors of the *Review* knew its existence ; and charity might suggest that neither the Professor would impugn the teaching of the Holy See, nor would such course be tolerated by the editors. Has the Professor attempted to impugn that teaching ? Not directly and in terms, says our reverend correspondent, but indirectly and inferentially. If the reverend writer will only examine the case a little more closely, he will find that whatever there is of *inferential* in it, is not Prof. Paley's but his own and utterly unfounded.

Let him weigh well his own reasoning and see what it amounts to. "Though the immortality of the soul is *not exactly the same thing* (as the spirituality), yet it is closely united to it, and may be regarded as its consequence." Here the writer, phrase it as he may, is forced to admit that the immortality of the soul is *not* its spirituality. Therefore, say we, it is *not that* which the Holy See has declared demonstrable by human reasoning. Or to couch the syllogism in words of his own choosing, the Holy See has declared that the spirituality of the soul is provable by reason ; but the immortality of the soul is not exactly the same as its spirituality ; therefore, the immortality of the soul is not exactly what the Holy See pronounced demonstrable by human reason. We defy him to draw any other conclusion. But the writer thinks and would have us believe, that if not exactly defined, it is *almost so*. He is mistaken. There is no medium between *defined* and *not defined*. In Catholic theology there can be no place for such an absurdity as a quasi definition. It involves contradiction, for a definition includes certainty and compels belief, a quasi definition would not bind the Catholic conscience, but would leave it as free to doubt or deny as it was before.

Yet our reverend correspondent is impressed with the notion, and wishes to convey it, that whoever impugns the demonstrability (by natural reason) of the soul's immortality, lays himself open in some way to censure, as running counter to a decision or quasi decision of the Holy See. We need not repeat what has been said. The Supreme Judge at Rome

either decides or he does not. Just as in his laws and precepts there is no such thing as a quasi command, so in his ruling from the Supreme Bench of the Church there is no such thing as a quasi decision. And on the matter before us the Holy See has never pronounced or decided at all. This is manifest from an examination of the document itself, which haunts the mind of our reverend correspondent and fills him with needless terrors. Here is the text of the decree or declaration of the Holy See, which may be found in a hundred books printed within the last twenty years. For the sake of accurate reference, we quote from a well-known handbook in general use :¹

“Reason may prove with certainty the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and man's free will. Faith is subsequent to Revelation; hence it cannot fairly be adduced as proof of the existence of God against an atheist, or as proof of the spirituality and free will of the rational soul against a naturalist or a fatalist.”²

The full meaning of this decision will perhaps be better understood when it is known why it was made and against whom. It was directed with some other propositions of kindred nature against some good, very good men (for error strives to creep into the stronghold of truth, *a dextris et a sinistris*, on the right side as well as on the left), who took it into their heads that they would be more orthodox, more Catholic than the Church herself. It is laid down in Catholic theology, that there are some primitive natural truths which man's reason may know with certainty, independently of revelation. They are called primitive, because they are the inheritance of rational man, and occupy the chief place among the traditions that have come down from the beginning of his race. They are called natural, because man's rational nature, even unaided by revelation, discerns their truth. They do not follow faith, but precede it; and as St. Thomas³ says, technically speaking, they are not articles of faith, but its preliminaries. Amongst these preliminary truths are the existence of God, His providence, the spirituality and free-will of the soul, future state of reward and punishment, and the chief points of the moral law. The hyper-Catholics of whom we spoke undervalue or ignore the province of reason in establishing those primitive truths. They would have authority, tradition, faith set up as a rule not only for Christians but even for unbelievers. From a mistaken notion of what they call the fallibility of reason, they will not allow it to prove the primitive truths nor even the all-important fact of Christ's resurrection. The disciples of this school vary in the details of their teaching, and even go by different names (Traditionalists, Supernaturalists, etc.), but their fundamental principle is one and the same. They had among them

¹ Denziger's *Enchiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum*, Wirceburgi, 1856, p. 448.

² *Ratiocinatio Dei existentiam, animæ spiritualitatem, hominis libertatem cum certitudine probare potest. Fides posterior est revelatione, proindeque ad probandum Dei existentiam contra atheum, ad probandum animæ rationalis spiritualitatem ac libertatem contra naturalismi ac fatalismi sectatorem allegari convenienter nequit.*

³ “Deum esse et alia hujusmodi quæ per rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom. I., non sunt articuli fidei, sed preambula ad articulos.” I. P., Q. 2, ad 1. In the “*alia hujusmodi*,” the saint includes what we know of God as Creator and Legislator of His rational creature, man, and consequently of the nature and destiny of the soul. His reference to St. Paul implies this.

great and good men, such as Viscount de Bonald, Gerbet, Lacordaire, Bautain, and others. They had adherents even in Italy and Germany. M. Bautain, a priest and professor of Strasburg, wrote a book containing these errors in 1833. His ordinary, Monseigneur Raess, Coadjutor in the See of Strasburg, remonstrated with him, and issued a pastoral letter explaining the doctrine of the Church. The matter was referred to Pope Gregory XVI., who by a brief of December 20th, 1834, approved the bishop's pastoral, and expressed his hope that M. Bautain would hold out no longer, but make the sacrifice of his private opinions on the altar of Catholic obedience. But even the good, pious man may have his own slight share of self-will and obstinacy. M. Bautain not only remained deaf to the exhortations of his ordinary and of the Supreme Bishop, but even more than once defended himself in print against what he considered the censure and condemnation of the truth.¹ It was only on the 8th of September, 1840, after a delay of seven years, that he humbly submitted and made his retraction. Fourteen years after that date, M. Bonnetty, the distinguished editor of the *Annales de la Philosophie Chretienne*, and a man of great learning and zeal for religion, renewed in some shape the same erroneous teaching. By decree of Pius IX. (June 15th, 1855), the propositions which had served for the retraction of M. Bautain, were sent with modifications and additions to M. Bonnetty for subscription. The second of these is the one which we have printed above.

Now, although Catholic theologians teach that the primitive truths are demonstrable to natural reason, they are by no means a unit in fixing definitively the number of such truths. Is the immortality of the soul one of these truths? Many, and we freely grant it, the majority of theologians class it among the number, but not all. There are theologians of good reputation and undisputed orthodoxy, who do not think that the immortality of the soul ought to be included in this category. They say that it is a most rational truth, inasmuch as it commends itself on its first enunciation to right reason; they acknowledge that, while it has many arguments in its favor, there is no shadow of an argument against it beyond a bare possibility; but they hold that, in view even of that possibility, the prop of revelation is needed to give the immortality of the soul its absolute certainty. Had the Holy See actually or virtually decided otherwise, it would be impossible for them to affirm this. Had Rome spoken there could be no dissentient voice.

Has Rome spoken? Has she given any decision in which the absolute demonstrability by reason of the soul's immortality is stated either immediately or by evident illation? Let any one read over the proposition of June 15th, 1855, and he will see that the immortality of the soul is not spoken of, not even hinted at in any way whatever. There is a clear, distinct mention of three truths, the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul and free will; but of the soul's immortality not a syllable. Did this happen by chance, or was it from forgetfulness that

¹ Bautain, *Philosophie du Christianisme*, Paris, 1835. Idem, *Psychologie Experimentale*. Ibid., 1839

the latter was omitted? We know that our reverend correspondent has too much respect for the Holy See to indulge in such supposition. No! the Holy See when about to compel MM. Bautain and Bonnetty to acknowledge that reason may know with certainty some primitive truths without the aid of revelation, knew full well that many, very many Catholic theologians included the immortality of the soul among those truths. It knew likewise that MM. Bautain and Bonnetty had denied that *any* of these truths (therefore the immortality of the soul amongst the rest), could be demonstrated by unaided reason. And yet with this certain knowledge the Holy See in making its decision, deliberately enumerates three, and as deliberately omits a fourth among these truths. Is not this a clear, evident case, where *inclusio unius* is tantamount to *exclusio alterius*? If we ventured to make as free with the decisions of the Holy See as our reverend correspondent seems to do, we might say it has decided that the soul's immortality is *not* one of the truths that are demonstrable by human reason. But our inference is more modest and more safe. It is what appears on the very face of the document. The Holy See has decided that the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul and man's free will are truths demonstrable by reasoning, and need not revelation to give them certainty; about the immortality of the soul it has declined to make any decision.

But our reverend correspondent cannot get rid of the notion that the demonstrability of the soul's immortality has been decided by implication in that of her spirituality. The immortality of the soul, he says, "*may be regarded* as the consequence of its spirituality;" and the demonstrableness of the one, he would infer, involves that of the other. If the reverend writer made deliberate choice of the words we have italicized, it argues caution, and we commend him for it. But waiving for the present the *equivocal* meaning of immortality in this connection, and granting that it not only may be, but is regarded, and with good show of reason, by many as a consequence of spirituality, are we to infer that it shares the privilege of demonstrability accorded to the soul's spirituality by the proposition of June 15th, 1855? This would be a most lame, untheological conclusion. When a proposition is connected by immediate intrinsic evidence with another that is revealed in Scripture, or defined as of faith, or otherwise established by Church authority, the former shares the authority of the latter. It may be contained in it, for example, as a part in the whole. Thus, Christ died for all; therefore He died for John, for Peter, etc. Christ assumed a human soul and human body; therefore he had a mouth, hands, and feet, and could suffer pain, grief, sadness. These consequences, even though Scripture were silent, would have been sufficiently revealed in the premises. Or had I the wicked presumption to make this assertion, "As a Catholic, I believe in the spirituality of the soul, but were I ignorant of the teaching of revelation and the Church, I think that the philosophy of materialism would furnish me quite a satisfactory explanation of what is called soul and its operations," in this case the impiety and falsehood of my assertion would reach the same degree of authority as the Pope's proposition.

That is, my statement would be as anti-Catholic as his teaching is authoritatively Catholic.

But on the other hand, where the propositions are not immediately connected, where the evidence of their mutual relation or union is not intrinsic, but is rather, so to speak, in the mind of the reasoner, where it can only be evolved and shown by a process more or less prolonged of reasoning, it is going quite too far to assign to both propositions the same degree of authority. The proposition that I establish, through a train of reasoning, as an illation from some truth revealed in Scripture or defined by the Church, is after all only a *conclusio mere theologica*, which may be true. But, absolutely speaking, it may also be false. Being convinced of it from the strong light of evidence in which I see it subjectively, I may urge it and do my best to press others to receive it as true. But I must not force its acceptance on others as if it were a necessary truth, as if to dissent from it were the same as to deny the original truth from which I claim it as a deduction. And, however strong the language I use, I must never go to the length of identifying my conclusions with the definitions of the Church. And even when the words used seem to imply this much and nothing 'less, they must be limited by the rule of orthodox interpretation. The great Bellarmine is remarkable for his moderation, for his freedom from all controversial bitterness, especially when he deals with the opinions of Catholic schools. Yet he is so stirred to indignation by what he considers the anti-Catholic tendencies of the system of Melchior Canus *de ministro matrimonii*, that he says, "if Canus has proved his theory, he has proved also that there is no such sacrament as marriage in the Catholic Church." And again, almost in an angry strain, he concludes that "either the doctrine of Canus is false, or the Church has grievously erred for many centuries." Now, does any one imagine that Bellarmine would have his readers believe these two propositions to be of equal authority: "the Church cannot fall into grievous error; therefore the doctrine of Canus is false?" By no means. The former is of faith and to be believed under pain of damnation; the other is merely Bellarmine's theological conclusion, which he thinks is derived from the former. In the same way some theologians may be heard to say that they cannot see in what the *delectatio victrix* and other such doctrines, the teaching of which is tolerated in some Catholic schools, differ from Jansenism and Calvinism; yet, while denouncing in no measured terms such teaching, they would not wish to be understood as saying or insinuating that the Church tolerates heresy in her schools of divinity. They would be the first to repudiate such construction of their words.

We hope we have satisfied our reverend correspondent, that the demonstrability of the soul's immortality has not been decided in the proposition of Pius IX., simply because the immortality of the soul may be regarded by him and other theologians as a consequence of its spirituality. If they think so, let them cherish, maintain, and propagate their opinion by all lawful means. We by no means undertake to deny its truth; we merely remind him and them that it is a *conclusio theologica* which they must not attempt to raise to an equality with a

decision of the head of the Church. If the Sovereign Pontiff, or any of the Roman congregations with his sanction, has ever pronounced that the immortality of the soul is one of the primitive truths which human reason can prove with absolute certainty, let it be produced, and none will bow to it with more heartfelt submission than ourselves. Until then, we consider it a theologian's duty to abide strictly by the known decisions of the Holy See, and out of reverence to refrain from putting our interpretation of their meaning on a level with the definition itself; and finally, in all cases of doubt, not to force dogmatically upon others our construction of their sense, but to await with patience and docility the time when the successor of St. Peter may further explain himself (should he think it necessary), or give an official interpretation of his own words.

We said above that the meaning of immortality as understood by our reverend correspondent is equivocal. The immortality which is a consequence of the spiritual nature of the soul, is not exactly the immortality which natural theology, or even treatises of Catholic psychology, seeks to establish. The former, for distinction's sake, may be called *negative*, the latter *positive* immortality. Man is a compound of soul and body. The body being composed of parts, is liable to corruption, that is, resolution into its component parts. Its elements, though undergoing change and modification, are imperishable; but the body *as such* perishes, because the organism perishes, which constituted it a body. The soul, however, being no result of parts organized as a whole, but a simple substance, has in it no germ of decay or dissolution. It is consequently incorruptible and imperishable. In this sense immortality may be called the consequence of the soul's simplicity and spirituality. But this is only *negative*. It simply means that the soul considered in itself has in it no principle of death, and can neither destroy itself nor be destroyed by any created power. Nothing beyond this can be pleaded as a consequence from the soul's spirituality. Yet the soul, though free from all danger of destruction by aught that is created, remains by its nature essentially subject to annihilation at the hands of the Creator. In order, therefore, to establish what may be called the *positive* immortality of the soul, there must be added the certainty that it *will not be destroyed* by the supreme power of God. God *can* annihilate the soul, if it so please Him; and as long as this possibility lasts, there is no such thing as *positive* immortality of the soul. How can this possibility be removed? Only in one way. As God's omnipotence is coeternal with His nature, and can be controlled by nothing but His own free will, we must have His promise, that is the act of His free will, engaging itself never to annihilate the human soul. Nothing short of this can stay His hand and limit His power; nothing else can establish for us with certainty the *positive* immortality of the soul. It will not do to fall back on abstract considerations of His goodness. This, as St. Thomas says, did not compel Him to creation, nor will it compel Him to conservation.¹ Where it is question of action by God's free will, some intima-

¹ Bonitas Dei est causa rerum non quasi ex necessitate nature . . . sed per liberam voluntatem. Unde sicut potuit sine præjudicio bonitatis suæ res non producere in esse,

tion of His intention must either be had positively from His own declaration, or it must be contained undeniably and with immediate evidence in the consideration of His attributes.

Have we this assurance, this pledged action of God's Free Will, for the conservation of the human soul? Many answer, unhesitatingly, in the affirmative. The equivalent of a promise on His part, they say, will be found by applying in this case the axiom, that God cannot deny Himself or His attributes. When creating man He implanted in the soul aspirations and desires which His justice cannot allow to go unfulfilled. He is the supreme legislator, and His sanction of the Moral Law would be incomplete, unless there were another life in which virtue and vice should receive the recompense, which they do not always meet in this world. Besides, the concurrent voice of all peoples and generations of earth in favor of the soul's immortality seems to stamp it with a primitive universal character, which argues a truth received by the parents of our race, together with their existence, at the hands of the Creator. Therefore, they argue, God, by His very creative act and by His Providence, and, still further, as Legislator and by natural right Teacher of His creatures, has pledged Himself to preserve the soul of man from annihilation. These are strong arguments, no doubt. We only indicate them, but they may be found developed fully in all scholastic treatises, and eloquently in many of the apologists of religion, natural and revealed, who have written against skeptics and freethinkers. They have been urged, not at great length, but with great vigor, and cogency of reasoning, by Rev. F. Hill, in his admirable article in the January number of the *Review*. It is not our wish, nor can it possibly be our interest, to seek to weaken the force of those arguments. But justice to the truth forbids our disguising the fact, that there are Catholic theologians, known for their religious sentiments and unquestionable orthodoxy, who have not hesitated to express their opinion, that the arguments usually adduced from natural reason, do not amount to absolute proof of the immortality of the soul. And this opinion they have uttered at Rome, under the very eyes, and with at least the passive approbation, of the Holy See.

Among these theologians we may mention the celebrated Muzzarelli.¹

ita absque detrimento suæ bonitatis potest res in esse *non* conservare. (I p., qu. 104, art. 3, ad. 2.)

¹ Alfonso Muzzarelli, born of an illustrious patrician family at Ferrara, towards the middle of the last century, became a Jesuit before his twentieth year. But, like many others, he was cruelly driven out of the peaceful home of his choice by the storm that burst upon the Society in 1773. Out of obedience, like the rest of his brethren, he left the religious house, which had been dissolved by the brief *Dominus Ac Redemptor Noster*; but during his sojourn at Reggio, Ferrara, Parma, and elsewhere, he continued in the world to preserve the obligations, and follow the routine of cloister-life for more than a quarter of a century. At the accession of Pius VII, though called to Rome by special favor, and treated with the highest distinction, he changed nothing of his former mode of life; and when the Jesuits were allowed to assemble and practice their Rule in Naples, he would have flown to join his brethren in their community, but yielded his own wishes out of deference to the Pontiff, who pressed him to remain in the immediate service of the Holy See. He was deported to Paris (to use their pet language) by order of Napoleon's government in 1809, about the same time that his

He was an ex-Jesuit, a personal friend of Pius VII. who loved and esteemed him so highly, that he sent expressly to Parma for him, brought him to Rome, and made him "Teologo della S. Penitenzeria," which is another name for the Pope's special theologian. In one of his works,¹ printed at Rome in 1805, discussing the arguments generally used to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, Muzzarelli says :

"Any argument of reason that you may bring forward to prove the immortality of the soul in this sense (viz., that beyond its natural incorruptibility the positive will of God also concurs to preserve the soul from annihilation) may be indeed an argument of congruity in the highest degree, such as to gain the assent of every sensible, prudent man ; but it will not be an argument that demonstrates, that has metaphysical evidence, so as to make all evasion impossible for an unbeliever."²

And again, after recommending that the great fact of revelation be proposed and proved as the first and most important point for an unbeliever, he continues :

"It may be necessary for example to prove the immortality of the soul. If you have first proved the existence of divine revelation, you have in it a stronghold from which you cannot be driven by any amount of force or artifice ; and then every proof drawn from natural reason is an additional argument, which derives lustre and strength from the aid of revelation. But if you attempt to prove the immortality of the soul in its full meaning without the help of revelation, I foresee that probably you will not succeed in evidently convincing your opponent."³

Half a century before Muzzarelli, the illustrious Dominican, F. Casto

benefactor, Pius VII., was dragged into exile ; and lived long enough to see the downfall of the usurper, who had so brutally trampled on the independence of the Pontiff, his patrimony, and his faithful subjects. But death prevented his return to Rome in triumph with his august patron. His holy life edified all Paris. He was a great propagator of the devotion of the Month of Mary.

¹ Il Buon Uso della Logica in Materia di Religione. This book seems to have been printed first at Foligno, in the Papal States, and immediately afterwards, perhaps simultaneously, reprinted at Rome. Since then it has been published at Naples, Florence, Rome, and at Venice by the Society for the Diffusion of Good Books. It was translated into Latin by a Hungarian priest ; and into French by some Catholic Association in Belgium.

² "Qualunque argomento di ragione voi mi rechiate per provare in un tale senso l'immortalità dell' anima, questo sarà bensì un argomento di somma congruenza, onde guadagnare l'assenso di ogni uomo discreto e prudente, ma non sarà un argomento dimostrativo e di metafisica evidenza, onde rendere impossibile ad un incredulo ogni ritirata." (Buon Uso della Logica. Roma, Salomoni, 1805. Appendice, Vol. II., page 115.) This *Opuscolo* is generally put in the first place in all subsequent editions. Its special title is, "On the Method to be observed in our day in writing about Religion" (*Sul Metodo da osservarsi al presente negli scritti di Religione*).

³ "Non arriverete probabilmente a convincere con evidenza il vostro avversario." Ibid., p. 113. As an apt illustration of this remark, we received a letter a few days ago from a gentleman in our native State, a habitual reader of the *Review*. He is an honest inquirer after truth, but his Protestantism has given him a skeptical turn, an effect it always has on logical and sincere minds. He complains that Father Hill's proofs of the immortality of the soul failed to convince him. In our reply, after expressing our surprise and regret, we could give him nothing better than Muzzarelli's advice,—to give up all abstract investigation, and to study the great fact of revelation, which, because it is a fact, may be tested and discovered by evidence, and once discovered renders speculation in detail unnecessary.

Ansaldi,¹ a name respected and honored in the annals of his Order and in the Italian Church, had held and published the same opinion. And nearly five centuries ago the celebrated Duns Scotus² taught in like manner; or, as he shrewdly expressed himself: "There exist, no doubt, good arguments from natural reason for the immortality of the soul, but they have not yet been discovered." Any one who had the privilege of listening to the lectures of the Roman professor Graziosi, may remember how strongly this point was pressed by that great and good man, when discussing before his class the necessity of revelation. We ourselves have known in the centre of orthodoxy those wearing the religious habit, men of most holy life and undoubted Catholic faith, who did not think differently from Muzzarelli, Ansaldi, and Scotus. To suppose that all or any of these worthy men were inclined to encourage or countenance freethinking, or that they did not know, or knowing wilfully disregarded the doctrine of the Church or the decisions of the Holy See, would be an insult to religion and to common sense.

Though nothing is farther from our design than to say anything that could detract from the arguments generally alleged in natural theology to prove the immortality of the soul, yet we cannot help observing with Muzzarelli, that the very men who use these arguments, occasionally speak in such a manner as to suggest, that after all they are not quite so sure of their ground. They are not agreed which are the strong arguments, and which are weak and mere auxiliaries. One disparages the force of another's proofs in order to recommend his own. Thus, even Cajetan finds fault with the main argument of St. Thomas. Suarez does the same, and declares it inconclusive, unless it be understood in the sense and coupled with the explanation which he (Suarez) adds.³ But may we not take the same liberty with Suarez which he has taken with St. Thomas?

Another point not to be overlooked by the Catholic theologian, is this: If some of the arguments used to prove the immortality of the soul be not cautiously handled, there is danger of running into extremes, and wounding Catholic theology by unduly exalting and Catholicizing human philosophy. By pushing these arguments too far, we may inadvertently fall into Bajanism, or at least straggle on its confines. But we have neither space nor inclination to pursue this topic. Our object is not to blame those who do their best to prove by human reason the doctrine of *positive* immortality, nor to disprove the opinion of those who hold that it can be apodictically proved without any recourse to the help of revelation. If any one believe this, he has at his back the support of great and weighty names. As far as we are concerned, he is welcome to

¹ This work was noticed by the *Journal de Trevoux*, of the year 1759, ap. Muzzarelli, l. c.

² *Reportata super (Libros) Sententiarum. Parrhisiis (sic) apud Joannem Granion, 1517.* In 4, Dist. 43, Qu. 2. Some of the volumes of this fine old black-letter edition were printed eight or nine months before the outbreak of Luther's so-called Reformation. In confuting the arguments of St. Thomas, Scotus does not mention him by name, but calls him rather quaintly "unus doctor."

³ Suarez de Anima, in the third volume of Palme's Paris edition.

believe and maintain it; we only insist that he shall not identify his opinion with the defined doctrine of the Church, nor say anathema to theologians who happen to think differently.

Our reverend correspondent further accuses Professor Paley of "combating, in no measured terms, the immortality of the human soul, as a truth accessible to reason." This, we humbly submit, is going too far, and does gross injustice to Professor Paley. He has pointed out in the text as well as in a note, at the very beginning of his article, the arguments by which the soul's immortality is upheld. He does not deny their value, he does not even discuss them, favorably or otherwise, for that is foreign to his subject; he merely enumerates them. And we venture to say, it could not have been done with more lucid brevity. And if Professor Paley has preferred to content himself with a reference to the proofs of immortality drawn from the *moral*, rather than the purely *metaphysical* argument, he has only followed in the footsteps of the great Archbishop of Cambrai, who was a great philosopher as well as theologian. He thinks the latter no proofs at all. Here are Fenelon's words: "La vraie preuve de l'immortalité de l'âme n'est pas tirée des recherches incertaines de sa nature, mais de l'idée de Dieu et de son dessein en la créant."

But Professor Paley "speaks unbecomingly of certain preachers" of former ages. Did the Council of Trent speak differently, when it forbade them to handle "difficult, subtle, uncertain, curious questions about purgatory" in the pulpit, and denounced their doing so as not conducive to piety, as disedifying and a stumbling-block to the faithful? That there were such preachers at the time of the Council of Trent is plain from the Decree of the Twenty-fifth Session, which denounces them, and calls on the Bishop to watch over their conduct in the pulpit. Much more would they be found in the middle ages. And that such preachers may possibly show themselves again, even in this polished century and country, would appear from the fact that the Fathers of the Plenary Council of Baltimore thought fit to reproduce in their Acts (page 18) the very warning and condemnation that were issued three hundred years ago at Trent. The people of the middle ages are called "devout and intelligent" by Professor Paley, not by way of slur or irony, but because such they were, as is plain from the context.

Our reverend correspondent seems to think that we ought to have made some remarks, by way of censure, on Professor Paley's article. Now we may not agree with all that the Professor has said; we seldom do with all the assertions of all the writers who contribute to the *Review*. But it would scarcely seem either required by justice, or in accordance with propriety, that we should add postils to each page of the *Review*, merely to let the reader know that in this and that point we dissent from the writer. Did he say anything in real or apparent contradiction with the teaching of the Church, the case would be different. Professor Paley has said nothing against the doctrine of the Church, nothing that is not susceptible of a Catholic interpretation. Our reverend correspondent thought otherwise; but we hope he is now convinced that he was mistaken.

BOOK NOTICES.

HAROLD. A Drama. By *Alfred Tennyson*. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1877. 16mo., pp. 170.

ST. THOMAS OF CANTERBURY. A Dramatic Poem. By *Aubrey de Vere*. Henry S. King & Co. London: 1876. 16mo., pp. 267.

It is a remarkable coincidence that these two dramatic poems should appear about the same time. Each is the second of the kind written by the veteran authors whose names are appended. Mr. Tennyson wrote *Queen Mary*; but, notwithstanding the facility with which he adapted himself to the language of the Elizabethan poets, and the numerous gems in which the piece abounds, he failed. We take it that he wrote *Harold* to retrieve his failure. Aubrey de Vere wrote *Alexander the Great* as his first published dramatic effort, and succeeded to the gratification of the most conscientious critics on both sides of the Atlantic. With what success his present effort is written, we will endeavor to determine in a few minutes. But first, a word upon *Harold*.

It is a hazardous undertaking for an author to attempt success in one department of letters after he has achieved it in another. It is seldom given to the same man to show genius in two distinct lines of thought. The very conception of genius is opposed to such an idea. Now, Mr. Tennyson is emphatically the poet of the day. In his *In Memoriam* he has caught up its reflective and philosophic mood. In *The Princess* he has attempted the discussion and solution of one of its most vexing problems, the social position of woman. In *Maud* he has sought to express those erratic and violent passions that are constantly seething in society, and which, when their impulses are uncontrolled, throw upon the surface the wreck of a character or a life, and disturb the moral equilibrium of a whole community by the shock they give. In the *Idylls of the King* he has rehabilitated the romantic spirit of mediæval times. And here, in a great measure, lies the secret of his success. The age lays special stress on the cultivation of the æsthetic and the sentimental in human nature. In going back to the Arthurian legends the poet was only going to the fountain-head of modern sentimentalism. He was supplying food for which the greatest craving was shown. Tennyson is pre-eminently the poet of refined sentiment. He is also successful in his exquisite description of nature, human and material. A mountain or a rill, the ocean-storm or the flash of a lady's eye, each is within the sphere of his excellence. He is a perfect word-artist, as minute and accurate in poetry as Meissonier is in painting. He is also as painstaking. These are the qualities that have insured success to Tennyson as the poet of the sentiments, and made him the pocket companion of many among the educated and refined of the day. But are they sufficient to make him a dramatist? By no means. Description is not action; sentiment is not stormy passion.

Harold is thrown in one of the most stormy periods of England's many stormy times. The Godwin family is harrowing the land and all but exhausting the patience of the saintly Edward. It is a time when men are not nice about the expression of their thought. For this reason the character of Harold is an unfortunate selection for the poet of nicety. He is not equal to the grasp of life and feeling and thought that actuated the men and women of the eleventh century. There is in his drama no development of character. It does not grow upon one. It is simply

made up of parts pieced together. The dialogue is short and occasionally crisp. And, as in everything that Tennyson writes, there are gems of description. Here is a specimen :

“ *Harold*.—Poor brother ! still a hostage !

Wulfnoth.—Yea, and I

Shall see the dewy kiss of dawn no more
Make blush the maiden-white of our tall cliffs,
Nor mark the sea-bird rouse himself and hover
Above the windy ripple, and fill the sky
With free sea-laughter—never—save indeed
Thou canst make yield this iron-mooded Duke
To let me go.”—P. 59.

But we are disappointed with the artistic construction of the drama. It is that of a novice. The first act is supposed to foreshadow the *dénouement*. Tennyson gives us insight into the whole play in his first act. Edward, in a mysterious manner, tells him :

“ Go not to Normandy—go not to Normandy.”

And Edith, his betrothed, tells him her dream in such a manner that it contains beginning and end :

“ Oh ! that thou wert not going !

For so methought it was our marriage-morn,
And while we stood together, a dead man
Rose from behind the altar, tore away
My marriage ring, and rent my bridal veil,
And then I turned, and saw the church all filled
With dead men upright from their graves, and all
The dead men made at thee to murder thee,
But thou didst back thyself against a pillar,
And strike among them with thy battle-axe—
There, what a dream !”—Act i., sc. ii., p. 33.

The vision of Edward added to this gives us the whole play. It has no plot. It is simply a series of panoramic views of historical events. It will give occasion for some pretty tableaux with explanatory speaking. As for characters, there are none. Stigand is a shadow of a miser. Edward is a driveller. William is a monster of refined cruelty. Shadows and puppets these, and nothing more. All this is unhistorical ; it goes to show that the poet did not understand the times or the personages he would represent. Harold he means to be strong. But we see in him no other strength than that of a war-beast. He appears at his best in the first act. There he is manly, truthful, repeats the maxim, “ Better die than lie ;” but he does not make even a show of resistance when called upon to live his own words. He gives way before Edith and betroths himself to her ; he gives way before Aldwyth and marries her ; he gives way before William and swears a false oath. This is weakness rather than strength. One lesson *Harold* teaches us. It is that Mr. Tennyson has not the remotest conception of what Catholicity is, or of what makes up a Catholic saint. It is something his exquisite art cannot reach, because his thoughts have not penetrated to it. When he wrote *Queen Mary* we were under the impression that he was only caught in that temporary current of bigotry which dictated the Gladstone pamphlets. This last effort of his satisfies us that it is the normal state of his mind, and that the mediævalism of his poetry is drawn from the surface of chivalric sentimentalism.

Passing from *Harold* to *St. Thomas of Canterbury* is going into entirely a new region of thought, and one much purer and more elevated. It takes an effort to climb into the sphere of Aubrey de Vere’s poetry.

He is no less a conscientious worker than is Tennyson himself, though he has not arrived at the perfect artistic word-power of the latter. In alluding to John Henry Newman's *Dream of Gerontius*, in a note to the present poem, he speaks of "the higher poetry." His is a "higher poetry," because it is the poetry of the higher life. It is the poetry of spirituality. If Tennyson is the poet of sentiment, Aubrey de Vere is the poet of the spiritual life. In his earlier poems he dwelt especially upon the noble passions and the noble natures of a people which has a spiritual life on record. He is the living laureate of the people of Ireland. Their aspirations, their sufferings, their constancy in the faith, their self-devotedness, have all filled his soul with glowing visions, and he has found for them in his beautiful productions "a local habitation and a name." In his *Legends of St. Patrick*, he went back to that twilight time when the setting glories of pagan song became blended with the dawns of rising Christianity. Only those who have read these noble poems can form any conception of how great a poet Mr. Aubrey de Vere is. This last effort seems to crown his poetical labors. It is a grand dramatic poem. It raises one up out of his materialistic surroundings and makes him feel what it is to be a great saint. Perhaps, and this is the most serious fault to be found with the poem as a drama, it is not *human* enough in its representation of St. Thomas. He did not arrive at that total estrangement from the world and that continual living in the upper regions of the spiritual life in a day or a year. It was a long and laborious work. Still we find him perfect from the moment he accepts the bishop's crosier till the day of his martyrdom. We would like to see his keen satire roll back upon their own heads the taunts which courtiers heaped upon him when they found him out of the King's favor. His vivacity is well known. Then again, such a great man, with the power of attaching children to him, such as he possessed, must have had a good deal of childlike simplicity in his nature, an element that has not been drawn out. This would require some scenes in which Becket's nature would be unbent. But, in justice to our poet, we must say that it is not in accordance with his plan. He casts the character of his hero more in a Grecian mould. He represents him as a statue is made to represent one. He gives him the pose of a saint in the attitude of resistance to lawlessness personified in Henry, to hate personified in De Broc, and to court obsequiousness represented in the Bishops of Oxford and London. We see all the powers of his soul under a constant strain, as single-handed he fights the many-headed monster that threatens his destruction. The poem is a spiritual Laocoön. The groupings are admirable. Becket stands out in bold relief. By him are two fast friends, John of Salisbury and Herbert of Bosham; the latter—

"A mystic, feeding on faith's inmost love—
A dreamer, scanning mysteries in flowers."—P. 232.

The former intellectual, learned, acute, and faithful. Becket so speaks of them:

"Herbert and John—both gone—how few are like them!
God made me rich in friends. In Herbert still,
So holy and so infant like his soul,
I found a mountain-spring of Christian love,
Upbursting through the rock of fixed resolve,
A spring of healing strength; in John, a mind
That, keener than diplomatists of kings,
Was crafty only 'gainst the wiles of craft,
And, stored with this world's wisdom, scorned to use it
Except for virtue's needs."—Act v., sc. ii., p. 198.

With admirable dramatic effect does the poet make the hate of De Broc follow the saint with all the persistency of a fate, and wreak his wrath upon his family and friends.

"*De Broc*.—One task is mine—

To slay the man I hate; and I will slay him. (*Departs.*)

De Luci.—The air grows healthier now *De Broc* has left us:

That man's a forest-beast no art can tame.

Three times my hand, with iron mace of law,

Hath spurned him to his den, or else *Idonea*;

But you, long absent, know not that black fount

Which feeds his hate for *Becket*.

Cornwall.—Tell his tale.

De Luci.—In youth his bad heart was a nest of adders,

Envenomed purposes and blind, at war.

A monk, on false pretence he burst his bond,

And roamed a preying on the race of man."—Act i., sc. ii.

But enough has been given to show the character of the human fiend who makes use of all his energies to bring about the ruin of *Becket*. And there is another character who loves not the Primate. It is *Eleanor*.

Unlike *Harold*, the poem is not pieced together; it grows. Act I. gives us the opinions of various stations in life upon the promotion of *Becket* to the See of *Canterbury*. Therein we find the various shades of men who will afterwards become the friends or enemies of *Thomas*. It also opens the breach between him and the King. Act II. introduces us to the struggle from the resignation of the great seal to the contest upon the royal customs, and the final break with *Henry*. The greatness of *Thomas* towers above all others. The bishops urge him to temporize. He answers them grandly:

"Bishops of England!

For many truths by you this day enforced,

Hear ye in turn but one. The Church is God's:

Lords, were it ours, then might we traffic with it;

At will make large its functions, or contract;

Serve it or sell; worship or crucify.

I say the Church is God's; for He beheld it,

His thought, ere thine began; counted its bones,

Which in His book were writ. I say that He

From His own side in water and in blood

Gave birth to it on *Calvary*, and caught it,

Despite the nails, His Bride, in His own arms;

I say that He, a Spirit of clear heat,

Lives in its frame, and cleanses with pure pain

His sacrificial precinct, but consumes

The chaff with other ardors. Lords, I know you;

What dare ye have and what intend ere yet

Yon sun that rises weeping sets this night;

And therefore bind I with this charge upon your souls:

If any secular court shall pass its verdict

On me, your lord, or ere that sin be sinned,

I bid you flee that court; if secular arm

Attempt me, lay thereon the Church's ban,

Or else against you I appeal to *Rome*.

To-day the heathen rage—I fear them not:

If fall I must, this hand, ere yet I fall,

Stretched from the bosom of a peaceful gown

Above a troubled king and darkening gown,

Shall send God's sentence forth. My lords, farewell!"

Act ii., sc. iii., pp. 64, 65.

This is the language of a great soul, firm in its resolve, and unflinch-

ing in its duty. He is summoned before the King. Personal charges are brought against him. He refutes them. He is asked to confirm the royal customs. Barons and bishops load him with abuse. Gilbert says to him :

"My Lord, your pardon ! you have placed your bishops
This day between the hammer and the anvil ;
At Clarendon the customs you received,
This day you spurn them.

Becket.—You have heard, my lords,
That partial truth which more envenoms falsehood.
At Clarendon I sinned—this much all know ;
Few know the limits of that sin, and fewer
The threefold fraud that meshed me in that sin,
From which, like weeping Peter, I arose,
To fall, I trust, no more.

* * * *

My lords, that eve
A truthful servant, and a fearless one,
Who bears my cross—and taught me to bear one—
Probed me and proved with sharp and searching words,
And as the sun my sin before me stood.
My lords, for forty days I kept my fast,
And held me from the offering of the mass,
And sat in sackcloth ; till the Pope sent word,
'Arise ; be strong, and walk.' And I arose,
And hither came ; and here confession make
That till the cleansed leper once again
Takes, voluntary, back his leprosy,
I with these royal customs stain no more
My soul which Christ hath washed."—Act ii., sc. iv., pp. 74, 75.

Thomas leaves the kingdom. After an interview with Pope Alexander III. he retires to the abbey of Pontigny. It is a haven of rest after his many tossings on the stormy sea of troubles through which his life has passed. Here, his language reflects the settled calm of his mind :

"*John of Salisbury.*—The spirit of Bernard
Hangs on this pure and hallowed air. Your brow
Was furrowed once ; to-day it wears no frown ;
His Holiness did well to send you hither.

Becket.—Leisure and peace, and communings with God
Above the glebe new-turned, when fresh and sweet
Rises earth's breath, and the thicket near
The unimpatient bird-song, evening-lulled,
Is soberer than at dawn, must help, I think,
Attuned by daily offices divine,
And faces calm wherein the chant lives on
When psalms are o'er—must help to soften hearts
How hard soe'er, and softening them, to brighten.
Here learn we that, except through the sin of man,
There's evil none on earth—not pain, not scorn,
Not death ! How well they name that stream 'Serene !'
Serene it wanders from the chestnut forests,
Serene it whispers through yon orchard bowers,
Serene it slides along the convent walls :
It counts the hours ; even now the sun descends,
And therefore in its breathless mirror glow
The gold-green pillars of those limes beside it.
This spot is surely holier than men know ;
I think some saint died here !"—Act iii., sc. vii., p. 114.

This is a passage that would have satisfied Wordsworth's fastidiousness. It is so natural, so suited to the occasion. Becket, after an interview

with the King, finally returns to England with full consciousness of all that awaits him.

"*Herbert.*—Bad rumors thicken.

Becket.—In three days hence I tread my native shores.

Llewellen.—With what intent?

Becket.—*To stamp this foot of mine*

Upon the bosom of a waiting grave,

And wake a slumbering realm.

Llewellen —May it please your Grace—

Becket.—My friends, seven years of exile are enough :

If into that fair church I served of old

I may not entrance make, a living man,

Let them who loved me o'er its threshold lift

And lay my body dead."

There is sublimity in this language. The high resolve in the face of the doom awaiting is grandly expressed in the words italicized. Becket's prophetic soul spoke correctly. The Queen has not forgotten her old hate for him. She stirs up the pride of Henry once more. She seems bent upon the death of the Primate. The poet thus groups the scene in the spirit of an old Grecian :

"*Queen Eleanor.*—Ye that have goblets, brim them ! Mark this cup :

It flames with Albi's wine !

[*QUEEN ELEANOR rises and stands on the highest step of the throne with a golden cup in her right hand.*

Leicester (to Lisieux).—Behold her, Lisieux !

That smile is baleful as a winter beam

Streaking some cliff wreck-gorged ; her hair and eyes

Send forth a glare half sunshine and half lightning.

Queen Eleanor.—A toast, my lords ! The London merchant's son,

Once England's Primate—henceforth King of England !

King Henry (leaping to his feet and half-drawing his sword).—Woman, be silent !"

Well she may. She has done the mischief. She has reopened the old wounds. Others are there ready and glad to keep them so. In the meantime Becket's return to England is one continuous triumphal reception from the people. And this fact is so represented that it chafes the King still more. When Gilbert, the venal Bishop of London, tells the King that Becket,

— "like a king, an army at his back,
In vengeance sweeps from shore to shore of England,
To abase a king ill-crowned"—

he grows furious, and gnaws the straws on the floor like a raving maniac.

"That too past.

The King was standing in their midst : his eye

Slowly he turned from each to each ; then spake

With pointed finger, and with serpent hiss :

'Slaves, slaves, not barons hath my kingdom bred,

Slaves that in silence stand, and eye their king

Mocked by a low-born knave !'

The Prior.—Did none reply ?

Llewellen.—No man. From that mute hall four knights forth strode,

Fitz-Urse, De Tracy, Moreville, Richard Brito,

At twelve last night they entered Saltwood gates :

De Broc attended them.

The Prior.—The end draws nigh."—Act v., sc. vii., p. 230.

The end was nigh. We all know what it was. It is not a piece of fiction that the poet is weaving from his fancy. It is historic truth. And he is throughout most faithful to history. In a laborious preface he confirms his conception of his hero with authorities, most of them adverse to the religious belief of the martyr. In this he contrasts with Tennyson, who distorts history and says nothing about it.

We have so far omitted mention of the most touching and beautiful portions of the poem. They are what we might call an episode. It is when speaks Idonea, whom Thomas à'Becket wrested from the foul touch of De Broc. She has become a nun. Her delicate soul has received unusual insight into things spiritual. Her conversations with the dying Empress are sweet, mystical, heavenly. We cannot refrain from giving a quotation :

"The Empress.—What see you, child?

Idonea.—An Eden, weed o'ergrown, but still an Eden;
Man's noble life—a fragment, yet how fair!
My father, pilgrim once in Southern lands,
Groping mid ruins, found a statue's foot,
And brought it home. I gazed upon it oft,
Until its smiling curves and dimpled grace
Showed me the vanished nymph from foot to brow,
Majestical and sweet. Man's broken life
Shows like that sad, sweet fragment.

The Empress.—Life, my child,
In times barbaric is a wilderness:
In cultured times a street, or wrangling mart:
We bear it, for we must.

Idonea.—O madam, madam!
God made man's life: it is a holy thing!
What constitutes that life? The Virtues, first;
That sisterhood divine, brighter than stars,
And diverse more than stars, than gems, than blossoms;
The Virtues are our life in essence; next,
Those household ties which image ties celestial;
Lastly, life's blessed sorrows. They alone
Rehearse the Man of Sorrows; they alone
Fit us for life with Him."—Act iv., sc. i., p. 145.

Here is another passage that would have delighted Wordsworth or Shakspeare had they dropped it in their metaphysical musings:

"The Empress.—Here too sin hides us from God's face; yet here
Feebly we mourn that loss.

Idonea.—So deeply here
Man's spirit is infleshed! Two moments are there
Wherein the soul of man beholds its God;
The first at its creation, and the next
The instant after death.

The Empress.—It sees its Judge.
Idonea.—And seeing, is self-judged, and sees no longer,
Yet rests in perfect peace. As some blind child,
Stayed in its mother's bosom, feels its safety,
So in the bosom of the love eternal,
Secure, though sad, that Vision it awaits
(The overbending of that Face divine)
Which now—now first—it knows to be its heaven,
That primal thirst of souls at last re-waked,
The creature's yearning for its great Creator."—Act iv., sc. i., p. 148.

These are passages not to be read simply; they are to be studied. Only so does their beauty grow upon one. They carry the reader, as they carried their author, into regions of the highest order of thought.

They are pure philosophy steeped in the glories of genuine poetry. But a truce to quotation. The book itself must be read.

We will not judge Mr. De Vere's poem by the rules for the drama. We do not think he intends to have it enacted. There is not in it sufficient diversity of style. It is rather too sustained throughout in the same elevated tone. Mr. Tennyson's drama is better adapted for representation, inasmuch as it is shorter, and has not such long speeches for any character, though *Harold* will fail through lack of plot. But poetry is not a quality required for dramatic representation. Vivacity in the dialogue, and versatility in the style, peculiar to each personage, are the chief requisites; hence the great successful modern plays are void of poetic merit. But in good truth the age of the drama is past. Goethe's *Faust* has shown how the dramatic form may be used in a poem not adapted to the stage, and has opened the door to a new use for the drama besides that of representation. In the same spirit, so far as concerns form, we conceive Aubrey de Vere to have written *St. Thomas of Canterbury*.

In conclusion, we say that the historic verdicts upon the dramatic writings of these two poets will be very distinct. Of Tennyson it will run somewhat in this fashion: "Combining in himself the sensuousness of Keats with the idealism of Shelley he rose to pre-eminence as the poet of the sentiments. In the cultivation of this field he has been most successful. The delicacy of his thoughts and the sweet music of his verse give him an unfilled niche in the Valhalla of great English poets. But in his latter days he undertook to write dramas, which betray a falling off. The mine of his genius became exhausted, and he filled up his life by giving us the rubbish he continued to gather, instead of the pure gold he used to dig out so frequently. This rubbish he worked up into the form of dramas, and to give them some appearance of worth he scattered an occasional gem among them. They are of value in enabling us to make a complete estimate of the poet's genius." And of Aubrey de Vere the verdict will read thus: "At first an enthusiastic disciple of Wordsworth he occasionally mistook that great poet's faults of detail for perfections, and literally imitated them. But soon outgrowing his defects he asserted his own individuality, and finally achieved crowning success in his dramatic poems. As Wordsworth used, in his efforts to conform to his own theory, frequently to prosaicize his poetry, and became truly great only when he forgot himself and his theorizings; so Aubrey de Vere became so lifted into the regions of poetic thought that he occasionally poeticized prose, and spiritualized every idea he touched upon. The great and the sublime in human nature were themes according to his own heart. Alexander among the ancients and Thomas à'Becket among the moderns, he presented as specimens of aspiring souls actuated by emotions above the crowd by which they were surrounded." And let us add that it is to be hoped he will present us many more such; for we take it that only now has his genius flowered into its true greatness.

CONTEMPORARY EVOLUTION. An Essay on some Recent Social Changes. By *St. George Mivart*. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1876.

This is a very interesting and thoughtful work. The author brings under review the various elements that enter into the social movement of the age, traces them back to their first principles, shows their workings and effects in previous ages, and endeavors to forecast their bearing upon and relation to Catholicity in the future. It is not easy to state in brief the scope of the argument, the premises on which it is based, or

the different considerations by which it is illustrated and strengthened. The number and variety of topics touched upon is great, and the arguments are so condensed that anything like a fair synopsis of them would be a work of extreme difficulty.

Whatever differences of judgment may be formed by readers as to the correctness of some of the views expressed by the author in his analyses of mediæval and modern society, and the conclusions he arrives at as regards their relation to the Church in the present and future, there can be but one opinion as to the importance of the subjects touched upon in the book, and the ability and thoroughness with which they are treated. The book has another merit. It is in a very high degree *suggestive*. Where topics are briefly touched upon, or thoughts stated without full discussion, they are so handled as to suggest to the reader further reflections, and open up to his mind kindred topics and thoughts which he may develop himself and place in proper relation to the main subject.

The leading idea and purpose of the work may be gathered from its introductory chapter. The author believes that we are "traversing an epoch destined to be memorable for a long time to come," and one which is "as critical as, even if not more so than, that of the sixteenth century, and that which occurred towards the close of the last century." It is not enough, however, to perceive that we are living in a critical epoch; it is also necessary, though very difficult, "to appraise that epoch and estimate its tendencies correctly." For, "no one, of course, can withdraw himself completely from the special influence of his age and country, however vigorous may be his will or extensive his culture, yet to estimate such phenomena correctly, and with as little bias as possible, is about the most important task to which a thinker can in these days apply his intellect."

"It is so supremely important because we are all called upon to contribute to social evolution, and more or less distinctly to take sides; and, of course, only by rare accident can beneficial action result from erroneous judgments."

The author then points out that "the very same character of religious excitation marks, however, both the French revolutionary epoch (of '98) and the period of the Renaissance as well as that in which we live," and then states as questions demanding our attention:

I. "Whether, in fact, one spirit has or has not really animated these great movements which have marked the post-mediæval epoch?"

II. "If there has been one such inspiration, what has been its true nature and character?"

III. "What is likely to be the farther effect of such a spirit, and is it likely henceforward to increase or to diminish?"

The first of these questions the author believes must be answered affirmatively. To the second he answers by the affirmation (which is substantiated by a strong array of evidence), "that the deeply pantheistic and pagan spirit with which the Aryan mind was once saturated, profoundly modifies and actuates not the minds of the poor only, but of the rich and educated, who, from whatever cause, have either failed to master or who (in rare instances) having mastered, have deliberately rejected Christian philosophy and theology. The result is the assumption of no merely negative attitude towards Christianity, but of a profound and violent antagonism to it, springing from a keen, often passionate, attachment to an opposite system."

With the proof and illustration of this statement the remainder of the introductory chapter is occupied. The argument covers a wide field, and the topics touched upon in it are treated with eminent ability and

with great clearness, and at the same time great condensation. The superstitions of the day are traced back to their origin in ancient paganism, the persistent though latent spirit of pantheism, lingering still among the peoples of Europe and occasionally showing itself in their national peculiarities and characteristics, is pointed out, the passionate study and worship of nature, and the passionate admiration of visible beauty, are dwelt upon as evidences of this pantheistic tendency. The material philosophy of the age is discussed, particularly as represented by Herbert Spencer, and the harmony between it and Brahmanism is traced out.

After a keen and searching analysis of the tendencies of modern thought and action in their different forms and manifestations, the author states his conclusion as follows:

"Hereafter, then, in the worship of the First Cause, not as made known to us by His own act of voluntary self revelation, but as manifested in the material world alone, we may find a fuller development of that pagan revival, which for more than three centuries has been gathering life and energy. But we shall not yet have reached its culmination.

"To be logical, we must not ignore *any* side of nature, which is equally in every aspect a mode of the Unknowable. If acts prompted by the devotion of a mother's love are to be reverently recognized as one mode of that which alone Is, not one bit less is the traffic of the courtesan another such mode; and if the chastisement of the assassin may claim Its sanction, so the assassin may equally claim it for the act on account of which he is chastised."

The author then devotes the main body of his work to a consideration of the effect on Christianity of the further development of this general movement towards paganism, and endeavors to "predict the result of the renewed conflict between such a modified Christianity and a so revived paganism."

In investigating the question, "whether Christianity is likely to be utterly destroyed, or more or less enfeebled, or slightly or greatly strengthened by the further development of the naturalistic movement," Mr. Mivart examines that movement in its (1) political, (2) scientific, (3) philosophic aspects.

In the discussion of the movement of modern society under its political aspect he reviews the destruction of Christian mediævalism in England, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland, and traces out the development of the great modern political movement as containing three distinct ideals:

"1. The mainly unconscious and partly conscious real pagan revival and revolt against God—PAGANISM."

"2. The assertion of natural right, and revolt against the domination of man (*merely as man*) over his fellow—CIVICISM."

"3. The tendency to preserve, and more or less bring back, the mediæval Christian theocracy—MEDIÆVALISM."

It is then shown, by a very clear and thorough analysis of these tendencies, that there is a temporary union of the first two (though essentially divergent and conflicting) against the third; and that in this temporary union the two first fiercely oppose and resist the last-mentioned tendency.

Mr. Mivart shows that the system of thought embodied in civicism holds, as regards morals (1), "that right is but another name for pleasure; (2), that temporal good is the only good to be sought after or desired; and (3) that no man has control over or is responsible for his actions." As regards politics he says:

"Such a system, recognizing no distinction of kind between God and

nature, the natural and the supernatural, man and brute, the good and the pleasant, naturally and logically asserts the *absolute* right of the State to control all and everything in the life of every individual citizen, and necessarily denies all rights to individuals or minorities. In principle it warrants the performance of acts incomparably more atrocious than the massacre of St. Bartholomew or the burnings of the Spanish Inquisition. . . . There is no principle in the views advocated by Professor Huxley's school to which a minority might appeal in bar of utter extermination by a majority, if unable to convince the majority that it would injure *itself* by that minority's destruction."

The author traces out the effects of the combination of "civicism" and "paganism" in the hostility to the Church manifested in almost every country, and then passes on to point out the manner in which the Church will eventually surmount and overcome this hostility, with an immense gain to Christianity. The argument is able and forcible, though we are not prepared to accept it in its entirety.

The subjects of Scientific Evolution, Philosophic Evolution, and Æsthetic Evolution, are treated, each in a separate chapter, with great ability and analytical acuteness. At the end the general conclusion is reached that "the great movement of the RENAISSANCE (of which the present movements in politics, science, philosophy, and æsthetics, are, in the author's opinion, simply the outcome and fruit) will hereafter take its place as the manifestly efficient promoter of a new development of the Christian organism, such as the first twenty centuries of its life afforded it no opportunity to manifest."

PUBLIC LIBRARIES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Their history, condition, and management. Special Report, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education.

Under this title the Government of the United States has issued a work of decided interest to the bibliographer, and of great use to the bibliomaniac. An introduction, by the joint editors, gives excellent *raisons d'être* for the book. While they have not presented any very new ideas on the subject of the importance of public free libraries, they have collected and classified all the benefits which accrue to the people from such institutions. Of course the editors view this importance chiefly in connection with the public free schools, and into that vexed question we will not follow them. Fortunately the usefulness of a public library is not confined to a form of education to which, as Catholics, we cannot subscribe; but such institutions are rather to be regarded by us as a means by which such schools will be finally and conclusively proved more hurtful than helping. We agree with the editors, that a librarian is as much a "teacher" as the professor, and only in proportion as he thoroughly understands his duty to the mute but eloquent objects of his care, and to the public, is he worthy of the post he fills.

In the introduction is embodied, in a necessarily condensed form, reports of public libraries in Mexico, of which there are sixteen, in Brazil, and in Japan.

The report, as must be expected in this centennial year, begins with an account of the resources for literary culture one hundred years ago, collated mostly from the memorabilia of Franklin, and is most interesting in giving the story of his struggles to establish a library in Philadelphia, and of the growth of the institution since known as the Philadelphia Library. The honor of establishing the first public library in the United States is divided with Philadelphia by Charleston, S. C., where in 1748 several young men associated themselves for the purpose

of forming such an establishment. In Georgetown, S. C., the Winyaw Indigo Club organized a library in 1753, and the New York Library was not established until 1754.

Following this interesting paper by Mr. Scudder is one upon school and asylum libraries by the editors, also a distinct one by them upon college libraries, and one upon theological libraries, divided into three parts, the second part being from the pen of Father Sumner of Georgetown College. Scientific libraries are treated by Prof. Gill, of the Smithsonian Institute. Of the thirty-nine divisions or chapters of the report, those numbered twenty-seven to thirty-seven are devoted to papers by the librarians and bibliographers of the country upon the cataloguing, binding, indexing, choice, and general care of books. There we find several articles from the pen of Mr. A. R. Spofford, the Librarian of Congress, than whom no one is better able to lay down the law in all things pertaining to the subject. The penultimate chapter is a contribution of ten several papers, giving a history of the public libraries in ten of the principal cities of the Union, and is extremely interesting reading. The closing chapter is one on the general statistics of all public libraries in the United States.

The volume is a bulky one, and had been much better divided into two smaller ones, more convenient to handle and to bind. It is one which should find its way into every study, for it is a storehouse of knowledge and suggestion for which every one who values books will be thankful. And nowadays who so bold as to profess not to care for books? While those who are blessed with a literary taste cultivate and cherish it as a glorious endowment.

It is a source of gratification to us, as citizens of a great country, to be able to offer the proof which this volume gives, that intellectual and mental culture have not been neglected in spite of the reproach so often flung upon us, that the "mighty dollar" is the "will o' the wisp" which leads us on a wild all-absorbing chase, and which is only relinquished when the eager foot is tripped up by the grave. Almost every city in the Union has its public library, a collection not confined to sectarian publications, but where people of all creeds can find mental food without being obliged to swallow, against their wills, aught that disagrees with their religious digestion. This, at least, is the theory on which our public libraries are professedly managed, though it must be acknowledged that in many instances they fail to practically realize it. A vitiated taste for sensational fiction crowds the shelves even of some of our larger public libraries with an immense quantity of trash; and a spirit of hostility to the Catholic Church, concealed under professions of liberalism and unsectarianism frequently gives only reluctant admission to a few Catholic works, while every new Protestant publication is immediately procured. It is to be hoped, however, that as our public libraries acquire solidity and their management passes, as it is passing, more into the hands of those who better understand the true use and functions of libraries, that they will come to represent and embody in their collections of books their proper purpose and design.

But to make it easier to reach the mental food they have stored up, a good system of cataloguing is necessary, and Mr. Spofford gives some excellent advice upon this point. While reading the Congressional Librarian's articles, and remembering the thousands of volumes under his care, and the aids and resources for their acquisition and preservation which have been furnished him by the government, we cannot help reverting to the first article in the report, which details the struggles of

Benjamin Franklin and the anxiety and trouble the collection of the first library cost him.

The Commissioner of Education, in his letter to the Secretary, gives the year 1874 as the date of the commencement of the compilation which he has just published. We congratulate him upon the result of the two years' labors.

THEOLOGIA MORALIS. Novissimi Ecclesiæ Doctoris S. Alphonsi in compendium redacta et usui Venerabilis Cleri Americani accommodata. Auctore *A. Konings, C.S.S.R.* Editio altera aucta et emendata. Neo-Eboraci, Cincinnati, S. Ludovici, Einsidlae. Benziger Fratres, 1876. Oct., vol. i., pp. 481; vol. ii., pp. 458.

The study of moral theology or casuistry, as it is often called, is erroneously supposed by many to be something new in the Church, the product of later ages, an outgrowth of scholastic theology, unknown to the fathers and the early Church. This opinion is not only held but studiously and eagerly put forward by not a few Protestant divines. But there could be nothing more false than this supposition, nothing more evidently disproved by the history of the Church in her earliest period. It might as well be argued that there was no systematic study of Scripture, no scientific knowledge of its laws and canons of interpretation in the first ages of the Church, because the technical names of biblical criticism and hermeneutics had not yet come into general use. St. Jerome, for example, knew nothing of our modern terminology, but no worthier or more accomplished Bible scholar ever lived inside or outside of the Church. And Protestants, especially German Rationalist interpreters, have come at last to discover and recognize his merits, and show how fully they appreciate his biblical lore. They often quote him with honorable mention, and perhaps just as often they appropriate his researches without any mention at all. Any student, who has the opportunity of going through the learned commentaries of modern authors, and comparing them with the Catholic sources from which they have drawn without acknowledgment, will find how largely, how skilfully, and we must add dishonestly too, they have availed themselves of the labors of a Sanctius, a Pineda, and other old Jesuit interpreters, whose only aim, according to the great Protestant tradition, was to suppress all knowledge of the Bible and keep people in ignorance, because ignorance is the mother of devotion. It is astonishing to see how much in them of what is purely erudition, illustration from classic sources, etc., is borrowed from those old scholars. This, however, is nothing new. In the same way the great Jeremy Taylor has a name that is universally revered amongst pious Anglicans. But how few of them know that he struts before the world in borrowed plumes, and that whatever is valuable in his devotional works is taken from French and Italian Catholic authors. And the better to hide his theft, he soundly berates his benefactors. But we are wandering from our theme.

The Fathers were eminently moral theologians. Many of their works are complete treatises on some parts of moral theology, or casuistry. St. Augustine's two books, *De Mendacio* and *Contra Mendacium*, exhaust the whole subject of the eighth commandment. We might add the great names of Clement of Alexandria, St. Cyprian, the two saints Gregory, one of Nazianzum, the other of Nyssa, St. Basil, St. Ambrose, St. Gregory the Great, and a host of others. Not only their formal treatises, but even their familiar epistles contain an abundant fund of decisions of moral questions, cases, doubts, etc. The decrees of councils, too, such as those of Elvira, Ancyra, and Arles, all held before the triumph of the Church under Constantine, and the decretals of many early Popes lay

down not only practical rules, but likewise occasionally the theory of moral science.

But it was only in the days of the scholastics or soon afterwards, that moral theology began to assume something of its present shape. Perhaps the first to publish what may be called an approach to the regular courses of the present day, was the learned canonist St. Raymond de Pennafort, who wrote in the early part of the thirteenth century. He called his book a *Summa*, or Summary of Moral Doctrine, and this name was commonly adopted by all those who imitated him in the compiling of these summaries. The name of the author, or of the place where he was born, or where he taught, was generally added by way of distinction. Thus after the *Summa Raymundiana* we have the *Astesana*, written by a Franciscan of Asti in Piedmont; the *Monaldina*, by Monaldus, Archbishop of Benevento, about 1320; the *Pisanella*, called also *Magistrucchia* or *Bartolina*, from its author the Dominican, Bartholomew a Sancta Concordia, who was Professor of Canon Law at Pisa; the *Pacifica*, compiled by the Franciscan Fra Pacifico of Novara. John Baptist Trovamala, a Genoese Franciscan, gave to his work the fanciful title of *Summa Rosella*, for what reason we are ignorant. The most famous of them all, and the one most frequently reprinted in the latter half of the fifteenth century, was the *Summa Angelica*, of another Genoese Franciscan, John Angelus de Clavasio. The last of the series seems to have been the *Summa Sylvestrina*, so called from its author the Dominican Sylvester Prieras, the same who wrote against Luther at the beginning of his career. Some of these treatises were in alphabetical order, but not all; and De Wette (in his *History of Moral Doctrine*) is mistaken in ascribing such arrangement to the first of them all, the *Summa* of St. Raymond.

The modern plan of teaching moral theology in the shape of graduated treatises, beginning with Human Actions, Sin, Conscience, etc., and ending with the sacraments, dates from the Council of Trent, and is almost simultaneous with the transition of scholastic into dogmatic theology. The whole doctrine of conscience has acquired a greater importance and is more fully treated now than in former times; but principles never change. What is now taught in the schools, differs in nothing from what was taught by the Gospel and the Fathers. It is the same in substance, with the addition of scientific development. Among the books of this last epoch, there is none that surpasses, none perhaps that equals in clearness and scientific precision the *Medulla* of the Jesuit, Hermann Busenbaum. Hence eminent casuists, such as F. Claudius La Croix and St. Alphonsus have chosen it as a text for their comments:

That Laxism, so called, was ever organized into a system by theologians (especially Jesuits) of the Catholic Church, is one of those bold, wicked assertions, which we hear every day, but which cannot be substantiated by any testimony, and which must soon be recognized as false by any one who has the courage or the honesty to examine for himself. Like all errors, it found a few adherents; but it met with speedy and universal condemnation. And even the small number of its adherents; as well as the extent and nature of the error, has been grossly exaggerated by unscrupulous partisan zeal. Even the good nature of the Holy See has been imposed on, though its wisdom never could be at fault. Propositions, said to be from Catholic authors, were submitted to Rome for condemnation. They were condemned because they were false; and their condemnation implied this and nothing more. It gave no warrant to the malignity of those who pretended they could be found *taliter qualiter* in the obnoxious Jesuit theologians. But, though the Laxism im-

puted to a few be almost mythical, Rigorism on the contrary was very far from being a myth. It was a fearful reality in the Church, but not of her. What is said of the Jansenists and their famous project of Bourg-Fontaine may be no fact historically, but it is at least a parable that represents and vividly illustrates an over true fact. To do away with the sacraments, by making them impossible, is to overthrow the Church. And Jansenism labored to make the sacraments practically impossible. Therefore it sought to overthrow the Church of Christ. Whether it formulated this purpose in certain words, on such a day, in such a council-chamber at Bourg-Fontaine, is quite immaterial. When Jansenism, against its will and in spite of its lying protests of submission, was forcibly ejected from the house of God, a few of its craftier adherents managed to remain behind, some under the innocent delusion perhaps that certain Jansenistical points of faith or morals were not inconsistent with external Catholic communions. We will not, we presume not to judge them; since the Church, who is sole judge, has tolerated them. They were not heretics; for they professed—and we are willing to admit that many, perhaps most of them, were sincere—unlimited obedience to her authority. But their periodical outbursts of mistaken zeal for what they called “the purer” moral doctrine were a standing source of scandal to good Christians. In the Catholic Church there is a “Rigorism” which is not only allowed but admired. It is that of the saints, who prescribe for themselves a lofty, stern, inflexible standard of conduct, from which nothing can turn them aside. But they have the spirit of the Gospel; austere and rigid with themselves they deal gently with others. But our theological rigorists, as far as we have been able to study their lives, did not take after this saintly pattern. They were indulgent to themselves, while imposing the yoke on others. It was against these men, and others of unquestionable orthodoxy, the brothers Ballerini of Verona, “*par nobile fratrum*” in every other respect, against the Concinas, Patuzzis, Contensons, Bertis, and others of this stamp, that God raised up His holy servant Alphonsus about the middle of the last century. He was not, perhaps, a man of extraordinary talents; but he had the grace of sanctity, and special gifts beside, bestowed upon him by Almighty God for the special task. He was called by God to be a Teacher, a Doctor of the Church, as Pius IX. has lately declared in the technical language of her tribunals, in a most important period of her history, and he has faithfully and gloriously fulfilled the mission assigned him.

When we say that Father Konings, in the work before us, has laid down well and faithfully the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus, we consider it no ordinary praise. But he has done more. He has written for no general, abstract purpose, but for the special benefit of the American clergy. Accordingly, he has sought out and carefully brought together whatever there is in our civil laws or social customs that has a moral character, and has examined it by the doctrine of St. Alphonsus. The peculiar condition of the Church in this country, from our legislation and society—especially since the wide spreading of New England ideas, which have pervaded the willing West and sought to force themselves upon the reluctant South—often brings about difficulties and complications that never existed in Europe, certainly not in the days of St. Alphonsus. These Father Konings has scrutinized keenly and decided by the unerring principles of Catholic doctrine. As an instance, we may quote the vexed question of mixed education, which he treats, as far as we can judge, with wise discretion and sound theology. Elegance of style is not expected and would be out of place in a book of the

kind. Father Konings has taken the proper course. He writes with clearness and in a way to make himself intelligible to every reader.

We should like to say something of the system of Equi-probabilism, and the disputes that have grown out of it; and we know that several of our clerical readers have manifested their desire, that we should give some expression of opinion on this point. But we have sealed our lips, and have no inclination to obtrude our opinion, where wise men disagree. And we have a still better reason. It is strange enough, but it is nevertheless a painful fact, that there are some things about which one can scarcely write, short of a miracle, without wounding charity. We are either tempted, it would seem, to write in an angry spirit; or without any evil intention we offend others, and stir up in their souls the waves of angry passion. It may be said without hesitation that, on an average, more sins—material sins if you will—more breaches of charity have been committed by any one Catholic writer who has written on these vexed questions against other Catholics, than by all the theologians together who have waged controversial war with Protestantism for the last three hundred years. Why this should be so, is a problem beyond our grasp. But we feel reluctant to utter even one word which might give additional meaning and illustration to this wicked, shameful enigma. We have dipped into this polemic literature in our early days, have perhaps enjoyed it with the zest of a young student, but have thrown it aside long since, depressed, disheartened, and disgusted by these domestic dissensions. We have read all the documents laid before the Sacred Congregation, the *Summarium Additionale*, the *Vindiciæ Alphonsianæ*, the *Vindiciæ Ballerinianæ*, etc., and can only marvel that instead of going forth to meet the common enemy, brave and worthy soldiers of the cross should, in our own camp, *Iliacos intra muros*, deem it their duty or make it their choice to lift even a finger in fraternal strife. And we cannot but recall the noble words of Pius IX., in his letter to the Jesuit Fathers of Lyons: “*Utinam omnes qui pro Deo, religione et patria decertant, licet in iis quæ liberæ sunt disceptationis varias sequantur sententias, uno velut agmine facto unanimes irrumpant in solos veritatis osores ancipitisque et perniciosæ doctrinæ magistros: sed memores veteris et sapientis effati: Eadem propositio in ore catholici est catholica, in ore hæretici hæretica, properantibus commilitonibus non injicerent impedimenta, nec per clamosa et severiora judicia verbi alicujus aut sententiæ non satis perspicue proditæ, eorum auctoritatem et efficaciam apud honestos elevent.*” We have alluded to Father Anthony Ballerini’s work, but pass no judgment on it. We neither assail nor defend him. But we have known enough of this worthy man, of great learning and holy life, for the last forty years, to make it hard for us to believe that he would intentionally dishonor one of God’s saints.

THE LIFE OF OUR LIFE. By *Henry James Coleridge*, of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates. 1876.

This work is based on the Latin Harmony of the Gospels, published some years ago under the title *Vita Vitæ Nostræ Meditantibus Proposita*. A large amount of matter, however, has been added which is not to be found in the Latin edition.

The importance of studying what is commonly called the harmony of the Gospels, is not generally appreciated as highly as it should be. Many turn away from this study because of certain difficulties which meet them at the outset; many more fail to see the advantages that are claimed for it; others have a fear that the seeming discrepancies be-

tween the several Gospel accounts may turn out to be irreconcilable; while still others see no great good to be accomplished by their perfect reconciliation. But no Catholic, and no believer, indeed, in the inspiration of Sacred Scripture, can admit that there are discrepancies in the Gospel which are real contradictions, and not due merely to our imperfect knowledge. Moreover, the study of the harmony of the Gospel is not limited to the solution of difficulties. In addition to the refutation of objections that otherwise might be embarrassing, it throws fresh light upon the history of our Divine Lord's work upon earth, conduces to a clearer understanding of the whole plan and method and development of that work, and opens up more fully the interesting subject of the gradual formation of the Gospel history as we have it from the hands of the Church.

The objects of Father Coleridge's work are, therefore, very important. We need not say, in view of his widely known ability and learning, that he is eminently qualified for undertaking it. His book is not critical, in the technical sense of the word; it deals with results of critical researches and examinations rather than their processes. On this account it is likely to be more widely useful; for, while of great value to the clergy as a clear and careful digest of the results of Father Coleridge's own studies added to those of previous writers, it is also well adapted to the needs of intelligent laymen.

Father Coleridge does not enter upon any elaborate proof of the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospels. That and other topics preliminary to a "Harmony," he passes by, or only refers to briefly, as not lying strictly within the scope of his work. He says that we have a right to treat the four Gospels as the works of the authors whose names they bear, "mainly for two reasons, either of which is abundantly sufficient for all who will give the subject candid and serious consideration. The first of these reasons is that the four Gospels may be considered and dealt with on the same principles as the works of any other ancient writer, Cicero, Cæsar, or Seneca," and indeed that there are "no ancient writers, whose works come to us with half so much certainty, even on simply critical grounds." The second reason is that "that has happened in the case of the Gospels, which cannot be said to have happened in the case of any other books, except such as so far are like them in the peculiarity of having been the authoritative books of a society which has been spread over the whole world. . . . The perpetual influence and life, so to speak, of the Gospels, such as we have them in the Church, establish the truth that they are what they are called with a force of evidence quite as strong, to say the least, as that by which we know Rome to be Rome, or Athens to be Athens."

At the same time, while the author starts with certain assumptions, he employs none which have not been already worked out, and proved to be "reasonable conclusions by a series of writers whose works are in the hands of scholars."

The preface is an able discussion of matters preliminary to the immediate subject of the work. In this preface Father Coleridge gives a brief but lucid sketch of the history and circumstances attending the formation of the four Gospels. He shows that "the Gospel existed before it was written;" and that, too, not merely in the form of general tradition, a recollection more or less full and distinct of the events of our Saviour's life and of his acts and teachings, but also in the form of definite distinct instructions given by persons duly authorized by the Church; that whether or not it was the special office of those whom St. Paul speaks of as "evangelists," to relate and comment upon the incidents of

our Lord's life and His carefully recorded sayings, "it is clear that there must have been from the earliest days some such office and some such teaching, on which the practical system of Christian morality, the imitation of the virtues of our Lord considered as our Great Example, and the following out of His peculiar precepts and counsels of perfection must have been built. The Epistles of the Apostles evidently suppose a large range of practical, we may surely say very catechetical, teaching of this kind, and the basis on which this must have been built must have been the substance of the Gospels. . . . This may be considered the nucleus of what we now call the Gospel history. Even before it was committed to writing it would take shape, and form, and character, according to the persons who were its authoritative exponents, and the spiritual needs or even the controversial position, or again the national and social peculiarities of the community to which it was addressed. It would gradually become a history, or it would assume the character of a series of arguments from the fulfilment of prophecy, or, again, form a chain of evidences of miraculous power by which the teaching and mission of our Lord had been attested, or it would bring into prominence doctrinal truths concerning our Lord's person, according to circumstances of time, place, and person."

The examination into the special purposes of the evangelists in the construction of their respective Gospels, of their selection and treatment of topics with constant regard to those purposes, and the manner in which this influences, throughout, the plan and character of each Gospel, is thorough and able, and the results arrived at are stated with great clearness and precision. It would be interesting to follow our author; but we cannot attempt either a synopsis or indulge in quotations. The principles which should govern the Harmonist in his efforts to construct, as it were, a history of our Lord's life upon earth are then discussed and stated; and Father Coleridge here takes occasion to administer a just rebuke to German rationalistic critics and others of the same school who, "approaching the Gospels with their own peculiar notions of what is possible in nature and in history, have introduced the practice of cutting up the text of the Evangelists into small portions, and declaring on their own authority whence each portion comes, and what amount of credence of respect is to be attached to each." This method of criticism Father Coleridge justly styles "childish," and says that the only excuse "for such writers, if it be one, is that they are mere *littérateurs*, and believe too little to have any serious purpose or sense of responsibility in what they say."

In the main body of his work the author treats in the first chapter of "The Life of our Blessed Lord as independent of its records;" he then examines what are the divisions that may be made in tracing out our Saviour's life on earth. Besides the self-evident lines which separate off His infancy, and hidden life, previous to entering upon His Public Ministry, and again the Passion, and the Resurrection, with the forty days which preceded the Ascension, Father Coleridge finds "two distinct breaks which mark a change in our Lord's method of action, and these are sufficient to justify corresponding divisions in the narrative of His life." The first of these occurs at that point of His life when he first drew upon himself the decided enmity and persecution of the Jewish ecclesiastical authorities, by occasion of His teachings as to the Sabbath. There is a plain difference in His attitude towards them, and in their attitude towards Him from that time. The second of these divisions, and one which is even more obvious than the first, is at the point of the confession of St. Peter. It is only after that solemn

scene at which the first Apostle confessed the divinity of our Lord and received in return the great commission and office of being the Rock on which the Church was to be built, that our Lord began to speak either of His Church or of His passion. This transition is noticed directly by the three first Evangelists, and its influence is discernible even in the arrangement of St. John, who gives an almost equivalent confession of faith on the part of St. Peter, in answer to our Lord's question to the Apostles after the great discourse on the blessed sacrament in the synagogue at Capharnaum.

Separate chapters are devoted to the consideration of the "Earlier Mysteries of our Lord's Life," "The Infancy and Hidden Life as Related in the Gospels," "The First Period of our Lord's Public Life and the First Stage of our Lord's Ministry." After this follows the Harmony of the Gospels, for this first period. This is supplemented by a number of very valuable notes on the Harmonistic questions that arise in regard to this period.

The author then gives a chapter to the study of the second period of our Lord's Public Life, which is followed by a chapter on the "Second Stage of His Public Life, as related in the Four Gospels." The Harmony of the Gospels is then given as regards this second period, followed by numerous learned notes on Harmonistic questions. After this Father Coleridge devotes a chapter to a consideration of the "Theology of the Parables." This makes up the first of the two volumes, into which the work is divided.

The second volume opens with a study of the third period of our Lord's public life, followed by an exhibition of this third period as narrated in the four Gospels; after which comes the Harmony of the Gospels for the same period, followed by notes. The First Days of Holy Week, The Passion of our Lord, and the Resurrection and Ascension are studied and treated in a similar manner.

The work evinces ripe scholarship, careful and extensive research, and a profound study of our Saviour's life on earth. To persons who find it necessary to be prepared to answer the objections of cavillers, to those who wish to understand more clearly the historical connection of the events narrated in the Gospels, and to those who devoutly desire and strive to apprehend more deeply the spiritual significance of our Divine Lord's words and actions, the work will be of great value.

HOURS WITH JOHN DARBY. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1877. Pp. 250.

This book is of a piece with the latter years' effusions of Oliver Wendell Holmes, in the *Atlantic Monthly*, but it lacks the redeeming trait of that author's genuine wit-flashes. They are, both of them, of the same nature with the monologues of Professor Wilson in *Blackwood's Magazine*, written over the *nom de plume* of Christopher North. But neither of them has the healthy tone of the Professor's outpourings. He had in himself a rare combination of parts. He possessed the elasticity of a boy and the delicacy of a woman; and his writings were frequently as accurate as they were eloquent. But Dr. Garretson's book possesses a trait Christopher North was unequal to; and for this reason it ought to be according to Hegel's own heart. It is well known that Hegel made the principle of logic to consist in the reconciling of contradictions. *Hours with John Darby* practically illustrates how a man may read much, give his assent to all he reads, and still call himself consistent. It is a book of contradictions. Its title implies that it is merely recreative. But looking inside the covers, we find the weightiest subjects

treated with a strange mixture of levity and seriousness. The style is forced and unnatural. This writer seems to be continually sailing in a balloon. Prick his inflation and he falls to the earth with a bang and a crash. The book is intended for young men who have read and learned to think. A most worthy object. It undertakes to solve the problem of life. A sublime aim. The greater portion of it deals with woman, and the choice of a wife. A not inappropriate theme. It were well that our young men thought carefully and seriously upon the question of marriage before taking a step that renders their lives happy or miserable, a success or a failure. A good book on such a subject would not be out of place. But does not Dr. Garretson's suffice? This is what he counsels a young man to do with a wife, when he has one. "Handle a wife when she comes to thee, as a jewel is handled; keep her in soft places, that the gloss be not injured; hold her at length of arm, that the gleam may enter thy heart; wear her upon thy bosom, that thereby thou shalt thyself be made beautiful; gloat over thy possession in secret, because that a something so priceless belongs to thee," p. 15. All of which means what? Ask John Darby.

But it is not with such harmless nonsense as that we have quoted that we would occupy the pages of the *Review*, were it not that beneath it all we find a pernicious idea. Dr. Garretson is one of a class of writers who attempt to naturalize the supernatural and to rationalize the mysteries of Christianity. "Nothing different from a parrot in Christianity is an unlearned man; he cries Christ, Christ, and cries it glibly enough; but what can he know—except apprehensively—of the God which spake from the mouth of a carpenter's son? What can he know of that which leaves no question to be asked?" p. 240. On the same page he says: "The philosopher saves himself through Christ, for in this man he recognizes the fullest wisdom of the world; aye, recognizes in him demonstration,—the great riddle solved,—philosophy at fruition,—the study completed." "*In this man.*" There is no misprint here. Dr. Garretson believes himself to be as much of a God as he does the Saviour. In another place he says: "The difference between Christ and Plato was the difference between soul and brain," p. 227. And in another place he tells us: "The meaning of man is in what he does, and in what he becomes; in whether he denies the God and remains an animal, or denies the animal *and grows into the God*," pp. 107, 108. The italics are the reviewer's. This is identifying God with man: it is making a divinity of humanity; it is a total ignoring of the revelations of Christianity; it is reducing mystery to myth, and identifying faith with knowledge. The author is at no loss to let us know his meaning: "I would assert that Faith and Knowledge are one and the same thing," p. 106. Therefore he concludes that there is only one evil in the world, and that is ignorance. In speaking on this subject he throws out some ballast, and his balloon rises a few feet: "O Ignorance! let man execrate thee; thou, thou alone art death, and beside thee is there none other; the demon of affliction art thou to mankind, apart from thee exists no evil," p. 34. And lest this contradiction may seem only apparent or momentary he carries his assertion to its full length, and says there is no such thing as death. "No death, Lysias; never yet has death come into the world. To die, as man calls dying, is to change—only to change—is to pass from an old shell into one new and fresh; is to assume bright colors and gay attributes; is to lapse into some expression of the great thing called life; is to go to other office; is to follow the beckoning of nature that one may be where most needed; that one may be in that fashion best suited to a necessity.

. . . Heed thou, my scholar, it is the eternal principle of life, and not a body, not any body, which is real existence," pp. 37, 38. The outcome of all this, and pages of similar language is, that all men will find themselves transformed after death—"no death, Lysias," p. 35—into another form of existence, in much the same manner as the caterpillar becomes a butterfly. Perhaps man, too, is going to have wings with which he will be able to play around the solar orb or fly among the stars. How about reward or punishment? It will be all reward. There is no such thing as punishment. "As regards the matters of future rewards and punishments, . . . the author accepts, with Spinoza, that little regard is to be had for the religion of him whose service of his God is founded alone on such tenure," p. 250. This sentence gives us a better idea of the author's position. In its light the whole meaning of the book has dawned upon us. It is intended to bring euthanasia in death and inculcate respectability in life to the contented and lettered few, whose worldly means enable them to sail smoothly above the trials and annoyances of the common folk. We assure Dr. Garretson that it is all an illusion.

MANUAL OF THE CONFRATERNITY OF THE SACRED THIRST AND AGONY OF JESUS TO REPRESS INTEMPERANCE. By *Rev. Edward McColgan*, Pastor of St. Peter's Church, Baltimore, Md. Approved and Recommended by the Most Rev. J. Roosevelt Bayley, Archbishop of Baltimore.

Among all the Catholic associations which have been formed for the special purpose of cultivating the virtue of temperance and controlling the evil of drunkenness, there is none which commends itself more highly to our judgment than the "Confraternity of the Sacred Thirst." We have no confidence in associations which derive their strength solely from good resolutions unsupported by divine grace, accomplishing any lasting good, or permanently repressing, much less destroying, any form of evil. And, as regards intemperance, the mushroom organizations which have successively sprung into existence, and promised to do great things in the way of reforming drunkards and preventing drunkenness, but have died almost as soon as they were born, furnish to every thinking mind abundant evidence that more than the sentiments which can be called into exercise by appeals to the better feelings of the natural heart of man, and by associated efforts resting on a like basis, is needed to lessen and repress the admitted evils which spring from the inordinate use of spirituous liquors. The help of divine grace is necessary, and the frequent and devout use of the means by which that grace may be obtained.

The Confraternity of the Sacred Thirst recognizes and is based upon this truth. It owes its origin, we believe, to Father McColgan, the author of the work which we have placed at the head of these remarks. The first association of the kind, if we remember rightly, was formed in St. Peter's Church, Baltimore City, of which he is pastor. The idea was taken up by others, and specially by a number of the clergy in Ireland. About seven years ago Rev. Robert Kelly, S. J., regularly instituted the association in Ireland, with the permission of his superior and the approbation of his Eminence, Cardinal Cullen. Similar associations were formed also in England and the United States; and on the 30th of August, 1874, the Holy Father, Pius IX., on the report of the Secretary of the Congregation of the Propaganda "ordered the association to be erected into a Confraternity under the direction of the Rev. Father Provincial of the Society of Jesus for the time being in Ireland, with the power of appointing a substitute, and of aggregating to this

Confraternity other religious bodies or congregations, and of communicating to them all the privileges and graces granted to the Confraternity." To this Confraternity his Holiness has granted a great number of special indulgences, both partial and plenary.

It is not necessary to take the total abstinence pledge in order to become a member of this Confraternity, but total abstinence societies can be affiliated to it.

We have entered into these details the more fully, from the conviction that this Confraternity is one of the most reliable and efficient, if not *the* most reliable and efficient organization existing to combat with and repress the sin of intemperance. It is a religious organization; it relies not on virtuous resolutions made in dependence solely on the strength of the natural will; nor on sentimentalism, the momentary excitement of feeling, or the influences connected simply with voluntary associations. Its weapons and sources of strength are prayer, religious services, devotions, self-mortification, and the exercise of charity, all connected with frequent resort to the sacraments of the Church. While, therefore, it has all the power and efficiency of ordinary temperance or total abstinence societies, and more, it is free from the dangers and objections which, in the opinion of many, attach to those societies. Without pronouncing any judgment upon the soundness or unsoundness of those objections, we simply remark that total abstinence societies will secure additional strength and efficiency in carrying out their laudable purposes by aggregating themselves to this Confraternity.

The Manual furnishes full information on this subject, and also in regard to the nature, rules, etc., of the organization. It contains, too, much other edifying and devotional matter, and is also a very good manual of devotion, both for private and in church services.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE BIBLE VINDICATED. By *Rev. C. O'Brien*. Charlottetown, P. E. I.: Bremner Brothers, 1876.

The title of this new book might raise expectations in the mind of the reader which the work itself cannot fully satisfy. The Bible contains the revelation of God; philosophy follows merely human reason as its guide. Holy Scripture never contradicts reason, and always supposes it, because faith itself supposes it. But the method followed in the Bible is entirely different from that of philosophy. The Bible contains the word of God to man, and consequently it must speak with divine authority. Philosophy relies on the authority of human reason, infallible in its own way, it is true, but grounded on an entirely different basis.

The book before us contains only an ordinary course of philosophy, and consequently refers to the reason of man for the development of its various theses. Nothing else could be done in such a work, and we are glad to say that it has been well done. First, it is complete, with the exception of its omission to treat on logic, of which nothing is said, probably because of its being considered a preliminary study. But all through the work the relation of philosophy to natural religion is solidly established, so as to guard against the danger attending studies of this kind. In this regard the doctrine set forth in the work compares favorably with that of other Catholic elementary treatises of philosophy, published in recent times with the highest approbation.

This is true, also, of the development given, in *part second*, to the metaphysical branch of psychology, and in *part third* to the important metaphysical branch of ontology. It is well in this age to oppose steadily the efforts of a large school of pretended philosophers to set aside

entirely everything above physics, and to regard as of no value every object of study that is not referable to mere matter. For this reason the publication of such books as this should be warmly encouraged.

The author states in the *preface* that "it is not a class-book; it is rather intended as a book in the reading of which any intelligent person may find profit." The idea is a good one, and to make the speculations of Catholic philosophy accessible and pleasant even to all educated readers, is most praiseworthy. The present volume, however, is only a first attempt, and for the purpose intended is too short and lacking in sufficient development to render the treatment of the various topics clear and entirely satisfactory. A text-book intended for students may be brief, because the professor is expected to explain what is obscure. But it is different with a volume thrown upon the public, and left to the meditations of people who are not well versed in those arid and difficult subjects.

We would advise the author, if he should publish a second edition of his work, to make it at least double in size. He might also speak more clearly in regard to innate ideas, of which he seems to admit two, and to reject all others. Why that choice, and why any? He might also examine more thoroughly how far the criterion of certainty is subjective only, and whether objectivity must be granted it? Then will naturally come the question, is the dynamic theory with respect to extension perfectly demonstrated? A general revision of the style of the work would also probably result in some improvement. On such a subject as the author treats of, the style, it is true, should not be exuberant or florid, but it should be refined in its simplicity.

But taking the book as it is, it is an important one, and deserves a favorable reception from the public. If all Catholics, nay, all Christians, knew how far philosophy corroborates, or rather settles, the principles of natural religion, the tendency to atheism and materialism, so prevalent in our age, would be to a great extent checked, if not entirely arrested. The noble questions long ago discussed, and brightly and strongly illustrated by the labors of our schoolmen, chiefly of St. Thomas, would carry the day, if they were lucidly explained in modern phraseology, and placed before readers in all their strength rendered more attractive by a plain but tasteful style. So might it be!

CREATION AND COSMOGONY. By *Rev. Dr. Theodore Appel*. Reprinted from the *Mercersburg Review* for January, 1877. 8mo., pp. 56.

This essay is written in the spirit of true science and criticism. Its scope is commendable. The canons of biblical interpretation made use of by the author are correct. It is perfectly true that God cannot say one thing in His revelation and another, its contradictory, when He speaks in the cosmos. Both orders of truth must harmonize. When contradiction appears, we may rest assured, it is not in science as such, but rather in our misapprehension of some truths of science.

The author strikes the right keynote of discussion when he at once and without equivocation lays down that the whole doctrine of creation is involved in the first verse of Genesis: "*In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,*" p. 2. We like the manliness that shows its banner from the start. And we are glad to find the author display the true colors of Christian belief upon that all-important issue. He thus proves himself one of the faithful few who do not allow themselves to be carried off in the whirl of scientific novelties which is just now making so many dizzy. He takes this proper view of the Mosaic account in contrast with the mythical ones of primitive peoples: "To us it seems that it requires only a small amount of reflection to

perceive that it rises up immeasurably above the cosmogonies of the nations in dignity and truthfulness; and that, instead of being one of many other myths, *it is their proper climax or truth to which they all look, and of which they are nothing more than variations, corruptions, or the dim shadows floating on the surface of human consciousness,*" p. 13.

But when Dr. Appel places his sense upon the words, "created from nothing," we do not see our way clearly enough to follow him. He says: "These ideas, by which the universe existed potentially in the Divine mind from all eternity, were, however, not simply the models according to which the world and its contents were fashioned, for that were Platonism; but their foundations, *their very substance*, the spiritual basis on which the entire phenomenal world rests," p. 8. The italics are ours. We think that in this sentence the author falls into the Pantheism he is otherwise so careful to avoid. Everything in the Divine mind is God. But if the ideas in the Divine mind are the "very substance" of the world and its contents, at the same time that they are God, then are they both God and creature, and on this supposition Pantheism were correct. A glance at St. Thomas would have cleared up the Doctor's ideas on this vexed point. He would there have learned that matter without form is a mere potentiality, and that it is the form that gives it actuality. This idea would have aided him in conceiving the cosmos as created from nothingness. The "form" of the scholastics is identical with the "force" of modern scientists. But, in giving actuality to existence, God makes it the embodiment of a created ideal, fashioned after the uncreated ideal in His divine intelligence. The uncreated ideal can in no sense exist in the created real. It is the archetype after which the latter is fashioned. But everything in that latter is creature, except the power by which it passed from not-being to being, and by which it is still preserved from lapsing into its original nothingness. Many of the errors of the day are based upon the misconception of the ideal in the Divine mind, and the identifying it with that in the human intellect, and in objective realities as distinct existences.

With the exception of this point, we see little or nothing to disapprove of in the essay under review, whilst there are many things in it really fresh and brilliant. The whole shows learning and a well-trained and thoughtful mind.

TWO THOUSAND YEARS AFTER; OR A TALK IN A CEMETERY. By *John Darby*, Author of "Thinkers and Thinking," "Odd Hours of a Physician," etc. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger. 1876. 12mo., pp. 106.

This is a singular little work. The author seems to have devoted much attention to it, and to have written it with best intentions. He thinks that it will help earnest inquirers after truth, and guide their steps out of a skepticism, which is so to speak involuntary, and out of which they would cheerfully see their way. He even seems a believer in Christianity and the Bible. But this only shows how loosely Christian faith may be claimed outside of the Church, and how consistent with the gravest errors in philosophy and theology may be the Christian name and belief, if they are sundered from due respect to her authority.

The writer has adopted the old philosophical form of dialogue, his chief interlocutors being Socrates, who represents the teacher, and Cebes, who acts the part of inquirer and disciple. In spite of the authority of the ancients, we do not believe that this is the best form of investigating and expounding truth. There is in conversational flow many a hiding-place for weakness of argument, which would not be found in direct reasoning by syllogism. And then our author has a way of using Chris-

tian words, but which in his mouth have no Christian meaning. He speaks of mind, but he means thereby a function of organized matter; he speaks of the soul, but it is a part of the All-soul; of creation, but it is no act presupposing divine power. He speaks of Christ, but it is not the eternal Son of God that he sees in Him; his pages are full of God's name, but He is the imaginary monster of the Pantheistic sects, not the God whom Christians worship, not even the God of natural theology. When he tells us of man's immortality he means nothing more than his absorption into the great WHOLE. He might as well call it with the French infidel, "the great NOTHING."

He believes in nothing but Matter and Force, and bows down at their shrine, as if they had succeeded in ousting the true God from His place as Creator and Arbiter of the universe. It is a great deal harder to believe in Force and thinking Matter than it is to believe in God and the spirituality of the soul. But no devout Catholic swallows his creed half as blindly or unreasoningly as the men who, scouting the idea of God and revelation, accept the incomprehensible absurdities of modern philosophy so-called. Instead of indulging in philosophical speculations that weary the heart and bewilder the understanding, let our author study the great FACT of Revelation. It needs no atomic philosophy to discover it. It stares the world in the face, and cannot by any ingenuity be hidden or set aside. Its truth or falsity can be measured by the rules of evidence that guide our courts of law. If it be false, human life and the world are a dreary void which no philosophy can fill. If it be true, God will one day judge mankind by that same revealed law, and by that only. By it we shall stand or fall. To fear God is not degrading to man, but, as the Psalmist says, is the starting-point of all true wisdom.

A *certain* fact overthrows all opposite theories. If the fact of Revelation *can* be established—the Catholic Church not only thinks so but claims to be sure of it, and hosts of witnesses have not only spoken and sworn, but died to attest it—it is the death-sentence of all the false philosophy that desolates the moral and religious world. In that case, the Lord, and He alone is our God, not the imaginary God of Socrates, Cebes, and John Darby, but the God of Sinai and of Calvary; and matter, force, and the *Welt-seele* are idolatrous figments. Even a prudent Pagan should investigate so far at least as to make sure of his deities before adoring them.

THE FAITH OF OUR FATHERS: Being a plain Exposition and Vindication of the Church founded by our Lord Jesus Christ. By *Rt. Rev. James Gibbons, D.D.*, Bishop of Richmond, and Administrator Apostolic of North Carolina. Third edition, revised and corrected. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1877. 12mo., pp. 438.

The whole country, Protestant and Catholic, owes a debt of gratitude to the good bishop for this excellent book. What must forcibly strike even the average Protestant reader is its tone, so honest, so candid, so gentle, all of which is in such marked contrast with the ordinary polemical literature of the day. How is it, we may ask, that whilst our divines write against error, or defend the Church, in such a spirit of love and gentleness, Protestant controversialists on the other hand cannot attack the Church or dispute her claims without losing their temper and heaping upon her head scurrilous language and foul abuse? This is no trifling question, but one well worthy the attention of all reasonable, soberminded men in the various Protestant denominations. Even the apostate Dr. Schulte, whose book has been noticed in the present number of the *Review*, has been compelled to make the same remark, though he himself is not a whit better than the rest of the anti-Catholic tribe.

"They (Catholics)," he says, "look upon us with suspicion, when we meet them in the arena of theological disputation; and *well they may*. Do not our best Protestant controversialists, men whom we regard as patterns in every Christian walk, seem to become inflated with bigotry and seized with insane frenzy, as soon as they enter the field of controversy with Roman Catholics? Is it not the settled custom to apply to the Pope and the Roman Church the most opprobrious epithets?" (Schulte's *Roman Catholicism*, p. 38.)

Bishop Gibbons's book is a model of religious controversy. It has the vigor of Bossuet and Milner clothed with the sweetness and evangelical spirit of Fenelon and St. Francis de Sales. We know well the class of men for whom the bishop principally wrote; and he could not, without the aid of inspiration, have more happily succeeded in accomplishing the purpose that he intended. Hence we are not surprised to learn that twenty thousand copies of the book have been sold already, and that fresh orders in great number have been pouring in upon the publishers from every part of the country and even from Great Britain. The book will lead many to the knowledge of the truth, and will be a crown of glory for its author both in this world and in the next.

ROMAN LITANIES IN HONOR OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY. Compiled and arranged by *Edwin F. MacGonigle*, Professor of Gregorian Chant, St. Charles's Seminary, Overbrook, Pa. Philadelphia: J. M. Armstrong, Musical Typographer, 1877, 4to., pp. 64.

It is a fortunate thing for the American Catholic Church that Prof. MacGonigle should have conceived the idea of publishing these litanies for the benefit of church choirs and also for the purpose of domestic psalmody. It is equally fortunate that one, of his singular gifts, rare taste and resplendent musical talents, should have had the charge of selecting and arranging them for publication. The selection and the arrangement are what might have been expected from Mr. MacGonigle's taste, skill, and experience. The melodies are not intricate or complicated. They are simple, but noble and majestic in their simplicity, and stir up devotion in the soul. To any one who finds in them some difficulty, from being unacquainted with the *style* of Roman music (which is more a matter of tradition than written rules), or from lacking the guidance of an experienced *maestro*, we must say, let them not be discouraged if they fail to appreciate them at the first trial. Let them try again; but above all let them remember two things: first, to approach this music in a devotional spirit; and, secondly, to avoid drawling. What may suit one of Watts's hymns will never suit a Roman litany. There lies hid in them a loving, cheerful strain of piety which never can be evoked by one who should sing them in the dreary fashion that some consider essential to sacred music.

We are glad to learn that Professor MacGonigle intends, if the present work meets with sufficient encouragement, to publish some choice masses, mottets, and psalms out of his Roman musical treasures. None could be more competent for such a task.

CONCILII PLENARII BALTIMORENSIS II. In Ecclesia Metropolitana Baltimorensi a die vii. ad diem xxi. Octobris, A.D. MDCCCLXVI, habiti et a Sede Apostolica recogniti Acta et Decreta. Editio altera mendis expurgata. Excudebat Joannes Murphæ Summi Pontificis atque Archiepiscopi Baltimorensis Typographus. Baltimore MDCCCLXXVII. Royal octavo, pp. 311.

Mr. Murphy, in a brief and satisfactory preface, informs his readers of his reasons for publishing this new edition. We are glad to see this practice revived. He only imitates the example of the Aldi, and other

great printers of other days. And well he may tread in their footsteps, for he has done for the glory and advancement of Catholic typography amongst us what was done by the Aldi and Juntas for Venice, the Plantini for Antwerp, and other men of typographical renown for other places.

Of the two editions that preceded this, one seems to have been too scanty, the other too full and bulky for the use of students. The former lacked documents, which were necessary to give completeness to the work. The present proposes to strike the happy mean, omitting what can be dispensed with, and retaining all documents, decrees, etc., that are necessary to a full illustration of the text. As far as we have been able to see, the book is singularly free from typographical errors.

The work is got up in the usual style, which has won for Mr. Murphy praise and admiration at home and abroad; and to which he refers, as justly as modestly, in his preface. The first edition, of which this will be a fac-simile, as far as possible, was a magnificent volume, of which we have heard the highest praises in Europe from professional men, and in the halls of the prelates and princes of the Roman Church.

TRANSFER OF ERIN; OR, THE ACQUISITION OF IRELAND BY ENGLAND. By *Thomas C. Amory*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1877.

A pretentious book, of no merit as a history, based upon the notion that the long-continued resistance of the people of Ireland to English aggression "had not its root" in religious or patriotic sentiments, but "was little else than a struggle to acquire or retain property and possession of the soil"—a notion too preposterously false to need refutation.

A POPULAR LIFE OF THE HOLY FATHER, POPE PIUS IX., DRAWN FROM THE MOST RELIABLE AUTHORITIES. By the *Rev. Richard Brennan, A.M.*, Pastor of St. Rose's Church, New York. Benziger Brothers: New York, Cincinnati, and St. Louis, 1877.

A work of real merit and interest, "popular" in the best sense of the word,—its adaptation to all classes of persons.

THE COMPLETE OFFICE OF HOLY WEEK, according to the Roman Missal and Breviary, in Latin and English. New edition, revised and enlarged. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 12mo., pp. 562.

The Same, in smaller type. Same Publishers.

MAJOLICA AND FAYENCE. ITALIAN, SICILIAN, MAJORCAN, HISPANO-MORESQUE, AND PERSIAN. By *Arthur Beckwith*. With Photo-Engraved Illustrations. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1877.

A HISTORY OF MARYLAND, UPON THE BASIS OF MCSHERRY. By *Henry Onderdonk, A.M.* Second Revised and Enlarged Edition. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., pp. 360.

LAST SEVEN WORDS OF JESUS ON THE CROSS. By a *Passionist Missionary Priest*. Permissu Superiorum. New York: P. O'Shea, Publisher, 1877.

Notices of the above-mentioned books were prepared, but must be omitted from want of space. A number of other important books have reached us too late for this number of the *Review*. They will receive attention in due time.

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